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DISORDERS OF SYMBOLIC THINKING DUE TO LOCAL LESIONS OF THE BRAIN.

BY R. MOURGUE.

NOUS admettrons ici comme un résultat acquis de la pensée scientifique contemporaine que les troubles de l'expression verbale de la pensée, les seuls que nous désirions envisager ici, auxquels, pour suivre la tradition, nous conservons le terme général d'*aphasie*, ne peuvent nullement être ramenés à des pertes d'images en relation avec des lésions de prétendus centres étroitement spécialisés. Considérant ce point de vue de *psychologie structurale* comme définitivement périmé, nous en tiendrons au point de vue de la *psychologie fonctionnelle* tel qu'il a été établi par les travaux, issus de points de vue différents, mais concordants dans leurs résultats généraux de Hughlings Jackson, Bergson, P. Marie, Von Monakow, A. Pick, etc. M. Head vous a exprimé son point de vue sur la question[1]; il n'y a rien à ajouter à sa démonstration si rigoureuse.

En admettant donc ce point de vue, qui tend à s'imposer de plus en plus, nous nous demanderons en faisant seulement appel à l'observation la plus immédiate, et, lorsque cela sera possible, à l'auto-observation vécue des malades, s'il est vrai, comme on l'a dit, que les troubles de l'expression verbale dus à des lésions cérébrales soient les plus propres à nous faire entrevoir la nature de la pensée. Dans cette recherche nous croyons qu'il faut se placer résolument sur le terrain de la *psychologie fonctionnelle*, comme l'avait fait Hughlings Jackson, qui, ici encore, fut un grand précurseur et devança l'application, si à la mode aujourd'hui, en Allemagne, de la *psychologie de la pensée* à la neuropathologie.

En effet, si on se place avec certains auteurs, héritiers de la psychologie des idéologues, au *point de vue structural*, on en arrive à dire que pensée et langage s'équivalent strictement et que, en conséquence, tout aphasique présente un affaiblissement intellectuel. Cette métaphysique nominaliste est d'usage courant, encore à l'heure actuelle, chez certains neurologistes. Remarquons, en outre, qu'elle caractérise le complexe des phénomènes étudiés uniquement par son côté négatif, c'est-à-dire ignore le principe

[1] Le lecteur devra se rapporter pour l'exposé intégral des idées de M. Head au mémoire suivant: "Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech" (Linacre lecture for 1920), *Brain*, Part 2, vol. 43 (July, 1920).

d'Hughlings Jackson, que la maladie, par les symptômes qu'elle présente, n'est pas l'expression de symptômes négatifs, ce qui n'a pas de sens, mais est la manifestation des degrés inférieurs de l'activité mentale. Or parcourons, par exemple, l'auto-observation du Dr Saloz père, de Genève, qui fut atteint d'aphasie totale suivie de guérison[1]. Ce malade a fort justement noté l'indépendance de la pensée et du langage, lorsqu'il écrit:

> Dans l'aphasie verbale, la persistance (ou la persévération) du souvenir du *son* du mot correct (ou de la lettre) n'implique pas la conservation de sa notion compréhensive, c'est pourquoi je dis qu'il y a toujours à ce moment-là, dans l'aphasie verbale, un déchet plus ou moins fort de l'intelligence du phénomène et par conséquent du malade lui-même.

M. Naville observe, en passant, que le Dr Saloz illustre ici les deux concepts allemands du *Wortlautbegriff* et du *Wortsinnverständniss*.

Par contre, l'absence d'évocation du mot n'implique nullement l'absence de ce que le malade appelle '*l'idée intuitive*' de ce mot:

> J'insiste de nouveau, dit-il, afin de mieux faire comprendre ma pensée, que chez l'aphasique entaché de surdité verbale *relative*, il existe en tout cas une sorte de paraphasie incomplète (comme chez moi, par exemple) caractérisée *par le sentiment de la conservation quand même de l'idée intuitive du mot plus ou moins correctement énoncé*[2], mais avec perte partielle du souvenir de son émission *non appropriée à la circonstance*, ce qui donne très souvent au discours du dit aphasique cet air embarrassé, bourru, inquiet et souvent malheureux, parce que, sentant lui-même l'insuffisance de ses propres moyens de compréhension de la notion du mot formé, il est toujours tourmenté par le sentiment d'oublier une partie de ses éléments, ce qui lui procure l'impression que l'observateur ne peut le comprendre, ce qui arrive en effet très fréquemment[3].

Nous n'avons rapporté les deux remarques précédentes que pour mieux marquer l'indépendance globale des deux processus du langage et de la pensée. Nous tenterons tout à l'heure d'arriver à une formule plus précise. Pour cela, faisons encore appel à l'auto-observation du Dr Saloz, et essayons de mettre en relief le complexe de symptômes qui reparaissent le plus souvent sous sa plume, ce qui, de son point de vue d'aphasique, constitue le point cardinal de son affection:

> J'ai eu souvent l'impression que je tenais la lettre, la syllabe ou le mot en *puissance*[4], mais par le fait d'un *accroc intempestif*, les voies psychologiques ont été subitement comprimées, déviées, oblitérées, coudées, etc., ou peut-être inhibées temporairement

[1] F. Naville, "Mémoires d'un médecin aphasique. Auto-observation et notes psychologiques du Dr Saloz père, de Genève, atteint d'aphasie totale suivie de guérison," *Archives de psychologie*, t. XVII, mai, 1918.

[2] Souligné par nous.

[3] *Loc. cit.* pp. 17, 18.

[4] Souligné par nous.

dans certaines circonstances. Il en résulte souvent qu'à la place du mot, de la syllabe et surtout de la lettre initiale, c'est un autre élément qui vient les remplacer, ce qui donne au discours une allure souvent incompréhensible et baroque, et par suite un cachet de timidité et de mélancolie: "*Je ne suis jamais dans le cas de savoir au préalable si je peux m'exprimer ou non*[1,2]."

Et ailleurs:

Quelque temps plus tard, je ne pouvais pas avoir le mot de *marasquin*, et je disais toujours *maraquecin* ou *mascarin*, sachant que ce mot commence par un *m*, mais ne pouvant pas avoir le mode de succession des différentes lettres du mot, je recherchais toujours les voies pathologiques resserrées, comprimées, tortueuses, oblitérées, coudées, obstruées, des tubes, des fibres et des cellules nerveuses qui se trouvaient dans le département de mon aphasie afin de les déboucher, de les redresser et de les découder. Je faisais de très grands efforts pour remettre ces voies à l'état de correction; je sentais très bien que la lettre, les syllabes et le mot allaient me revenir comme un écho lointain qui se rapproche toujours plus, jusqu'à ce que j'aie pu trouver effectivement le mot cherché. Alors j'ai eu comme le sentiment d'un effort fructueux et fécond de détente[3].

De même:

Quand j'ai commencé à lire, j'ai dû débuter naturellement par les lettres de l'alphabet. Je me souviens très bien qu'au début, la lettre ne me disait rien, puis, plus tard, qu'il y avait des lettres que je ne pouvais pas avoir, surtout *b, c, f, g, l, m, n, p, r, t, v.* J'étais souvent obligé de recommencer l'*a, b, c,* pour avoir une lettre. *J'ai eu aussi une difficulté extraordinaire pour avoir les diphthongues. J'ai encore souvent le sentiment qu'il y a entre la lettre, la syllabe et le mot, une désharmonie que l'on ne peut pas vaincre facilement*....J'avais toujours l'impression d'une difficulté énorme à suivre ma voie en ligne droite. Il me semblait surtout que des accidents multiples se produisaient pour entraver la bonne marche du phénomène psychologique, tels que accrocs, pannes, retards, déviations, retours en arrière, compressions, resserrements, dilatations, vagues vaso-motrices, inhibition, etc.; phénomènes que le psychologue non prévenu attribuerait à un défaut de compréhension, ce qui équivaut pour le profane à une déchéance intellectuelle...[4].

Le Dr Forel, dont les travaux sur le système nerveux et les fourmis sont bien connus, et qui a également relaté l'auto-observation des légers troubles du langage dont il a été atteint à la suite d'une lésion cérébrale très vraisemblablement circonscrite du cerveau, fait des remarques exactement superposables aux précédents:

En définitive, dit-il, je peux prononcer tous les mots, en parlant avec une lenteur suffisante ou en scandant. Mais certaines consonnes, par exemple *s, t,* viennent plus difficilement; à ce moment je ressens par l'introspection un effort de la parole fortement inhibiteur. Celui-ci est souvent si grand, surtout lorsque je suis un peu excité et que j'ai le désir de parler plus vite, que j'applique presque involontairement les doigts de la main gauche contre la lèvre inférieure, pour en extirper, pour ainsi dire,

[1] *Idem.* [2] *Ibidem*, p. 13. [3] *Loc. cit.* p. 15.
[4] *Loc. cit.* pp. 13, 14. Souligné par l'auteur des mémoires.

les consonnes en question. Cependant je ne vois pas du tout que ce phénomène ait aucun rapport avec une contraction musculaire quelle qu'elle soit. Car (1°) la langue et la mâchoire ont leurs mouvements entièrement libres, et (2°), quelques minutes après, par le repos ou à l'occasion d'un autre mot, ou en chantant, je peux prononcer facilement la même consonne, ce qui ne serait pas le cas s'il y avait contracture musculaire. C'est pourquoi je peux considérer les résistances, que je ressens fortement, par introspection, lorsque je parle, sous forme d'inhibitions, comme d'origine cérébrale (centrale) et non comme les conséquences de contractures musculaires[1].

Forel interprète ses propres troubles comme relevant d'une inhibition de l'*ecphorie des engrammes*. Nous pensons que cette interprétation est exacte mais trop générale, le langage objectif de Semon manquant de précision.

A première vue, il semblerait qu'il s'agisse ici d'un phénomène analogue à l'exemple que nous avons emprunté à l'auto-observation du Dr Saloz, où le processus parcouru pour arriver à la prononciation correcte du mot '*marasquin*' *semble* calqué sur un processus mnémonique; mais l'hypothèse simple de l'oubli ne peut, de l'aveu même de Forel, s'appliquer à son cas, puisque, comme le remarque aussi le Dr Saloz (remarque banale d'ailleurs) le même mot ou les mêmes consonnes qui ne peuvent être retrouvés à un moment donné le sont, quelques instants après, soit par le moyen du chant, du rythme ou tout simplement du repos.

Il nous semble qu'ici il s'agit d'une atteinte de ce que A. Pick appelle les éléments '*musicaux*' du langage. Nous croyons qu'il serait d'un grand intérêt philosophique, comme nous le verrons, de nous demander si ces éléments '*musicaux*' ne constitueraient pas une partie seulement d'une fonction cérébrale plus générale ou plutôt plus étendue. Suivant toujours d'aussi près que possible les faits cliniques, voici les phénomènes qui nous ont amené à nous poser cette question. Forel remarque, dans son auto-observation que ses facultés de travail n'ont pas baissé sensiblement, une volonté inébranlable de lutter contre les conséquences de son apoplexie ayant atteint chez lui son plein épanouissement. Remarquons que M. Forel est biologiste; cela a son importance. C'est par une remarque exactement semblable que débutent les Mémoires du Dr Saloz, qui, ainsi qu'on a pu s'en apercevoir par les passages que nous en avons cités, témoignent d'une certaine pénétration. Or Forel, qui, *au cours de son affection a pu découvrir une espèce nouvelle de fourmis*, fait sur lequel nous attirons tout particulièrement l'attention, était devenu

[1] A. Forel, "Subjektive und induktive Selbstbeobachtung über psychische und nervöse Tätigkeit nach Hirnthrombose (oder Apoplexie)," *Journ. f. Psychol. u. Neurol.*, Bd. 21, 1915, p. 434.

incapable d'exécuter la plus simple opération d'arithmétique. C'est le trouble intellectuel qu'il met au premier plan de ses préoccupations:

Avant tout, le calcul et surtout le simple fait d'additionner m'était particulièrement pénible. Je n'ai jamais été un calculateur virtuose, parce que des pensées intercurrentes avaient pour effet de me distraire; mais maintenant la chose devenait tout à fait grave. Je confondais fréquemment les chiffres à retenir avec ceux à écrire ou je confondais les colonnes à additionner et autres absurdités pareilles. Je remarquais toujours la chose aussitôt, mais j'avais la plus grande peine à ne pas faire toujours des fautes de ce genre. Je faisais des omissions particulièrement nombreuses en comptant, ce qui me causait beaucoup d'ennuis...[1].

Forel remarque, en outre, qu'il omettait des lettres en écrivant, ne pouvait dire s'il avait tourné ou non le bouton de l'électricité, si la porte était ouverte ou fermée.

Parti des troubles classiquement dénommés aphasiques, nous pensons qu'il est temps actuellement de montrer que les phénomènes cités en dernier lieu ne paraissent pas d'une nature essentiellement hétérogène. D'une part, en effet, on peut très bien admettre que les troubles du calcul ne sont que l'expression d'une atteinte du *langage intérieur*, celui-ci se manifestant par des *mouvements naissants d'articulation*. Le calculateur prodige Inaudi était incapable de calculer, quand on empêchait les mouvements de la langue. D'autre part, d'une façon plus générale, et, sans qu'il y ait contradiction avec ce point de vue, il nous semble que les phénomènes aphasiques (et par là nous entendons les deux formes distinguées, dès 1868, par Hughlings Jackson, et appelées plus tard *aphasie motrice et aphasie sensorielle*) relèvent d'un trouble fondamental qu'on pourrait appeler la perte (plus ou moins complète, plus ou moins élective, nous reviendrons là-dessus) de la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition de l'intelligence*. Particulièrement suggestives à cet égard nous paraissent les recherches récentes de Van Woerkom, entreprises d'ailleurs dans un but et avec des conclusions tout à fait différentes des nôtres[2].

Il s'agit d'un cas d'aphasie type Broca en voie de régression, chez lequel le neurologiste hollandais a mis en lumière une perturbation de l'orientation spatiale (en l'absence, bien entendu, de toute lésion de l'appareil vestibulaire) et de ce qu'il appelle la notion du temps et du nombre des plus curieuses. Voici quelques passages de cette observation. Elle avait attiré notre attention avant que nous ayons eu connaissance

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 429.

[2] Van Woerkom, "Sur la motion de l'espace (le sens géométrique). Sur la notion du temps et du nombre. Une démonstration de l'influence du trouble de l'acte psychique de l'évocation sur la vie intellectuelle." (*Revue neurologique*, 1919, No. 2.)

du mémoire de M. Head, où sont rapportés certains faits du même genre. Voici donc ce que dit M. Van Woerkom:

A ma demande, le malade me montre la main droite, mais il est embarrassé quand je le prie de me donner la main gauche. Invité à porter la main droite vers le côté gauche ou le côté droit, il se trompe continuellement. Assis à côté de lui, je mets entre nous deux une règle et je l'invite à placer une pièce de monnaie soit de mon côté, soit du côté de la règle: même après démonstration, la notion des deux côtés lui reste vague....Il ne sait pas s'il va en haut ou en bas quand il descend l'escalier. Ce même trouble est constaté pour la direction sagittale....Invité à mettre une règle à quelque distance, mais de la même manière qu'une autre règle, qui est mise devant lui, il fait des efforts multiples, mais paraît incapable de trouver la direction parallèle; en outre, le malade rapproche, malgré mes protestations, sa règle de la mienne, de sorte que bientôt les deux règles sont superposées....Je présente à mon malade trois sortes de papiers, les uns en forme de carré, les autres en forme de cœur, les autres ronds; il est incapable de les mettre deux à deux malgré la reconnaissance des formes....Je place devant lui un grand carton et je l'invite à mettre trois allumettes de telle sorte qu'elles soient aussi distantes que possible. Il avance une pièce vers le bord supérieur, mais au lieu d'avancer une autre dans la direction opposée, il la fait suivre la première.

Il faut remarquer que, dans la vie quotidienne, ce trouble ne se manifeste que pour un spectateur attentif. De même, au point de vue de la notion du temps, voici ce que M. Van Woerkom a remarqué:

En battant un iambe ou un trochée (succession inverse), le malade ne peut pas se rendre compte de la différence de succession. Par contre, il a conservé le rythme de la marche, qu'il battait comme soldat. Malgré le fait que le malade nomme les jours de la semaine et les mois de l'année sans se tromper dans la succession, il ne sait pas nommer le jour ou le mois précédant ou succédant, quand il vient de lire la date. Quand on lui demande s'il fait jour ou nuit, il se contente de constater l'obscurité ou la lumière, sans arriver à une réponse nette. De même pour les saisons. Quelques fables bien connues (Petit-Chaperon rouge, Cendrillon) nous permettent une démonstration facile de la difficulté qu'éprouve le malade à s'imaginer les étapes successives dans ces petites histoires, même après des répétitions multiples de ma part....

La notion du nombre.—Je mets devant lui deux séries de bâtons, une série de cinq pièces, une autre série de quatre pièces. Je lui demande ce qui est plus. Il commence par compter l'une en comptant les bâtons avec son doigt: un, deux, trois, quatre, cinq. Maintenant, le malade s'embrouille, il prend le dernier bâton encore une fois, dit: six, en prend un autre de la même série, dit: sept, ou bien il en prend de l'autre série tout en continuant son compte à haute voix. Toute explication de ma part reste vaine.

Je mets devant lui quatre bâtons en l'invitant à en mettre autant. Il commence à compter de la manière décrite, sans naturellement arriver à un résultat....

En présence de deux pièces de monnaie, il en prend une, dit: un, il prend l'autre, dit: deux, reprend celle-ci ou bien la première, dit: trois. Quand je l'empêche de continuer au moment où il a prononcé le chiffre deux, en disant: "C'est bien, main-

tenant, dites-moi le nombre," il est embarrassé et finit par dire: "Je ne sais pas."... Le nombre de ses enfants lui est inconnu; il sait pourtant leurs noms.

Le malade est également incapable d'apprécier le nombre des coups que je donne sur la table; en frappant toutes les fois le nombre deux, il dit que cela lui rappelle la machine de son bâteau; en donnant les coups isolés il dit: "C'est comme un clou qu'on plante dans une planche," mais il ne saisait pas la différence arithmétique.

Ainsi nous assistons au curieux spectacle d'un malade, qui a conservé l'acte de la numération, mais qui, pourtant, a perdu toute notion du nombre. Il a perdu cette notion pour les objets séparés dans l'espace comme pour les sons séparés dans le temps....

L'agraphie est absolue dans une phrase où la lecture est déjà facile. Invité à copier le mot *Poot* avec des lettres mobiles, il met *Ppot*, le mot *Saar* il met *Asar*. Parfois, les lettres sont mises au-dessus les unes des autres. Quand je lui fais copier des séries de lettres, qui sont sans signification verbale, il se trompe dans la succession; de même pour les séries de barres de couleur différente. Les troubles que nous constatons dans l'écriture (la malade tient la plume adroitement) se laissent résumer ainsi:

(1°) déformation des lettres dans la dictée comme dans la copie, il écrit *p* pour *d*; *j* pour *l*;

(2°) impossibilité de garder la ligne horizontale dans l'écriture, parfois les lettres sont dans une ligne verticale;

(3°) réduction du nombre des lettres (l'augmentation est plus rare);

(4°) trouble de la succession des lettres....

Même dans l'écriture sous la dictée, le malade s'en aperçoit, quand il a fait une faute; il indique la place qui lui paraît fautive, mais ne peut la corriger.

L'épellation ne réussit guère mieux que l'écriture, parfois même il écrit un mot spontanément qu'il ne peut pas épeler.

L'épreuve de Proust-Lichtheim-Déjerine est négative. Je lui demande combien de fois il ouvre la bouche dans le mot 'olifant,' il compte sur les doigts jusqu'à cinq.... Malgré l'absence d'agrammatisme véritable et malgré le fait qu'il sait le contenu de la phrase à écrire, il est incapable de formuler son savoir dans une phrase. Il faut que je lui précise les premiers mots, alors il peut continuer. Comme il le dit lui-même: "Je ne peux pas trouver le commencement."

L'observation de Van Woerkom, dont nous venons de rapporter les parties essentielles, nous paraît du plus haut intérêt pour l'hypothèse que nous hasarderons sur la psychologie de la pensée chez l'aphasique. Ce qui caractérise essentiellement le cas du neurologiste hollandais, ce sont des troubles de *l'orientation spatiale* d'origine corticale, c'est-à-dire, en définitive, si on peut s'exprimer ainsi, de la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition* de l'intelligence. Nous allons voir en quel sens il faut prendre cette expression. Lorsque le malade ne peut orienter une regle par rapport à une autre, quand il ne sait s'il vā en haut ou en bas quand il descend l'escalier, la perturbation de l'orientation est manifeste; mais nous croyons que, malgré les apparences, tous les autres troubles qu'il présente (y compris ceux que Van Woerkom range sous la rubrique de

notion du temps) peuvent être ramenés à des phénomènes d'ordre spatial. Notons seulement, en passant, que nous prenons ici la notion d'espace au sens psychologique du mot, c'est-à-dire dans le sens d'objets étendus, distincts les uns des autres et constituant des unités concrètes; c'est *l'espace perçu*, par opposition à la notion géométrique que nous n'avons pas à envisager ici. En ce sens l'espace est essentiellement *distinction, découpage, différenciation, opposition*; en ce sens nous pensons que le fait de ne pas pouvoir distinguer une pluralité d'unités concrètes par comparaison avec une autre unité (expériences avec des séries de bâtons ou des pièces de monnaie) est un fait de même ordre que l'impossibilité de se représenter les phases diverses d'un récit quelconque. Remarquons toutefois que le malade de Van Woerkom, ainsi que ce dernier le relève, a conservé intact *l'acte de la numération*; il s'agit de la conservation d'un acte acquis plus anciennement, par conséquent d'un système plus stable et plus automatique que la dissolution n'a pas atteint (Hughlings Jackson). Mais le sentiment intellectuel de la *différenciation*, d'acquisition plus récente et partant moins automatique et moins bien organisée, fait défaut. C'est un phénomène d'observation banale chez le jeune enfant.

Arrivons-en maintenant à *l'agraphie*, pour employer une expression consacrée par l'usage, mais aussi vicieuse que celle d'*aphasie*. Le trouble constaté dénote encore ici un défaut de différenciation, d'opposition des lettres. Mais ce qui montre, semble-t-il, qu'il s'agit d'un phénomène dépassant le cadre de l'écriture, c'est que les mêmes erreurs de succession se produisent pour les séries de barres de couleur différente, qui, eux, ne sont pas des symboles graphiques. Notons, en outre (fait dont la *nature spatiale* saute plus rapidement aux yeux), l'impossibilité de garder la ligne horizontale dans l'écriture.

De même que ce malade avait conservé la numération mais non la différenciation d'une pluralité d'objets par comparaison avec une autre, de même, dans l'écriture sous la dictée, il peut indiquer l'endroit où il y a une faute sans pouvoir la corriger. Ce petit fait (qui, comme beaucoup d'autres, peut se retrouver à l'état dit normal) montre bien la *dissociation*, conforme au principe de la dissolution d'Hughlings Jackson, *de l'intuition et de la connaissance différenciée*.

Encore plus remarquable, dans le même sens, est le fait que, tout en sachant le contenu de la phrase à écrire (probablement sous forme d'une intuition immédiate), il est incapable, à moins de lui préciser les premiers mots, de formuler son savoir dans une phrase. Cette constatation suffirait, à elle seule, remarquons-le, en passant, à rendre insoutenable la

thèse de MM. P. Marie et Moutier, qui identifient pensée et langage; car, parti des troubles grossiers de l'orientation spatiale présents chez le même malade, nous voilà revenus au problème de la *pensée symbolique* (Head).

C'est qu'en effet, de même qu'il ne lui était pas possible de découper dans l'espace homogène les diverses directions par rapport à son corps, de même il ne pouvait pas découper les diverses unités concrètes qu'on lui mettait devant les yeux, ni découper dans le temps la succession des sons, ni découper les lettres dans l'écriture, ni découper à l'aide des mots la continuité plus ou moins homogène de sa pensée.

M. Head a rapporté plusieurs faits du même genre finement analysés; chez plusieurs de ses malades, la notion de la relation de divers objets dans l'espace paraît absente. Il note plusieurs fois chez ses *aphasiques* la difficulté qu'ils ont de dresser un plan de lieux familiers, à moins qu'on ne leur donne des points de repère. La même *notion de rapport* appliquée non plus à l'espace mais à la suite logique de faits de la vie courante se retrouve dans l'exemple suivant de M. Head:

> Le n° 10 se souvenait qu'en achetant du tabac il plaçait deux shillings sur le comptoir et recevait deux onces de tabac et trois pence de monnaie, mais il ne pouvait dire combien lui coûtait le tabac. *Il pouvait enregistrer les faits correctement, mais ne pouvait les relier les uns aux autres*[1].

Tout se passe donc comme si la pensée du sujet se présentait tantôt comme une masse indifférenciée, tantôt comme formée d'unités isolées. Dans les deux cas, toute opposition est impossible.

Tous ces faits montrent bien, comme y insiste M. Head, que le terme d'*aphasie* est absolument faux en ce sens que ce qu'on appelle vulgairement le langage est loin d'être seul atteint. Pour M. Head, la notion de *pensée symbolique et expression*, destinée à renouveler la vieille conception de l'aphasie basée sur la *psychologie substantialiste*, déborde le cadre du langage, cette désignation ayant été choisie, nous dit l'auteur, parce que les troubles les plus graves et les mieux définis ont été constatés dans *l'emploi* des mots, des nombres et autres symboles. M. Head reconnaît cependant qu'on ne peut supposer que cette expression définisse exactement les limites et l'étendue de la perte actuelle de la fonction, qui peut être découverte avec la série si ingénieuse des tests qu'il a proposés.

Le point de vue que nous esquissons ici n'est que le prolongement de ses idées, en ce sens que la notion de *pensée symbolique et expression* d'une exactitude clinique rigoureuse, ne serait pour nous qu'un cas

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 161. Souligné par nous.

particulier de la *notion d'opposition*. Certains des phénomènes sur lesquels M. Head insiste à plusieurs reprises, tel que le fait que certains sujets (les anarthriques par exemple) imitent parfaitement bien le geste accompli derrière eux devant une glace, mais ne peuvent le reproduire placé face à face avec l'expérimentateur, nous paraissent pouvoir être interprétés dans un sens différent et plus simplement que ne le fait l'éminent neurologiste.

M. Head suppose, dans ce cas, que le sujet invité à imiter par exemple le mouvement du bras de celui qui est devant lui, doit faire agir son *langage* intérieur et mettre d'abord sous *forme de proposition* l'acte à accomplir (acte à intermédiaire symbolique verbal), tandis qu'en face de la glace, il s'agit d'une simple imitation. Ne serait-il pas possible, dans certains cas du moins, d'interpréter le phénomène en terme de mouvements; le sujet ne pouvant exécuter la transposition spatiale nécessitée pour l'imitation des mouvements de l'expérimentateur placé devant lui? Remarquons d'ailleurs que, dans le cas de l'intermédiaire du langage intérieur supposé par M. Head, il s'agit encore de l'atteinte de la même *fonction d'analyse et d'opposition*. C'est le seul point qui doive nous retenir ici.

M. Head fait également remarquer que si on demande au même sujet de décrire les mouvements qu'il voit dans le miroir, il fait de grossières erreurs. Ne pourrait-on pas admettre que l'acte imité correctement devant le miroir l'est par suite d'une *intuition immédiate*, sans que la décomposition du mouvement intervienne nullement, tandis que l'expression verbale ne peut exister sans cette décomposition? *Qu'il s'agisse de langage ou de mouvements*, plus le nombre des alternatives possibles, c'est-à-dire au fond des *rapports*, sera grand, plus il sera certain que l'action désirée sera défectueuse. Cette remarque est de M. Head lui-même.

Le même auteur a mis en lumière, pour la première fois croyons-nous, dans ce qu'il appelle *aphasie sémantique*, un symptôme qui nous paraît d'un grand intérêt psychologique. Il s'agit de ce qu'il appelle l'*ultime intention du symbole*; rappelons un de ses exemples: 'Le n° 10 comprenait les mots *Été* et *Heure* et était sûr que *Heure d'été* signifie que les horloges sont changés avec la venue de l'été. Mais il était absolument incapable de dire si on les avançait ou si on les retardait, et essayait en vain de résoudre le problème[1].'' M. Head ajoute très justement que si ces mêmes malades ne peuvent additionner ou soustraire avec certitude, c'est parce que ce sont les *processus de l'arithmétique* qui

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 161.

ont été perdus et non la signification directe des nombres. Comme on le voit, c'est encore ici la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition de l'intelligence* dont nous retrouvons l'atteinte.

Que, maintenant, ces mêmes malades soient atteints, également et *dans le même sens, dans leurs actes*, c'est ce qu'a très finement observé M. Head:

Ainsi quand le n° 10 arrangeait avec du fil un cadre de ses ruches, il pouvait faire ce travail s'il consistait à passer le fil d'un côté à l'autre du cadre, puis à revenir l'enfiler dans des trous voisins, mais aussitôt qu'il voulait aller d'un coin à l'autre, il ne pouvait. *Il pouvait accomplir un acte continu, mais était embarrassé si la discontinuité du travail l'obligeait à formuler son intention.* De la même façon un jeune officier, le n° 1, était incapable de mettre son ceinturon quand les coulants avaient été déplacés[1].

Lorsque M. Head nous dit qu'un malade, incapable de mettre une montre à l'heure sur *ordre verbal*, le fait correctement lorsqu'il règle *par la vue* sa montre sur une autre, peut-être n'est-il pas nécessaire de voir dans les deux cas un phénomène de nature *essentiellement* différente. Dans l'ordre verbal de: "*Mettez votre montre à 5 heures moins le quart*," il s'agit pour le sujet de la réalisation mentale d'un grand nombre de rapports (rapport de temps, de propriété (car il s'agit de la montre qui lui appartient et non d'une autre), rapport de l'heure par opposition à la minute, opposition du plus et du moins, etc.). Au contraire dans l'acte de régler spontanément par la vue la montre à 5 heures moins $\frac{1}{4}$ sur une autre, il ne s'agit que du rapport spatial respectif des deux aiguilles. De même si *le même* malade peut exécuter correctement l'ordre verbal: "*Mettez la montre à 4 h. 45*," et ne peut exécuter celui de "*Mettez la montre à 5 heures moins le quart*," c'est peut-être parce qu'il s'agit, dans ce dernier cas, d'un *rapport negatif* portant non sur des objets concrets mais sur une unité abstraite et conventionnelle.

L'acte le plus complexe et le plus différencié, partant le plus instable, a disparu, laissant subsister l'acte plus simple et moins différencié (Hughlings Jackson). Ce qui fait, semble-t-il, comme l'a très justement observé M. Head, que plus une action symbolique se rapproche d'une forme propositionnelle, plus elle présentera de difficultés, c'est, semble-t-il qu'il s'agisse de langage *sensu stricto* ou de mouvements, parce que *nombre des rapports possibles* augmente en proportion.

Dans l'auto-observation du Dr Saloz, nous voyons que tantôt le mot est prononcé avec absence de sa notion compréhensive, tantôt il y a conservation de *l'idée intuitive* du mot avec erreur de prononciation, tantôt, enfin, le malade remarque qu'il tenait la lettre, la syllabe ou le

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 162. Souligné par nous.

mot *en puissance*, mais que, par le fait d'un *accroc intempestif*, les voies psychologiques, suivant l'expression pittoresque dont il se sert, ont été subitement *comprimées*, *déviées*, *oblitérées*, *coudées*, etc., ou peut-être inhibées temporairement dans certaines circonstances. Les mêmes images reparaissent encore sous la plume de l'auteur lorsque, à propos de ses exercices de rééducation, il remarque la désharmonie existant dans son esprit entre la lettre, la syllabe et le mot. Remarquons que ce sont toujours des comparaisons d'ordre spatial qu'il emploie pour se faire comprendre: "*J'avais toujours l'impression d'une difficulté énorme à suivre ma voie en ligne droite.*" Lorsque nous rapprochons ces faits des phénomènes de désorientation spatiale, tels que ceux relevés dans le cas de l'aphasique étudié par Van Woerkom, peut-être est-on fondé à prendre les expressions sur lesquelles nous avons attiré en passant l'attention, non plus dans un sens métaphorique, mais dans un sens réel.

On peut se demander, cependant, si l'importance que nous accordons aux *éléments musicaux* du langage n'est pas excessive et, dans tous les cas, si elle ne s'appliquerait pas exclusivement à certains malades, à ceux atteints d'*aphasie dite motrice*. L'expression d'*aphasie*, malheureusement conservée par l'usage, est une expression absurde, comme l'a montré Hughlings Jackson. Un aphasique, contrairement à l'étymologie du mot, n'est jamais totalement dépourvu de langage; ce qui lui en reste semble pouvoir s'interpréter très bien par le degré de la dissolution et le *niveau mental* du sujet au moment considéré. C'est là un des côtés les plus originaux et les plus profonds de la pensée d'Hughlings Jackson et une question qu'il n'entre pas dans nos vues d'exposer ici. Nous considérons ici seulement la nature de la fonction atteinte, lorsque les malades ne parlent pas ou parlent incorrectement.

Quant à la question de savoir si notre représentation des phénomènes aphasiques est unilatérale, c'est-à-dire ne s'applique qu'à ce que P. Marie appelle l'anarthrie, elle soulève aussi un bien gros problème, celui de l'unité ou de la dualité des deux complexes pathologiques inexactement dénommées *aphasie de Broca* et *aphasie de Wernicke*. Non seulement nous n'avons, fort heureusement pas, à l'envisager ici, mais encore nous pouvons restreindre la question à nous poser au point suivant: peut-on faire intervenir la déficience de la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition* dans l'interprétation des phénomènes négatifs observés (ce qu'on appelle classiquement par exemple la *surdité verbale*), car, ne l'oublions pas, durant tout ce travail, ce ne sont que les phénomènes négatifs que nous avons en vue? Bien entendu, nous admettons avec M. P. Marie (1906) que la *surdité verbale pure* est une conception théorique sans existence

clinique; nous n'avons en vue maintenant que le *complexe de phénomènes* ainsi désignés classiquement.

Ici, nous ne pouvons mieux faire que de nous reporter à la fine analyse que M. Bergson a donnée dans *Matière et Mémoire* de l'audition du langage articulé. Loin d'être un acte purement réceptif il entre dans la catégorie des phénomènes que M. Sherrington appelle aujourd'hui les *phénomènes anticipateurs*, caractéristiques des *récepteurs à distance* (*distance-receptors*). Lorsque nous écoutons parler quelqu'un, nous scandons la parole entendue, non pas en suivant parallèlement l'articulation de chaque mot, mais seulement les contours saillants de la phrase. C'est le *schéma moteur* de M. Bergson, qui, ainsi qu'il l'a remarqué, est accompagné d'un certain travail intellectuel rudimentaire. Nous dirons en passant que nous croyons à l'exactitude de cette vue, non pas pour des raisons d'ordre théorique, mais parce que, ayant eu à nous occuper des hallucinations auditives présentées par les aliénés, nous avons pu nous rendre compte que chez les malades qui "*disent entendre des voix*," les mouvements des lèvres et du larynx ne font *jamais* défaut.

Ce serait le lieu de rappeler également ici qu'on a observé des hallucinations auditives chez des sujets aphasiques, dont la caractéristique *phonétique* était celle des troubles aphasiques eux-mêmes (A. Pick). Il y a d'ailleurs ici un phénomène qui, au point de vue physiologique, intéresse probablement l'organisme entier du sujet et constitue une partie de ce que l'on a appelé: *attitude, situation* (A. Pick) ou *adaptation*.

Du point de vue psychologique, il s'agit d'un phénomène incontestablement intellectuel. Comme l'a bien montré M. Bergson, si nous ne percevons que des fragments de ce que nous entendons ou de ce que nous lisons, c'est par le *sens* que nous entreprenons la reconstitution des formes et des sons. Demandons-nous seulement ce qu'il faut entendre par le mot *sens* que nous avons prononcé dans la phrase précédente? Il s'agit des relations abstraites que "nous matérialisons imaginativement en mots hypothétiques qui essaient de se poser sur ce que nous voyons et entendons." C'est là l'essentiel du *schéma dynamique* de M. Bergson, c'est ce que Bühler, postérieurement à cet auteur, a appelé la *construction anticipatrice* (die Vorkonstruktion). Hughlings Jackson, bien antérieurement, avait parlé dans le même sens de la '*forme propositionnelle*,' précédant l'apparition des mots dans la conscience.

Pour revenir à la pathologie, nous croyons que ces notions permettent d'interpréter ce que les classiques appelaient la *surdité verbale*, dans les cas où elle se présente, autrement que par la perte hypothétique des images auditives; mais ce n'est pas ce point, que nous considérons comme

définitivement acquis, qui doit retenir notre attention. Nous voulons simplement faire remarquer que le travail anticipateur de l'esprit représenté par le *schéma dynamique* constitue un travail de découpage; mais, ici, ce dernier est effectué avec l'aide de l'appareil cérébral *récepteur*. Dans ce qu'on appelle: *aphasie motrice*, l'appareil cérébral *effecteur* seul semble en jeu.

Il n'en reste pas moins qu'il y a quelque chose de commun aux deux formes classiques de l'aphasie. Dans les deux cas, la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition* de l'intelligence est atteinte, mais pas sur le même plan. D'ailleurs, c'est une banalité de remarquer qu'il n'y a pas deux malades qui se ressemblent, parce qu'à l'état normal, il n'y a vraisemblablement pas deux individus dont l'évolution antérieure du psychisme soit superposable; d'autre part, tout état pathologique, comme tout phénomène se produisant chez un être vivant, étant un devenir, il y a lieu d'envisager toutes nos observations comme des abstractions. Le concept même d'*aphasie*, qui s'est déjà présenté maintes fois sous notre plume, est une pure abstraction sans réalité, comme nous l'avons fait remarquer, si on le prend au pied de la lettre.

Mais ici, on ne saurait trop y insister, pour éviter le reproche de simplifier à l'excès les phénomènes, notre but n'est pas d'étudier la réalité clinique dans toute sa complexité, comme M. Head l'a fait avec tant de pénétration, en distinguant ses quatre formes de troubles de la *pensée symbolique*, mais de l'utiliser dans le but de voir si elle est susceptible de nous laisser entrevoir la direction dans laquelle il faut chercher pour arriver à nous faire une idée de la nature biologique de la pensée et du langage. Il nous a semblé que ce qui constituait le processus essentiel atteint dans les deux formes classiques d'aphasie était la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition* de l'intelligence.

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Abandonnant, maintenant, un instant le domaine de la pathologie, demandons-nous si les lois récemment élaborées par la linguistique sont d'accord avec cette conception. Sans doute, le *langage* n'est pas la *langue*, celle-ci ayant une existence et une évolution relativement autonomes; mais ce ne sont pas deux phénomènes absolument hétérogènes, et Arnold Pick a bien montré tout l'intérêt que la neurologie pouvait retirer de l'étude de la linguistique. Depuis la publication du livre bien connu de Pick (1913), l'apparition du "*Cours de linguistique générale*" de Ferdinand de Saussure, et le commentaire de ses idées par quelques-uns de ses disciples est un évènement dont le neurologiste n'a pas le droit de se désintéresser. Ici, nous réclamerons quelque indulgence, car nous

ne sommes pas spécialiste de cette science si complexe et hérissée de tant de difficultés. C'est pourquoi nous citerons de préférence nos références, plutôt que nous ne les commenterons.

Tout d'abord, d'un point de vue négatif, il est curieux de constater que les linguistes modernes sont d'accord avec les observations des neurologistes (H. Jackson en premier lieu) pour affirmer que le mot isolé est une *abstraction vaine*, suivant l'expression de M. Meillet. On sait, par contre, que, d'après Ferdinand de Saussure, la notion qui est à la base de la linguistique est la notion de *valeur*. Qu'entend-il par là? "Pour déterminer ce que vaut une pièce de cinq francs, il faut savoir: (1°) qu'on peut l'échanger contre une quantité déterminée d'une chose différente, par exemple du pain; (2°) qu'on peut la comparer avec une valeur similaire du même système, par exemple une pièce d'un franc, ou avec une monnaie d'un autre système (une livre sterling, etc.). De même un mot peut être échangé contre quelque chose de dissemblable: une idée; en outre il peut être comparé avec quelque chose de même nature: un autre mot. Sa valeur n'est donc pas fixée tant qu'on se borne à constater qu'il peut être *échangé* contre tel ou tel concept, c'est-à-dire qu'il a telle ou telle signification; il faut encore le comparer avec les valeurs similaires, avec les autres mots qui lui sont opposables. Son contenu n'est vraiment déterminé que par le concours de ce qui existe en dehors de lui. Faisant partie d'un système, il est revêtu, non seulement d'une signification, mais aussi et surtout d'une valeur, et c'est tout autre chose[1]." Comme on l'a remarqué, de Saussure, sous l'influence de sa conception de la valeur linguistique, en arrive à affirmer que dans la langue il n'y a que des différences: "Qu'on prenne le signifié ou le signifiant, la langue ne comporte ni des idées ni des sons qui préexisteraient au système linguistique, mais seulement des différences conceptuelles et des différences phoniques issues de ce système. Ce qu'il y a d'idée ou de matière phonique dans un signe importe moins que ce qu'il y a autour de lui dans les autres signes. La preuve en est que la valeur d'un terme peut être modifiée sans qu'on touche ni à son sens ni à ses sons, mais seulement par le fait que tel autre terme voisin aura subi une modification[2]."

A. Sechehaye, un des disciples du maître de la linguistique contemporaine, a encore insisté sur le caractère strictement différentiel des valeurs linguistiques. "Un mot comme *cheval*," dit-il, "paraît avoir un

[1] F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*, publié par Ch. Bally et A. Sechehaye, avec la collaboration de A. Riedlinger. Payot, Lausanne et Paris, 1916, p. 166.

[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 172.

son par lui-même et un sens à lui, mais de Saussure nous déclare qu'il y a là une part d'illusion; la véritable raison d'être du mot *cheval* est en dehors de lui, dans tout le reste de la langue, car: *ni les signes phoniques de la langue, ni les idées qu'ils représentent n'existent autrement que par les différences que l'on constate entre tous ces signes phoniques d'une part et toutes ces idées d'autre part*....D'ailleurs ce principe fondamental du signe purement différentiel se vérifie aussi empiriquement dans certains faits d'observation banale. Si quelqu'un nous demandait: 'Croyez-vous qu'une diction impeccable soit vraiment nécessaire pour l'intelligence du langage?' nous répondrions: 'C'est selon.' En effet, nous faisons dans ce domaine deux sortes de constatations diamétralement opposées. Quelquefois une très légère nuance d'articulation observée peut prévenir un malentendu (par exemple entre *vous oubliez et vous oubliiez* ou dialectalement, entre *la voie* et *la voix*, *l'aîné* et *l'aînée*), et d'autres fois nous avons des complaisances presque illimitées pour des prononciations relâchées et même vicieuses. Cela n'est-il pas la preuve que dans le travail qui consiste à entendre et à comprendre, notre oreille ne s'intéresse aux sons que dans la mesure où ils sont nécessaires pour éviter des confusions de signes[1]?"

Remarquons en passant que cette théorie de la *valeur oppositive* nous permet de comprendre comment le même mot peut paraître avoir disparu chez un aphasique, sauf dans certaines phrases. Il est évident que ce phénomène serait plus difficilement explicable dans l'hypothèse qui considérerait le mot comme ayant une existence autonome. D'une façon générale, on voit que la théorie de la *valeur oppositive* de Ferdinand de Saussure est d'accord avec ce que nous avons cru pouvoir considérer, d'après les cas pathologiques, comme caractéristique du langage, à savoir la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition* de l'intelligence, dont le langage, rappelons-le, paraît n'être qu'un cas particulier.

Revenons maintenant à nos *aphasiques* et essayons de nous rendre compte de ce qu'il y a derrière leur mutisme apparent. Les seuls documents utilisables, à notre connaissance, en la circonstance, au point de vue des données immédiates de l'introspection, sont les *Mémoires d'un aphasique* dont nous avons déjà parlé. Dès les premières lignes, il nous dit:

J'ai le souvenir que tout me paraissait un peu tomenteux, un peu nuageux, comme dans un rêve ou plutôt un cauchemar....J'avais à certains moments l'impression comme d'un voile qui s'appesantissait sur moi et me rendait mes pensées flous comme dans un rêve, les yeux ouverts; j'avais aussi le sentiment lointain de choses

[1] A. Sechehaye, "Les problèmes de la langue," *Revue philos.* 1917, t. II, pp. 16 et 17.

déjà vues....Sauf quelques mots, tels que: oui, non, merci, s'il vous plaît, je ne pouvais absolument rien dire ni écrire; *et non seulement je ne pouvais rien dire mais je n'avais rien à dire, en tant qu'expression de paroles. J'avais déjà toutes mes pensées, toutes mes conceptions; c'étaient mes symboles que je n'avais plus à ce moment.* Mais le sens ou l'intuition du mot ou de la lettre me restait comme le souvenir d'un écho lointain qui me rappelait la chose. *J'avais donc perdu la mémoire du mot, mais il me restait le souvenir de la place qu'il occupait*[1].

Donc, indistinction des éléments psychiques, avec impression d'état de rêve, conservation complète de la pensée intuitive, sans images du moins verbales, conservation d'une certaine *articulation* (au sens étymologique du mot) de la pensée, car le malade avait le souvenir ou plutôt l'intuition de la *place des mots* sans avoir l'image verbale de ceux-ci, telles sont les remarques essentielles du malade sur son propre état. Dès le début donc il nous avertit explicitement de l'erreur de ceux qui, comme Moutier, identifient pensée et langage.

Au point de vue fonctionnel, le Dr Saloz insiste aussi immédiatement sur la conservation intégrale de sa volonté, s'efforçant de récupérer l'état normal:

Souvent, écrit-il, je repense aux incidents de ma brusque attaque suivie d'aphasie subite, et je suis arrivé à cette constatation que le phénomène *psychologique* qui a prédominé chez moi au début de ma maladie, dans l'intimité même de mon cerveau, a été un désir et un besoin impérieux de rechercher les éléments de toutes sortes que j'avais le sentiment d'avoir perdus sans l'espoir peut-être de pouvoir les retrouver: recherche angoissante de la chasse à mes idées et à mes conceptions, recherche de mes sentiments et de mes sensations cérébrales, recherche de mes éléments verbaux, lecturiers et graphiques....Or, le phénomène essentiel de cette recherche est toujours, quoiqu'on en dise, un phénomène de *volonté*....Ces retrouvailles comptent certainement parmi les plus grandes satisfactions et je dirai même les plus grandes voluptés cérébrales qu'un aphasique comme moi puisse goûter, car elles sont basées essentiellement sur le sentiment d'un effort effectif satisfaisant accompli par la volonté dans des conditions de recommémoration cependant souvent très difficiles à enregistrer[2].

C'est là, croyons-nous, un phénomène très caractéristique, que nous retrouvons également noté avec soin dans l'auto-observation du Prof. Forel. Cette conservation intégrale et même cette exaltation de la volonté est en contraste absolu avec les états d'affaiblissement intellectuel étudiés dans d'autres domaines de la neuro-psychiatrie (paralysie générale, schizophrénie, sénilité cérébrale, etc.). Elle nous permet, à elle seule, d'affirmer que si, au cours de l'aphasie, il y a un affaiblissement intellectuel, il est certainement d'un genre tout particulier et n'a d'analogue dans aucun autre cas pathologique.

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 10.

[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 11.

En ma qualité d'ex-aphasique ayant eu la chance de pouvoir récupérer une partie des éléments de mon entendement antérieur, je pose en fait et sans risquer d'être contredit par tout neurologue un peu expérimenté en cette matière, que, par le fait même de la maladie qui a produit l'aphémie, l'aphasique est entaché, d'une manière générale, d'une diminution plus ou moins forte de son intelligence, mais que cette diminution n'est que relative à son état antérieur et nullement à celle d'un homme normal doué d'une intelligence banale ordinaire....*Je fais remarquer à ce propos que je ne parle que d'intelligence, et nullement d'instinct et surtout d'intuition*[1].

L'auteur, qui n'est pas psychologue, ne nous donne malheureusement pas autant de détails que nous en désirerions sur ce point, le plus important à notre point de vue, puisque, s'il était élucidé, il pourrait nous apporter des indications sur la nature de la pensée privée de son expression symbolique chez l'aphasique. Le fait, cependant, que le malade parle de conservation de *l'instinct* et de *l'intuition* doit nous retenir. Ce qui paraît, en effet, caractériser le psychisme de l'aphasique, c'est son absence de *différenciation*, de *discrimination*. Privé du soutien matériel de l'expression verbale, c'est-à-dire du secours de la motricité, il n'y a plus possibilité pour le sujet d'opposer nettement un concept à un autre:

Il y a des moments, dit le Dr Saloz, où j'ai le sentiment d'une espèce d'interférence ou d'une polarisation de mes *idées*, c'est-à-dire que leur choc me fait l'impression, au lieu de me les éclairer, de produire au contraire, dans leurs éléments, une obscurité partielle, naturellement au point de vue psychologique s'entend. J'ai le sentiment à ce moment-là qu'il existe des espèces de lacunes ou des trous passagers dans mes conceptions, avec un sentiment *impérieux* d'être comblés d'une façon quelconque pour émerger de nouveau de l'obscurité à la lumière[2].

Dans des recherches récentes poursuivies avec la méthode de l'école de Wurzbourg sur des aphasiques blessés du cerveau, Lotmar (de Berne) a montré que la difficulté considérable, attribuée classiquement à l'amnésie, que les sujets éprouvent à actualiser certains mots abstraits, provient de ce que chez eux la pensée se présente sous forme de complexes indécomposables ou de ce que, en même temps que le mot juste, surgissent des phénomènes intermédiaires (Zwischenerlebnisse), soit sous forme de représentations, soit sous forme de mots[3]. M. Head a fait la même remarque que plus la phrase est abstraite, plus facilement le malade se trompe. Nous avons là, croyons-nous, au point de vue pathologique, la confirmation de la théorie des *valeurs oppositives*, qui constitueraient, d'après F. de Saussure, l'infra-structure du langage.

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 24–25. Souligné par nous.

[2] *Loc. cit.* p. 25.

[3] Lotmar, "Zur Kenntnis der erschwerten Wortfindung u. ihrer Bedeutung für das Denken des Aphasischen," *Archives suisses de neurol. et de psychiatrie*, t. v, fasc. 2, et t. vi, fasc. 1 (1920).

L'instinct ou l'intuition sont, par contre, étrangers à toute *fonction de découpage*, à toutes catégories analogues à celles de l'intelligence. Sans doute, nous ne voulons pas rouvrir ici le si intéressant débat qui a eu lieu en juillet 1919 sur le problème de l'*instinct* et de l'*intelligence*, dans la séance commune de l'*Aristotelian Society*, de la *British Psychological Society* et de la *Mind Association*; nous nous permettrons seulement de remarquer: (1°) que l'expression d'*instinct* est celle même employée par le malade pour caractériser son activité psychique résiduelle; nous ne faisons donc qu'enregistrer le résultat de son auto-observation; (2°) que la notion d'*instinct* ne doit évidemment pas être entendue ici dans le sens étroit d'*actions instinctives*, mais doit être entendue dans le sens de *dispositions, tendances instinctives*, ainsi que l'admet R. Brun pour les animaux supérieurs et l'homme[1]; (3°) que l'opposition globale et volontairement schématique de l'*instinct* et de l'*intelligence*, quoique niée par d'illustres naturalistes, n'est pas une thèse purement philosophique. Nous nous permettrons de rappeler, en passant, que les idées de M. Bergson à ce sujet ont été adoptées par un spécialiste de la biologie des insectes, comme M. Bouvier[2].

Rappelons-nous, maintenant, le malade de Van Woerkom, chez lequel nous avons cru apercevoir que les troubles aphasiques n'étaient qu'un cas particulier d'un trouble plus général, quoique bien spécifique, de l'intelligence. Il savait le nom de ses enfants, sans pouvoir en indiquer le nombre, il appréciait qualitativement, à l'aide de comparaisons, les coups qu'on donnait sur la table; il connaissait individuellement les jours de la semaine et les mois de l'année, etc.; *toute représentation de rapports géométriques ou arithmétiques était absente de chez lui.* De même nous avons attiré l'attention sur la difficulté énorme qu'éprouvait le Prof. Forel à exécuter les moindres opérations arithmétiques. Il est évident, que, dans ces cas, que ce soit ou non par l'intermédiaire du langage intérieur, il y a une atteinte relative de l'intelligence, *sensu stricto.* A ce point de vue, nous pensons que la pathologie nous autorise à accepter la conception que M. Bergson a donnée de cette fonction, en s'appuyant sur les principes de la biologie générale: "*Si l'on envisage dans l'instinct et dans l'intelligence ce qu'ils renferment de connaissance innée, on trouve que cette connaissance innée porte dans le premier cas sur des choses et dans le second sur des rapports*[3]."

[1] R. Brun, "Das Instinktproblem im Lichte der modernen Biologie," *Archives suisses de neurol. et de psychiatrie*, t. VI. fasc. 1 (1920).

[2] Cf. Bouvier, *La vie psychique des insectes*, Paris, Flammarion, 1918; en particulier ses conclusions.

[3] Bergson, *L'Évolution créatrice*, 26me éd. 1907, p. 161.

Or, comme l'a bien montré l'auteur que nous venons de citer, d'accord en cela avec les résultats les plus récents de la linguistique, la prise de conscience de ces *rapports* n'est guère possible que par le langage. Avec celui-ci et avec la mobilité du mot, la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition de l'intelligence* entre en action. Celle-ci et son œuvre, la science, sera d'ailleurs d'autant plus développée que la combinaison seule des symboles exprimeront des rapports de plus en plus subtils. Le résultat sera la *distinction* et la *clarté*.

Dans ces dernières années, on a relevé, non sans raison, croyons-nous, les analogies existant entre certains états de dissolution de l'esprit et le stade de l'évolution auquel en sont resté certains peuples. Quoique la plus grande prudence soit nécessaire dans ces rapprochements, on ne peut pas ne pas être frappé du parallélisme existant entre l'état d'une langue, à un moment donné, et la qualité (ce mot n'impliquant dans notre pensée aucun jugement de valeur) des produits de l'*intelligence* de ceux qui la parlent. Remarquons bien, encore une fois, que nous disons: *intelligence*, et non *pensée*.

A ce propos les études toutes récentes de M. Granet sur "*Quelques particularités de la langue et de la pensée chinoises*[1]" nous paraissent d'un intérêt tout particulier pour la question qui nous occupe: "Tandis qu'un Français, par exemple, possède, avec sa langue, un merveilleux instrument de discipline logique, mais doit peiner et s'ingénier s'il veut traduire un aspect particulier et concret du monde sensible, le Chinois parle au contraire un langage fait pour peindre et non pour classer, un langage fait pour évoquer les sensations les plus particulières et non pour définir et pour juger, un langage admirable pour un poète ou pour un historien, mais le plus mauvais qui soit pour soutenir une pensée claire et distincte. En fait, quand on lit les plus authentiques penseurs chinois, Tchouangtseu, par exemple, ce qui frappe, c'est un goût extraordinaire pour l'expression concrète, c'est une prodigieuse virtuosité plastique et musicale[2]." Il semble que, dans ce cas, l'esprit procède par intuitions et combinaison d'intuitions ou, même, par une espèce d'analyse d'ordre intuitif. M. Granet a fait ressortir l'analogie de cette pensée symbolique où le rythme joue un grand rôle, avec la musique, où tout est *indifférenciation*, où les sentiments exprimables, d'une façon nette, sont en réalité très peu nombreux.

Remarquons également que ce qui fait l'impuissance de la langue et de la pensée chinoises en matière scientifique, c'est le fait que presque

[1] Cf *Revue philosophique*, en particulier la partie publiée dans le nº de mars–avril, 1920.
[2] Cf *Revue philosophique*, mars–avril, 1920, pp. 184 et 192.

chaque mot est attaché à un fait particulier. Or, en partant de considérations bien différentes de celles que nous faisons ici, M. Bergson n'a-t-il pas écrit: "*Le signe instinctif est un signe adhérent, le signe intelligent est un signe mobile*[1]"?

Remarquons aussi combien il serait intéressant de posséder des observations précises de cas d'aphasie chez des individus cultivés de races différentes de la nôtre; cette neurologie comparée, dont Brodmann demandait l'étude systématique au point de vue de l'architectonique cérébrale, est encore à peu près inexistante.

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Jusqu'ici, remarquons-le, nous avons pu, nous plaçant sur le terrain de la psychologie fonctionnelle, parler des troubles aphasiques sans parler d'*images verbales*. Est-ce à dire que nous en nions l'existence, car, si étrange que cela puisse paraître, cette opinion a été soutenue? On ne saurait aller contre les données de l'observation interne. Le problème est, en effet, d'une importance capitale pour le problème de l'aphasie. D'une part, en effet, il pose la question de la notion de localisation cérébrale des phénomènes psychiques, question dont nous considérons la solution comme étant en train de se faire à l'heure actuelle; nous avons décidé de ne pas nous en occuper ici. D'autre part se pose le problème de savoir si, dans *l'aphasie motrice*, il s'agit d'un trouble particulier de l'articulation (l'*anarthrie* de P. Marie) ou d'un phénomène plus proprement intellectuel. M. Head vous a exposé, avec la pénétration de pensée unie à une expérience clinique des plus étendues, qu'il adhérait a cette dernière hypothèse en ce sens que, contrairement à ce que soutient M. P. Marie, le langage intérieur est atteint. Elle trouve une confirmation des plus explicites, comme nous l'avons vu, dans l'auto-observation du Prof. Forel ainsi que dans celle du Dr Saloz, à laquelle vous me permettrez de recourir encore comme à la source des données immédiates de la conscience d'un aphasique:

La majorité des auteurs qui se sont occupés d'aphasie ont une tendance à croire que le phénomène qui joue le principal rôle dans l'aphasie dite motrice ou d'expression, est une opération psychologique consistant essentiellement dans un défaut de la mémoire du mécanisme lui-même de la lettre ou du mot extériorisé. Je crois que ces dits auteurs font une confusion entre les phénomènes dysarthriques en général et ceux de l'aphasie motrice proprement dite, dans laquelle c'est l'oubli de l'*idée* même du mécanisme articulatoire qui prédomine. Ces auteurs ont l'habitude de dire à ce sujet que l'aphasique moteur conserve son langage intérieur, mais que c'est sa faculté motrice d'extériorisation *seule* qui lui manque, sans se douter que le premier degré de cette opération psychologique incorrecte réside justement dans un déficit de la

[1] *Loc. cit.* p. 172.

mémoire de l'idée du symbole lui-même, et par conséquent dans une altération de sa sensibilité, quels qu'en soient du reste ses éléments primordiaux antérieurs[1].

Cette constatation vient tout à fait à l'appui des idées de M. Head, et permet certainment de se représenter le phénomène comme une déficience de la *pensée symbolique* (symbolic thinking). Remarquons-le, cependant, c'est là un point de vue de *psychologie structurale*, dont nous ne contestons nullement la légitimité, mais qui ne permet pas, semble-t-il, de considérer le problème du point de vue biologique. Dans ce but, certains auteurs (M. de Monakow en particulier) ont trouvé un avantage incontestable à employer le langage objectif de Semon; pour eux, il s'agit, dans les phénomènes présentés par les aphasiques, d'un trouble fondamental de l'*ecphorie des engrammes*. Mais cette expression est un peu vague, parce que le sens du terme d'*engramme* est par trop indéterminé quand il s'agit de phénomènes aussi complexes. Nous ne nions pas cependant qu'il constitue un grand progrès sur la terminologie plus subjective de la clinique traditionnelle. Nous sommes ainsi amenés à nous demander s'il ne serait pas possible de se représenter les phénomènes en termes de mouvements? Par là nous suivrons la méthode générale qui est en germe dans l'œuvre de Hughlings Jackson lorsqu'il écrivait en 1876: "Les opérations mentales ne doivent être, en dernière analyse, que les côtés subjectifs de substrata sensitifs et moteurs[2]."

Rappelons-nous de l'insistance avec laquelle le Dr Saloz essaie de rendre, à l'aide de multiples métaphores, le fait qu'il n'avait plus *la libre disposition de son énergie nerveuse*. Il remarque, par ailleurs, la variabilité de ses troubles aphasiques d'un moment à l'autre, et, en particulier, le matin. A ce sujet, nous nous souvenons d'un de nos malades qui, pour traduire le même phénomène, parlait de la *paralysie du repos*, comme si l'exercice augmentait la perméabilité (Bahnung) des voies nerveuses. Enfin, il est très remarquable de noter qu'objectivement aussi bien que subjectivement, c'est par l'*esquisse d'un phénomène moteur d'articulation* que débutait l'apparition du mot:

> Au début, sous le rapport de la lecture, je n'avais pas encore le mot ou la lettre, qui ne me disaient rien du tout, mais j'avais le sens du mot ou de la lettre, ou le sentiment intuitif que j'avais la place pour le ou la mettre, c'est-à-dire en puissance, comme si j'avais un écho interne lointain qui me revenait en me les rappelant et qui m'avertissait qu'ils allaient venir; mais ce n'était pas sans de grands efforts de pensée et souvent vainement. C'étaient comme des voix intérieures qui m'avertissaient comme par une sorte d'extériorisation anticipée des expressions du langage parlé. J'ai fait la même observation pour la lecture à voix basse (chuchotement), et d'une façon

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 33–34.

[2] Cf. *Clin. and Physiologic. Research on the Nervous System*, 1876.

beaucoup plus prononcée, c'est-à-dire que j'en ressentais un besoin impérieux. Ma famille a pu constater le fait, attendu qu'on m'entendait très bien essayer de chuchoter la lettre ou le mot avant de l'exprimer à haute voix d'une façon effective[1].

D'une manière plus générale même, le Dr Saloz a constaté que ses phénomènes aphasiques étaient en rapport avec l'hémiparésie droite qui avait suivi l'ictus. Le malade parle, il est vrai, de *parésie* de la sensibilité; nous ne croyons pas qu'il faille entendre cette expression autrement que dans le sens d'un trouble des sensations kinesthésiques, le sujet disant un peu plus loin qu'il a toujours eu conscience d'un affaiblissement notable du sens musculaire du côté droit:

Immédiatement après mon attaque, j'ai constaté, comme je l'ai déjà dit dans mon journal, une *parésie* très prononcée de la sensibilité de tout mon côté droit, de la tête aux pieds. Ce symptôme très pénible a diminué progressivement, mais avec des fluctuations journalières provenant d'une foule de circonstances, souvent capricieuses en apparence, mais dans lesquelles j'ai toujours constaté une concordance remarquable de mes sensations pathologiques, *surtout au point de vue de l'élaboration plus ou moins difficultueuse des éléments de ma parole*....J'ai eu constamment le sentiment, même au plus fort de ma maladie, que mon aphasie avec amnésie de la parole et de l'écriture, avec tous ses dérivés psycho-métaphysiques, a toujours été en corrélation avec ma parésie hémianesthésique associée à cette impression réitérée que les circonvolutions de mon hémisphère gauche étaient bourrées de coton. Je crois d'autre part qu'il faut rattacher ma parésie hémianesthésique au sentiment que j'avais d'une espèce d'insensibilité *cérébrale* générale qui se faisait remarquer dans de multiples phénomènes que j'aurais beaucoup de peine à détailler séance tenante, mais qui s'exprimaient aussi bien au point de vue matériel et organique, qu'au point de vue psychologique et intellectuel[2].

Tout se passe comme si le phénomène élémentaire était un trouble de la circulation de l'énergie nerveuse. Ce phénomène est fréquent en pathologie nerveuse, fondamental même à notre avis, mais nulle part il n'est plus facile à observer qu'au cours de l'aphasie. Rien n'est plus variable, comme il est facile de s'en apercevoir, en multipliant les examens, aux diverses heures de la journée, que le comportement d'un sujet atteint d'un trouble de la *pensée symbolique.* Ce dernier, même, s'il s'agit d'un homme au cerveau encore jeune et porteur d'une lésion qui ne provoque pas une *diaschise* trop étendue, n'est pas toujours exactement comparable à lui-même au cours du temps, si les influences externes (fatigue, émotions, etc.) viennent à varier. Quelle que soit l'interprétation qu'on donne du phénomène, on ne peut pas ne pas être frappé de l'importance de la *mise en train* (mouvements naissants des muscles phonateurs, chant, scansion) en particulier chez les sujets atteints de la forme dite: *aphasie motrice.* Avec sa pénétration habituelle,

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 12–13.

[2] *Loc. cit.* pp. 22–23.

Hughlings Jackson avait rapproché la parole articulée de l'acte moteur volontaire. Or, bien plus tard, Brailsford Robertson a fait remarquer, à propos de celui-ci, qu'il existe, soit dans le tissu nerveux central, soit dans le système neuro-musculaire périphérique, une résistance analogue au frottement et qui exige un effort donné pour céder et pour laisser la réaction se faire. Les choses se passent exactement comme pour un corps pesant placé sur le plan incliné: il ne commence à se mouvoir que lorsque l'inclinaison du plan a atteint un certain degré. Nous serions tenté de dire, pour continuer la comparaison, que, chez l'aphasique, l'inclinaison du plan est fonction de la libre circulation de l'énergie nerveuse.

Nous savons que celle-ci s'extériorise sous forme de contractions des muscles phonateurs; mais, nous ne saurions trop y insister maintenant, il semble bien qu'au cours des phénomènes aphasiques, il s'agisse de complexes psycho-moteurs plus hautement spécialisés et dont le champ d'action n'est nullement, de façon exclusive, les muscles phonateurs. Sans doute, le jeu de ceux-ci est le plus apparent, mais il n'est certainement pas le seul. Ainsi que nous l'avons vu, en relatant les observations de Van Woerkom, et comme le montre certaines des épreuves imaginées par M. Head, l'aphasique présente des troubles de la spatialité qui, pour n'être pas apparents à un examen portant uniquement sur la fonction du langage, n'en sont pas moins très importants; il nous a semblé que ceux-ci constituaient un trouble général portant sur la *fonction de découpage et d'opposition*, dont l'aphasie ne paraît être qu'un cas particulier.

Nous en arrivons ainsi à considérer, d'accord en cela avec M. Head, que, même dans le cas de l'aphasie motrice, il n'y a pas d'*anarthrie*, au sens étymologique du mot, mais que le *découpage et l'opposition* qui interviennent normalement dans le fonctionnement de l'*intelligence* ne peut plus se faire, parce que l'*attitude psycho-motrice* complexe, qui est le substratum objectif du processus, n'est plus en mesure de se faire. Cette hypothèse a, croyons-nous, quelques avantages.

D'une part, en effet, elle est bien en accord avec ce que l'anatomie comparée nous apprend sur l'origine et la fonction du cortex. Rappelons-nous ici les savants travaux d'anatomie comparée de M. Elliot-Smith. Mais, surtout, c'est à une autre partie de l'œuvre de M. Head, à celle qui a trait à la participation respective de l'écorce et du thalamus dans les phénomènes de sensibilité, que nous sommes redevables d'une connaissance plus approfondie des caractères de l'activité corticale. Or n'a-t-il pas montré que la *discrimination*, la *différenciation*, le *découpage*

en un mot, étaient caractéristiques de l'activité corticale, tandis que l'*indifférenciation*, le *caractère diffus*, qui est une qualité attachée aux phénomènes affectifs, était caractéristique de l'activité thalamique? Si nous nous reportons à ce que nous avons déjà dit, nous aurions été tentés, si nous n'avions craint tout d'abord de ne point nous faire comprendre, de remplacer l'expression d'*instinct* par celle d'*activité thalamique*. Rappelons-nous aussi que la dissolution de certains des processus les plus élevés de l'activité cérébrale provoque l'apparition d'un état d'*hyper-réaction affective* bien connue de tous ceux qui ont étudié les aphasiques. M. Drever n'a-t-il pas soutenu, par ailleurs, que l'instinct est non seulement lié à l'activité, mais à l'émotion?

Ce n'est pas sans une légitime satisfaction qu'en prenant connaissance du mémoire de M. Head, nous avons trouvé ce rapprochement du langage et de la fonction spatiale du cortex, que l'étude de ses travaux antérieurs nous avaient suggéré: "La ligne suivant laquelle les centres supérieurs du cerveau progressaient se manifestait par l'augmentation du pouvoir de distinguer les variations d'intensité, de similitude et de différence et les relations dans l'espace. A cela fut ajouté le langage, qui, à part ses côtés le rattachant aux émotions, sert à exprimer ces relations. Des symboles définis, comme les mots et les nombres, furent inventés pour enregistrer ces attributs." M. Head se sépare, par contre, de notre point de vue plus uniaste, car il ajoute: "Mais ce ne sont pas les seuls facteurs qui peuvent être touchés dans les troubles de la pensée symbolique et de l'expression[1]." N'est-il pas caractéristique, d'autre part, que certains auteurs, comme M. de Monakow et son école, en arrivent à désigner l'activité corticale globale du terme de *spatialité*?

Ce qui montre bien, d'ailleurs, que, dans l'aphasie, les phénomènes intéressant à nos yeux les organes de la phonation sont secondaires; c'est que la haute spécialisation des innervations musculaires (*mélodies kinétiques* de M. de Monakow) que nous constatons dans le langage, peut se réaliser en dehors de celui-ci. Sans parler de la mimique et du geste, sur la signification desquels il serait trop long de nous étendre, l'exemple des sourds-muets est banal. Sans doute il n'est plus guère donné, aujourd'hui, d'observer des sourds-muets à développement cérébral normal, en raison de la perfection des méthodes d'éducation phonétique. Nous avons cependant connaissance d'une observation du Prof. Grasset, où la paralysie du bras droit était assez incomplète pour ne pas expliquer à elle seule l'impuissance où était le sujet de *parler* avec sa main droite le langage habituel des sourds-muets.

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 160–161.

Sans doute ce cas n'est pas aussi intéressant, en raison de l'âge du sujet et du caractère peut-être diffus des lésions, que les observations faites sur des blessés du cerveau, jeunes et résistants, mais il n'en reste pas moins que les troubles observés sont exactement superposables à ceux des aphasiques ordinaires:

Si on lui dit de réciter avec sa main droite l'alphabet des sourds-muets, il commence, essaie, fait péniblement l'*a*, plus péniblement le *b*, essaie vainement le *c* et y renonce, impatienté. Alors avec sa main gauche, il dessine tout l'alphabet avec autant de vitesse que d'exactitude.

De même si on lui montre des lettres et qu'on le prie de les lire tout haut, il essaie inutilement de le faire avec sa main droite, mais le fait correctement avec sa main gauche[1].

Il est donc bien réellement aphasique de la main droite, dans la vraie et seule acception du mot. En même temps, il est agraphique. Autrefois, il écrivait, paraît-il, fort bien. Aujourd'hui il ne peut plus. Il ne veut même plus essayer, convaincu qu'il est de son impuissance qui l'humilie et l'impatiente. Et les deux impotences ne sont pas justifiées par la paralysie du bras droit....[2]

Il est regrettable, pour la question qui nous occupe, que nous ne possédions pas, à notre connaissance du moins, d'autres cas de ce genre étudiés avec une technique plus approfondie. C'est pourquoi nous n'en retiendrons ici qu'un seul point, c'est que la haute différenciation des innervations musculaires n'a pas d'appareil d'élection pour l'extériorisation du langage. Ce qui est essentiel (et le cas des sourds-muets est typique à cet égard) c'est, si nous pouvons nous exprimer ainsi, l'existence d'une fonction d'innervation psycho-motrice permettant à la pensée de se fractionner. Tout se passe comme si l'intelligence était un mouvement discontinu, qui se fractionne à divers degrés et suivant divers modalités. Elle ne paraît pas pouvoir fonctionner sans être pour ainsi dire sous-tendue non par le langage (ce qui est un cas particulier) mais par un mouvement de même forme générale, sinon réalisé, du moins esquissé. C'est pourquoi l'absence du langage phonétique n'est nullement une raison, du moins pour les vertébrés supérieurs, de poser à priori l'impossibilité de quelque chose ressemblant à l'intelligence humaine chez les animaux.

Par là nous entrevoyons comment la théorie de l'aphasie rejoint la physiologie générale du système nerveux, mais ici une remarque capitale est nécessaire. C'est artificiellement que nous avons parlé jusqu'à

[1] En ceci, de même que pour la récitation des lettres, ce malade est évidemment totalement différent des aphasiques ordinaires qui n'ont qu'un seul appareil effecteur à leur disposition.

[2] Grasset, "Aphasie de la main droite chez un sourd-muet" *Progrès médical* 31 octobre 1896.

maintenant de la fonction du langage en général. Comme l'a bien exposé de Monakow, reprenant un point de vue exprimé cliniquement par H. Jackson, c'est ici que la théorie de la *localisation chronogène* trouve sa plus intéressante application. Dans l'individu comme dans la race, primitivement les organes utilisés pour la phonation servent presque exclusivement à la nutrition et à la respiration. Peu à peu, au cours de l'évolution phylogénique et ontogénique, ces mêmes organes, pour pouvoir servir à l'expression de la parole, ont acquis de nouvelles formes de mouvements infiniment plus différenciés. Ceux-ci sont représentés au niveau du cortex sous forme de *mélodies kinétiques*, et non pas exclusivement au niveau de l'operculum rolandique et de l'operculum frontal. C'est en ce sens seulement que, d'après de Monakow, on peut parler de *centres* phylogénétiquement plus jeunes, dont l'organisation physiologique est encore aujourd'hui très obscure. Ayant particulièrement en vue ici la question générale des rapports du langage et de l'intelligence *sensu stricto*, il n'est pas inutile de faire remarquer que ce sont naturellement les degrés supérieurs du langage, ceux qui sont généralement atteints en premier lieu par la *dissolution*, que nous avons constamment envisagés.

A ce stade nous avons vu qu'il est absolument impossible, comme P. Marie l'avait remarqué au point de vue clinique mais sans précision psychologique, de séparer les troubles du langage d'un trouble plus général, plus étendu de l'activité corticale tout entière. D'un côté comme de l'autre, c'est l'absence de différenciation, de découpage, d'opposition qui nous a frappé. Envisageant ensuite le problème du point de vue moteur, sans avoir jamais eu à nous occuper des *images*, ce sont des complexes moteurs dont la différenciation avaient subi la même atteinte que nous avons été amenés à envisager.

Il n'entre pas dans nos vues d'étudier le détail des phénomènes, qui constitue un monde; il nous suffira d'avoir montré d'une part que, *dans ses éléments différenciés*, intelligence et langage étaient en union intime—parce que tous deux coulés dans le même moule—mais qu'au delà, la vaste région de la pensée, nous voulons dire de l'intuition, de l'instinct et de la volonté, non seulement restaient intacts dans l'aphasie à lésions circonscrites mais acquéraient, pour ainsi dire, un renouveau de vie. Il semble bien que ce soit ce dernier phénomène qui permette de se rendre compte du fait que beaucoup d'aphasiques peuvent continuer à vivre dans leur famille. La distinction capitale des deux genres d'activité psychique nous paraît fondamentale quand on tente d'évaluer le *niveau mental* des aphasiques.

Et cependant, arrivé au terme de ce travail, nous avons pleine conscience de l'insuffisance de nos analyses grossières au regard de la complexité des faits. On nous excusera en songeant aux obscurités naturelles de beaucoup de passages de l'auto-observation du Dr Saloz, qui, pourtant, parlait, lui, de son *aphasie vivante.*

AN OUTLINE OF THE IDEA OF REBIRTH IN DREAMS

By MAURICE NICOLL[1].

THE idea of rebirth is practically universal in religions, however primitive. In this paper I am going to try and bring home to you the idea that the motive or theme or myth of rebirth is universal, because it lies in the human unconscious and still continually appears in dreams. From practical experience in analysis, I would go so far as to say that the rebirth theme is the very basis of our psychical life. I believe that in human psychology is embodied a dynamic principle which appears under the alternating symbols of death and resurrection, and that it is ultimately for this reason that neurotic conflict and neuroses and all psychological unhappiness exist. In other words the psyche is not designed to be stationary, and if we seek to be static, and to cling to outlived values in ourselves we must inevitably suffer, because we shall be at war with a principle *in* ourselves—not outside ourselves, although we may see it only so.

Whenever an entirely new attitude enters into a person's life, psychological rebirth to some extent has occurred. There are certain periods in life when certain biological transformations seek to come. They come from within as forces. The period of puberty is an example. For some time before puberty has actually expressed itself, there are movements of energy in the unconscious, and characteristic dreams. I mean that the coming function still lies in the unconscious and appears under a symbol —as, for example, under the symbol of the dark snake, the wound, the bull, or the unknown, earthy, rough and alarming stranger. Puberty may then come about in the body, but remain unexpressed for years in the psychology, in which case the psychological energy or libido belonging to this function will continue to appear as the snake or earthy and alarming man, and in many other ways, in dreams. For a symbol is energy in the unconscious. Now this is repression of what is growing up from below—not repression of the past, but repression of the future. Elsewhere I have called this non-expression. It is repression of the normal psycho-biological growth. It is not repression of what has been

[1] Read before the Medical Section of the British Psychological Society, June 23, 1920.

experienced but repression of what has yet to be experienced. We can understand that the new energy coming up from below, from the unconscious, may strike against a hard crust of conscious and rigid values and so be unable to get through. Birth of the new energy is then made impossible, and the result may be neurosis, or the first bias to neurosis.

At different ages there are different tasks, and our attitudes should change. Now, if we look at the dream from the dynamic point of view, we see apart from its cathartic value that it contains what is germinal. If we look at embryonic development we find, before the perfect organ appears, many preparatory stages of that organ. In exactly the same way we find, before the perfect function appears, many preparatory stages of that function in the unconscious. Now, there are dreams that deal with normal sexual growth. Some of these dreams are so characteristic that we might call them myths. There is in my opinion a dream-myth for every period of life, and a myth-cycle for life itself. There are myths that deal with normal sexual growth. There are also, at a later stage, myths which deal with normal sexual involution. In my experience there is a psychological menopause which precedes by some years the actual menopause in women. The dreams in this stage of life tend to be all of a certain kind—unlike the dreams of puberty. These dreams are very complicated and it is impossible to understand them in the form in which they are dreamt without reference to mythology and the psychology of primitives.

Broadly speaking, these dreams that women have at the psychological menopause always involve the understanding, and the acceptance or refusal, of a new attitude; which if accepted leads to an easier future. There are certain very critical points in life and at these points new attitudes are very necessary, and the myth in the unconscious changes. I would say that in men the age of about thirty-three to thirty-seven is one that is very important. The dreams that come during this time are quite characteristic and do not, in my experience, come at any other time. It would seem that the unconscious has a certain attitude at this period of a man's life which tends to lead him in a certain direction. He comes to a cross road. If he does not take a new direction then he may lay down the foundation for eventual neurotic trouble. It will be seen that from this aspect neurotic trouble means that we have not followed our myth. The idea that life must be a series of inner changes and not a stubborn inflexible unvarying course is perhaps new to some. We have the idea of change, however, expressed concretely in those old ideas that man renews his body every seven years. In women

I would put the age of about twenty-eight, particularly for unmarried women, as one of great importance—as important as that period which I have just stated concerning men. Now, whenever a critical point in life is reached certain symbols appear which deal with the idea of a rebirth to new attitudes and to the new myth for the next phase of life.

Whenever we have a new attitude or function forming itself in the unconscious and we hesitate to go down into the depths to meet it, but cling to our old attitudes, then we add a bias towards neurosis, in place of adding to ourselves a new understanding. But if we do go down to meet it, we experience a minor or major rebirth.

At those ages in the life of men and women which are critical, rebirth symbolism is regularly found in the dream, so far as my experience goes. It is perhaps to be expected that in world-periods of transition, such as the one we are now in, when the interpretation of life is becoming more obscure and therefore a more personal matter, rebirth dreams should be more general. But of that we can have no proof.

Rebirth is expressed by the unconscious in as many ways as it is in mythology. The dream may contain all the main motives; or only express a few. Jung has given us the main movements in the theme from a psychological standpoint in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*. There is first of all the movement *towards or into the mother*. This is an expression for the movement of the libido, seeking new values or rebirth, going into the unconscious. It is expressed in mythology, ritual or religion in symbols such as Jonah going into the whale's belly, Christ going into the heart of the earth, the initiate in the cave or lying in the grave, the knight sleeping naked before the altar, the hero travelling in the interior of the monster under the sea towards the west, etc. After varying adventures, the hero reappears with renewed or divine strength, in the east.

The symbols refer to the entrance into the womb. Reductively considered, this movement of the libido, whenever it occurs in the course of a person's life means a movement towards the mother. This can easily be given a concrete expression as an incest-wish, relating to the objective mother. As you know, this movement of the libido has found such an interpretation. It is perfectly valid as it stands, provided the second and third acts of the drama of rebirth are ignored, and beyond all doubt we find continually this movement of libido to the mother in the dreams of the neurotic. We can say therefore that in the unconscious lies an incest-wish. But this view is horizonless; it blots out the ultimate meaning of the movement, which is an attempt at healing, or *regenera-*

tion. I must remind you that in so far as the neurotic fails to be reborn, his libido, seeking rebirth, will remain striving towards the mother. We might be content to take the mother concretely, because this is often a help in making the analysis effective in the early stages, but it would not do away with the psychological meaning of the mother—that is, as a symbol of the unconscious, of the re-creative psychological womb, where energy enters in and finds a new germinal attitude to fertilize.

The ritual of rebirth is very common in primitive tribes at the age of puberty. The number of examples, from every part of the world, is almost endless. Among Australian tribes the following customs have been noticed. (1) A long hut is made in a lonely spot in the shape of a monster with a gaping mouth. The novice has to pass into this. He is swallowed up by it and then after various séances, he is released from the monster's belly. Circumcision follows. After a period he returns to his village, but he is now supposed to be reborn—that is, he is something new, and has forgotten his old attitudes. This idea is carried out by his not recognising the speech or faces of his relations, etc.

The monster is the womb, exactly comparable to the belly of the whale. There are still theologians, devoid of psychological understanding, who speculate about the particular fish in the Mediterranean Sea that swallowed Jonah. The ritual outlined above *externalises the psychological motive in the unconscious.* It satisfies the unconscious compulsion; for the dynamic racial myths lying deep in the human unconscious may exert compulsive force.

(2) After a tooth has been knocked out, the novice lies in a grave and is covered over by sticks and earth. He then 'comes to life,' performs a magic dance in the grave, and exhibits the magic substance he has got in his mouth from his rebirth, etc.

The grave again is the womb. The losing of something old may express the idea of rebirth in a negative way. The knocking out or losing of a tooth—a very common theme in dreams—and the act of circumcision both signify, in primitive custom, an initiation, and are associated with the ritual of rebirth. The psychological meaning is that before a new attitude can emerge, an old one must be lost.

Apart from primitive ritual, the idea of rebirth runs through folklore. For example the idea that sickness is cured by passing the sick person through a hole in a tree or through a narrow circle of wood or by wearing a certain kind of ring is a concrete expression of the act of rebirth—of being cured by entering and leaving the womb. It is the externalisation of a motive springing out of the human unconscious. When we externalise

or project the unconscious, we put the world of the psychological realities into the world of the concrete realities, just as the insane person does, and so confusion comes about and many strange customs.

Whenever we begin to see rebirth symbolism in dreams we must suspect the existence of a crisis, major or minor, in the history of the patient. I do not know how to speak about rebirth symbolism in dreams quite simply; it is something that is rather complicated. Let me remind you again that we can handle rebirth symbolism in two ways; we can trace it back to a desire to enter the mother's womb, as did Nicodemus, and say that it is an incestuous movement towards the objective mother; or we may say that it is a movement of libido towards the unconscious—that is, towards the creative mother-source of psychological being. This movement takes place when some new power for life is needed and at such a crisis the new function lies in the womb of the unconscious and the libido must go downwards to animate it. A period of introversion, and of in-going, must always occur before the new psychological birth can be brought into daily life. This is the second act of the drama. It is the lying in the 'womb.' Coincident with the rebirth dreams we may find the new function frequently represented as a little baby. The little baby in dreams is not always the new function; it has not always to do with the birth of the *individuality*—of psychological freedom. The little baby in dreams may also stand for the *infantility*—for psychological bondage. The associations are very important in telling the difference between the two, but sometimes we have to wait and let the unconscious develop its theme before we can be certain. Practically, the periods where the rebirth symbolism comes are of great importance in analysis, and unless the newly forming libido is successfully led forth the outlook will not be good. We can only destroy the infantility by developing the individuality. We can destroy nothing by a negation, by a negative gesture. The libido cannot be stamped out; it can only transform itself. The libido that goes to the infantility must be gradually brought into the sphere of the individuality.

The idea of going into the water as a symbol of rebirth is found in the widespread ritual of baptism. By immersion, by going into the water and emerging from it, the old is washed away and the new is born. It is an idea that is much older than Christianity. Here the water plays the same rôle as the tomb, the cave or the belly of the fish. It is the symbol for the psychological mother. The sea or the sea-shell is used as a symbol for the re-creative mother in ancient myths.

I will give you an example of the simplest rebirth dream that I can

find amongst my material. I have chosen examples in which the rebirth motive occurs clearly in the manifest content. The dream occurred in a young officer, in the early thirties, who was becoming rather neurotic. *He dreamt that he was on a steamer with a crowd of people. He suddenly dived over the side of the steamer and plunged into the sea. As he went down the water became warmer and warmer. At length he turned and began to come up. He reached the surface, almost bumping his head against a little empty boat. There was now no steamer, but only a little boat*[1]. He had no idea why he should have such a dream. In his associations he said that the water was about *blood-heat* at the depth at which he turned. As I have said, the idea of going into the water as a symbol of rebirth is found in the ritual of baptism. Baptism means a rebirth. But why should going into the water mean rebirth? Rebirth, concretely expressed, means a return to the womb. The sea is a symbol of the Great Mother. You will note that in my example the water is of *blood-heat*. This is a mythological expression used by the unconscious to indicate the idea of returning to the maternal depths, for a movement of the libido towards the unconscious in its aspect of the re-creative mother. You will see by the manifest content of the dream, *which is always of the utmost importance*, the *motif* of rebirth comes between two symbols, that of the steamer crowded with people and the little boat. Broadly speaking, this means that the dreamer must leave collective values, which are represented by the crowd on the steamer, and go through a process of rebirth whereby he comes to the little boat; that is, to something individual. Whenever we cease to live by purely collective values and begin to develop individual values for life we undergo a psychological rebirth, and rebirth symbolism begins to appear in the dreams.

I will give two further examples of dreams in which the rebirth *motif* is contained. In the case of a woman approaching the climacteric *she finds in her dream that she has to go somewhere she has never been before. She is taken to this place and discovers it to be a kind of Turkish bath. She is taken inside and placed in a small room not much larger than herself. The door is closed and the steamy heat gradually begins to increase. At the same time she observes that at the top of this small room there is a brilliant light. She feels she cannot stand the atmosphere and realises suddenly that she has taken in her fur coat with her, although she was warned not to do so. She escapes.* Here the idea of the womb is contained in the symbol of the small room, in which there is an increasing moist heat. This dream was one that occurred during what I term the psycho-

[1] This dream was recorded at the first interview.

logical menopause, which precedes the actual menopause by several years. The difficulty that this patient found in facing the alterations in her attitudes which were apparently necessary at this stage is shown by the dream. She cannot yet stand the process of rebirth, which she complicates by insisting on retaining the fur coat. A sacrifice of the instinctual (the fur coat) in favour of the intuitional (the brilliance) is the underlying theme that the dream deals with in this symbolism. I suppose that this idea of rebirth, of the libido becoming divided against itself, is at the root of the conflict between the different schools of analytical psychology. About the period when the most powerful rebirth symbolisms appear another kind of symbol is met with. It recurs continually in conjunction with rebirth *motifs*. It is the symbol of double personality. The dreamer dreams that he is two people. I am not referring to that 'familiar' with whom we are so constantly associated in dreams—that shadowy other person whom we never see, but who accompanies us often in our adventures and is our other-self. In the case of the symbol of double personality there is a distinct sense of being two people or of splitting into two people in the dream. "*I dreamt that I was two people,*" or "*I dreamt that I saw a person who was two people at the same time and yet it was the same person.*" Consider for a moment what the movement of rebirth means in the psyche of the individual. It means that he has to sacrifice himself to himself. He is at once a sacrifice and sacrificer. He thus becomes two personalities. In the Norse myth in which the god describes how he acquired his divine power the words occur "I know that I hung on the windy tree for nine whole nights, wounded with the spear consecrated to Odin, *myself* to *myself*." Turning to another part of the world we find in the initiations of a Brahman two black antelope skins are used, upon which the initiate sits. This is symbolical of the inner situation which is supposed to arise at the time of the ritual. When consecrated the initiate becomes Vishnu, a god, but at the same time he is a sacrifice and the same person is the sacrificer; he is the god who sacrifices a god to a god—himself to himself. The black antelope skins have also the significance of the womb, being in certain variations of the ceremony wrapped round the initiate, thus forming an envelope. After this the initiate is proclaimed the twice-born or the spiritually born. You will understand how easily this *motif*, i.e. of rebirth, which according to my experience continually appears in dreams of people who are entirely unacquainted consciously with mythology or ritual, may be taken in a literal and objective way as a horizonless incestuous wish. Because the regenerating

aspects of the unconscious are so often represented by a striving towards the mother, they can easily be misinterpreted in terms of concrete reality instead of as a psychological reality.

The final example is more difficult; it belongs very much more to mythological themes. "*I was out in a field and a wolf came to me. He seemed to know me and caught hold of my wrist and tried to urge me to go with him. I went with him and we came to a grey rock through which we seemed to pass magically to the interior in which there were two caves. I remained in the outer cave, while the wolf went into the inner cave with me, because I was somehow two persons. I thought that the wolf was teaching something to this other person who was myself in the inner cave.*" This dream contains the idea of a major rebirth. More properly, it deals with the preparatory stages of a major rebirth. The going into the rock and the coming out of the rock are mythological themes. In myths the god is sometimes born out of the rock. The god Mithra is observed by the shepherds emerging from the rock. I must say a word here about the significance of the 'god' in mythology. Rebirth leads to the development of individuality and of psychological regeneration. This is one aspect of the 'god.' In the dream above the patient passes into the rock and there splits up into two personalities and one of these is related to the wolf, who appears to be teaching it in the inner cave. The emergence from the rock will be the act of rebirth—that is, the birth of the individuality. The rock is the same thing as the sea. It is the same thing as the womb of Sheol or the Hades of Christ. It is the same thing as the mountain which rests on Jonah. It is the same thing as the belly of the whale. From these situations, which are psychological and represent the movement of the libido into the unconscious, comes the resurrection. If we manage to undergo a psychological regeneration we throw off old attitudes and so become renewed. Part of the libido leaves the old values that we have worked with consciously, and goes down into the deep (rock, hut, mountain, whale, etc.) of the unconscious, where it finds the new symbol waiting, and re-emerges under a new attitude to life. This is the underlying idea in the treatment of all neuroses by psychological analysis as I understand it. When such a dream as the one I have just quoted occurs in patients it marks an important crisis. By analysis, we have to find out the necessary task, the new attitude. As I have said, there appear to be dreams dealing with the *motif* of rebirth in a minor way and others dealing with it in a major way. When the major symbolisms appear then the psychological development is at an extremely critical stage, and requires careful handling.

I have given dream examples dealing with the going into the womb—the first movement in the drama of rebirth. The emergence from the womb is the third act in the rebirth drama. Its treatment by the unconscious is extremely complicated. The idea that something is gained after the rebirth is put variously in myth and ritual; as a magic substance, a stick, a jewel, a new faculty of vision, a new power, a new protection from enemies, etc. In myths of higher culture, the thing gained is often expressed as divinity or immortality. This follows the release of the hero from the womb, and he may carry in his hand the magic thing—*e.g.* the heart of the monster, which is, psychologically, the new-born libido. The idea is well expressed thus in a dream of a patient of Dr James Young's. "*The patient knew there was a dangerous monster under the sea—it was like a submarine. People were all waiting in fear. Then up from the depths came a man. He had come out of the submarine, destroying it by so doing. He was borne upwards by a parachute, which he held in his upraised hand, and rose into the air.*"

Here is the *motif* of the rebirth of the hero out of the womb, with the magical power in his hand. The ship under the sea is the whale of Jonah. Such a dream marks an important phase. It is potential. But I cannot enter into this enormous field in this short paper.

I have given some suggestions concerning the significance of the mother and of the little child in dreams, regarded from the constructive or anagogic standpoint, and I would conclude by making a suggestion about the significance of the father in this respect. You are familiar with the Oedipus myth, in which Oedipus, the swollen-footed one, murdered his father and his father's charioteer and was confronted by the Sphinx. It is only after guessing the riddle of the Sphinx that he can pass into Thebes and marry Jocasta, his mother. This myth is very wonderful and contains many difficult points and it has been used in analysis chiefly as showing the tendency that is found for the striving towards the mother after the overcoming of the father. It has been only used in an objective relationship. The overcoming of the father is a theme that appears in the dreams of adults, especially when the need for individuality is strongest. The enemy in the dream frequently is connected with the idea of the father or with the idea of authority. With the development of individuality, when the power lies *within*, the *motif* of the father and of the enemy ceases. Psychologically we only overcome the father in ourselves through a rebirth of values in ourselves, and this is the development of the human spirit in all functions that are individual, and not merely a collective imitation. We give

birth to the father in ourselves and pass from what I would term the first psychological orientation to the second, and so enter a new myth-cycle. Just as the child stands between the mother and the father, so does the libido of the adult stand between the world of the magical unconscious and the world of stern reality—between the world of the germinating and becoming, and the world of fixed values. To overcome the psychological father (which always has a special meaning for each person and denotes a special use of a function) before the psychological mother (which always contains a special value for each person) can be reached means a sacrifice of that part of the libido which is held to fixed attitudes and old ways of thinking or feeling. To remain, however, 'in the mother' is disastrous—as disastrous as it was to Oedipus, who made himself blind. In giving these suggestions and interpretations I am aware that they are only outlines drawn from one angle, but they offer new avenues of approach to the subject of symbolism in dreams—avenues of approach that were originally opened up by Carl Jung. I think they are well worth following even though they lead into the most complicated mysteries, for the solution of which we have to turn to the records of folk-lore, mythology, religions and primitive culture. But the unconscious is primitive mind, and to understand it we must study the history of man, and the myth of man, which nowadays requires to be discovered afresh.

STUDY OF A SEVERE CASE OF OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS

By JAMES YOUNG.

THE patient came to me eight months ago complaining of obsessions of such severity that his life was a misery to him. He had often thought of suicide and had given up all hope of cure. He is aged thirty-three. He is the son of a Yorkshire manufacturer—a self-made man. Until the age of nine he was at a ladies' school. He was rather delicate and was a good deal at home due to illness. Later at a grammar school he took very badly to the more robust methods of both boys and masters.

To continue in his own words:

"At the age of thirteen I left school and gradually became interested in my father's business. I used to be with him a large portion of my time. A clothier's shop was opened for my brother who unfortunately did not give it the attention he might have done. So here I used to spend hours with father, often on Saturdays until ten and eleven o'clock. He thought a great deal of me and I of him. This state of affairs was continued for a few years."

There is a history of a well-marked desire for exhibitionism about the age of puberty, gratified on two or three occasions. Masturbation also began about this period. Later developed the obsessive desire to micturate when about to engage in any activity which called for resolution or determination. This was specially liable to occur if this undertaking were something a little outside of the ordinary routine. At the age of nineteen he fell in love with a girl who accepted him as her fiancé. At this period obsessive emotions developed. If she lent him a book and he returned it, he always doubted whether he had returned it. He sometimes actually had to write the question "Have I returned so-and-so," and she had to write the reply "Yes." Verbal assurance was not enough. The patient destroyed not long ago a large sheaf of written questions and answers belonging to that period. The girl apparently was long-suffering, but after three years the association was broken off. The following summer he suffered from hay fever and has done so every summer since. This summer, however, it has troubled him much less than usual, whether due to vaccine treatment or in consequence of the

general psychological improvement I am unable to say. The range of the obsessions gradually increased. He had to refer the settling of the most trivial details to his parents. He could with the greatest difficulty leave home even for a holiday, and his life became restricted to the narrowest of circles.

At length came the war. He was exempted from military service many times on the ground of neurasthenia. Finally he was accepted and served in Mesopotamia and India for eighteen months, when he was invalided—utterly broken down by the force of his obsessions. A typical one which occurred in India was as follows. Although there was a strict rule that topees should be worn on all occasions, once or twice he had run out of his tent without putting on his topee. The fear was that if anyone should die from sunstroke through not wearing a topee it would be due to his example.

The most striking feature in the above history is the obsessive desire to pass water at all sorts of inconvenient times. It was this for which he chiefly sought relief, because it restricted his wanderings to within a few miles of his home. It is notable that the desire did not have compulsive force if the patient felt free to gratify it at any moment. But in practically any circumstances where there was not easy or immediate access to a urinal, the compulsion would occur. The usual places were theatres, church services, clubs and railway compartments. Before going to keep an appointment he also always found it necessary to empty the bladder. Always in his mind he had the idea that he must be a success, that he must come up to his conscious estimate of himself as an intelligent and really rather an important man. If he could have felt indifferent, no compulsion would have occurred. He was always orientated by the idea of success—the philosophy of his father. It was as if he carried the competitive spirit of his business life into all the other relations of life. There was always the desire to be adequate or to dominate the situation. If at a meeting he spoke freely and successfully all compulsive desire to micturate vanished. He had been adequate in that situation.

If on entering a railway carriage he met with people with whom he could 'chat'—to use his own term—freely and as he might do at home or in his own circle of friends, there was no compulsion.

If, however, he could establish no *rapport* and so was left to his own resources, the compulsive desire to pass water occurred. If it were a corridor train with the usual toilet accommodation it mattered little, but if it were a closed compartment, the desire to micturate gradually

changed itself into the sensation of approaching orgasm and on many such occasions the actual *ejaculatio seminis* occurred. On no occasion, however, was the bladder actually emptied incontinently. This failure to establish a *rapport* resulting in compulsion of such enormous and incapacitating force would appear to be regarded by the ego as a menace to its supremacy. The fact that the patient is ignored or does not obtain an immediate reward for his infantile feelings calls forth an immediate protest. By the rules of ordinary behaviour he cannot force people to speak. But something must happen and so the libido spills over or regresses to the organic and power may be said to be expressed by the desire to micturate. Now, urination as an expression of power is a feature of primitive human conduct. Little boys perhaps first show the spirit of rivalry in seeing who can make his urinary stream go furthest or last longest. Men who are going to sit for an examination, or pass some other test, notoriously have frequency of micturition. It is as it power were called upon too soon and were side-tracked from the psychological into the organic. We have seen that the patient as it were anticipated events. It might be said that when a situation was to be met the libido was summoned too soon. It could hardly deal with a situation which had not developed and so perforce it regressed to the organic, and an emission either threatened or occurred.

In my opinion, this psychological hurry is another aspect of the will to dominate every situation. As the history shows it usually frustrated itself. The following dream is quoted as an unconscious picture of this functional tendency.

"I am with the army. We are marching and the leading section persists in going too quickly. Eventually they are much ahead of the remainder of the column."

In this and in other similar dreams the idea of hurry is clearly indicated. It is as if he attempted to keep his hand on the throttle of the future and so dominate the event by anticipating it. Now, when there is interference with the cortical system nervous energy is driven into the reflex autonomic system. Similarly, when energy is expressed in the inferior unadapted way which has been described, it must be either because there is no potentiality of a higher path, and so of more adapted functioning, or because the higher path is not sufficiently canalized. That is to say, it is undifferentiated. It offers obstruction to the nervous impulse and so the latter chooses the line of least resistance along a lower path. An example of this lack of differentiation is seen in the case of the child who in its early efforts to climb a rope in the

gymnasium, experiences, during the intensity of muscular exertion, sexual excitement and sometimes orgasm. It is as if the neuro-muscular system were not sufficiently canalized or differentiated to allow the full influx of energy. Again there are people who see colours when they hear sounds. This phenomenon is called coloured audition. It is often regarded, specially by those who experience it, as being something rather remarkable, as evidence of high development or of artistic potentiality. But it is really due to lack of differentiation. The two functions of sight and hearing are still to some extent fused. They have not become discrete, clear-cut functions. They are not self-determined. They are not differentiated. Now if we view this case of obsessional neurosis in the light of the above remarks we shall see that when a situation was to be met, the energy available used often to express itself through the organic channel in urinary or seminal discharge. This means that there was an absence or limitation of canalization, in higher purely psychological paths, so that the libido of the patient was short-circuited and his expression was inadequate. A part of his psychology remained as it were in the mass—undifferentiated. This is what Jung calls the undifferentiated co-function in the unconscious. It is unconscious because it is undifferentiated. It is potential. I shall call it the inferior function. In this case I think it is feeling which is the inferior function.

It may be asked why does the inferior function remain inferior? The reply is that his family life in which he is so bound up does not tend to develop his feeling. His father's philosophy is exceedingly hard and materialistic. His life has been exclusively devoted to the acquirement of wealth. His religious beliefs were of a crude fire and brimstone order, which made life for his sensitive son bristle with taboos and prohibitions. It is easy to understand that feeling with the patient under these influences is at a discount. But feeling, and that of a very finely graduated kind, is demanded in the various relationships of life outside the family. It is in the feeling relationship that the patient invariably fails. He states that he assumes a pleasant manner to everyone but rarely feels it. Certainly his uniformly pleasant manner is abnormal—almost irritating. In matters of conduct he always represses his feelings. He asks himself "Is this right or wrong?" rather than "What do I feel?" He distrusts feelings. They are irrational. They might compromise him. This distrust is understandable when one thinks how crude and undifferentiated his feeling has shown itself to be in the course of analysis.

For these reasons, then, we say that feeling is the inferior function. In so far as the patient calculates rather than feels his way into life he tries to adapt by means of thought, with distressing results as we have seen. This attempt at adaptation is always with a view to the preservation of his own integrity. He is therefore still identified with the infantile pleasure principle. He has not accepted the pain principle. He has not left his parents either geographically or psychologically. That would certainly mean sacrifice and suffering, which he regards as one aspect of the irrational. Through his father's influence the idea has been ingrained in him that by taking thought, by being prudent, one can secure oneself against the chances of life. This prudent rationalism is backed by all the instinctive energy which has not been freed from the parents as object. In this instinctive energy is included his sexuality in an infantile or primitive form. The force which motivates his rationalism is therefore immensely powerful. The power system is directed by the whole of the instinctive energy which strives, not to lose itself in the scheme of things as they are, but to confine itself in the mould of the infantile pleasure principle. This seeks to maintain that security from the chances and changes of life—the immutable integrity of the ego—which is associated with abnormally prolonged dependence on parental love. It might be said that the onward movement of life is denied and resisted by all the force of that power which should affirm it—that is, sexuality. This is auto-eroticism. It includes the activities usually associated with the term masturbation, but it transcends the ordinarily accepted bounds of the term, because it is developed into a well-organized, if limited, intellectual system. It has become a "Will to Power." I shall call this the superior function. To be identified with it results in a condition which Jung has called God-Almightiness. The rationalistic power system is compensatory for the inferiority of the unconscious feeling. At no time in the analysis has the material shown anything that would indicate an organic inferiority or insufficiency in the sense in which Adler uses the term. In my experience the question of organic inferiority plays a minor part in the great majority of neurotics.

We must now turn to the question of how the inferior function is to be differentiated and made a conscious adapted function—in other words how the mass is to be canalized. During the first two months of rather irregular analysis, the patient became aware that the possibilities of his life had been restricted in no small degree by his fixation to the family. At the same time an orientation about sexuality was obtained. This delivered him from a feeling of isolation and insecurity with regard

to sexual matters, which caused repression of them and contributed to his efforts to maintain his rationalistic power system. The micturition compulsion almost disappeared. He was able to travel long journeys and sit out theatre performances with little or no trouble. At this period he had the following dream.

"I am playing the piano. It seems to be an unusually large one and I can play faster, better and more freely than ever before—such lightning movements."

Associating with piano, he said that he was very fond of playing it, that he had often had recourse to it when hard pressed by obsessions, and that it called forth more feeling in him than many human relations —the piano was larger than usual both in height and compass.

Now here is the idea of greater compass—greater range combined with greater freedom and dexterity. This is exactly what is required psychologically. In my opinion it is the unconscious representation of the potentiality for canalization or differentiation of the crude psychological mass, which I have called the inferior function.

This is most important from the point of view of prognosis. There are neurotics and psychotics whose dreams show the instrument under symbols other than the piano, as being limited or incomplete or feeble. Such dreams may be of great value in indicating how far the psychological condition can be improved by analysis or in indicating a fundamental primary and irremediable defect or deficiency. This important factor in prognosis was pointed out to me by Dr Maurice Nicoll and illustrated by a striking dream of a patient which I am not at liberty to quote.

I am aware that a Freudian interpretation of this dream would reduce it to a repressed masturbation complex. This is inevitable, as the Freudian system is based on the theory of sexual determinism. I am far from minimizing the part played by sexuality in this case. I shall emphasize it later. But it must be pointed out that in the course of analysis, masturbation had ceased to be an acute problem. For that reason perhaps the practice had almost ceased. Therefore, as there was no repression, on which the genesis of the dream depends according to the Freudian system, I submit that the significance of this dream does not refer to the sexual history and therefore to the past, but to the psychological potentiality and so to the future. In this connection it may be interesting to quote from a document which the patient brought about this time. Under the heading "Particular results of analysis," two extracts are as follows:

"Whilst walking along Oxford Street yesterday I experienced a feeling as though somewhere inside my brain a new hope were dawning. There was also a physical sensation as though about one square inch of material lifted. I felt this in the left side of my head."

"During the same afternoon I had a picture—a very live one—of a thin snake stretching from the neck to the forehead under the skin. A lid opened. The head appeared and thin sunlight seemed to stream in."

These would appear to be insane phantasies, but I think they have validity as prognostic signs at that time. The first is an unconscious picture of the lifting of the repression. The second embodies a *motif* which is universal in mythology—instinctive libido under the symbol of the snake becoming active and moving towards the surface. It probably signifies that amount of energy which through analysis has been released from an unsuitable form.

Let us now turn to the aetiology of the obsessions. "Freud came to the conclusion that obsessive processes represent the return in a distorted guise, of self-reproaches dating from childhood and buried since then until the outbreak of the malady. They always refer to *active* sexual performances or tendencies." I quote from Dr Ernest Jones's book, *Treatment of the Neuroses*. This theory of origin holds good in this case. By analysis those obsessions with a manifest sexual content were easily traced back to a specific or a typical episode of adolescent sexual life. For example, he had an obsessive fear that any woman who touched a letter which he had written after an act of masturbation would become pregnant. This made him destroy many letters from time to time. It was traced back to an early sexual misadventure which had caused him great suffering and anxiety. Many other obsessive fears, such as his being the cause of pregnancy or of being the means of transmitting disease in various ways to others—were found to have their origin in past sexual incidents.

But the obsessions spread from the purely sexual field to a much wider field of human relations. For instance, on his way home from India, he bargained with an Egyptian boy about some coins. A British comrade remarked that he was rather hard or unfair to the boy. At the same time an older Egyptian beat the boy for making such a noise. The latter ran away. A railway was near, the track of which was used by pedestrians. The patient feared that the boy might be killed by a train and that he would be responsible. This gave rise to one of the worst and most enduring obsessions he ever had. It lasted for about six months.

What is it that determines this enlargement of the obsessive field beyond the purely sexual? According to the Freudian teaching these obsessions are the results of *displacement* of affect on to non-sexual themes. It follows that if all sexual repressions are brought into consciousness, there should be no more obsessions of any kind whatsoever. Now in this case I think that after six months of analysis all sexual repressions *had* been brought into consciousness. Yet obsessions still occurred, particularly those of self-reproach, although not with such overpowering force. If he borrowed money and was not able to pay it back because the lender was out of reach, he became quite distressed. It was as if he felt himself at the mercy of the world because he was a borrower. It was not consistent with his conscious estimate of himself as an upright citizen. His infantile power system kicked and screamed because his integrity was in danger. His rationalism cannot accept a situation which is incomplete or dubious. It is irrational for him and the principle which is common to all the obsessional ideas, whether sexual or not, is the irrational. From this point of view the obsession may be said to be due to the fact that the superior function (the rational) gets its teeth into the irrational event or possibility and will not let go. There comes a deadlock in the psyche, which monopolizes the whole of consciousness. The question may now be asked, does it help the patient to attribute the meticulous accuracy, the tyrannical scrupulosity of the last-mentioned obsession to a mechanism of sexual repression? Will such knowledge in itself suffice to release the patient from the power of the obsession? I think not. I think that this accuracy or scrupulosity with regard to money to which I have just referred is something important in itself. It is due to that attitude which embodied the crude parental philosophy. I do not think that to reduce this characteristic down to a repressed infantile anal eroticism helps to rob it of its power. I think the redemption from the distressing psychological impasse which so often occurs is through the differentiation of the inferior function of feeling. This can only be brought about by a constructive technique directed to broadening the patient's outlook and philosophy of life, which we have seen to be so limited. The differentiation of feeling proceeds hand in hand with the broadening of the basis of personality. The possibility of this broadening was indicated in the dream of the piano and the process has proceeded steadily and I think satisfactorily. His obsessions now take no organic form whatever and the intensity of the purely ideational ones is greatly diminished. He is able on many occasions to *feel* that what he fears may happen, has every right to

happen, must have happened to other people, and so on. When he really *feels* this the obsession loses its force. It is significant that the unconscious has been much occupied with religion, particularly with oriental forms, the symbols being often reminiscent of his experiences in India. A short time ago he dreamt the following.

"I was in a strange house. I heard a great noise, shouting and the clanging of a bell. A big strong man wished to come in. He called out 'I declare unto you a new religion. I can quiet you and change your present mode of life.' But I was afraid of him and he passed away."

This dream speaks for itself. It may be that if the patient can incorporate the feeling values which are symbolized by the man of the dream he will be delivered from the tyranny of the superior function, and so cease to suffer from that God-Almightiness which has crippled his life.

LA TENSION PSYCHOLOGIQUE, SES DEGRÉS, SES OSCILLATIONS[1]

PAR PIERRE JANET.

LA HIÉRARCHIE DES TENDANCES[2]

IL est facile d'affirmer d'une manière générale que la force et la tension psychologique jouent un rôle considérable dans la conduite humaine et qu'il serait nécessaire de les apprécier pour se rendre compte de la nature et de la gravité d'une maladie mentale. Mais en pratique il est extrêmement difficile de mesurer ces qualités de l'action, car nous connaissons bien mal les caractères qui mettent en évidence la force et l'élévation d'un acte. Sans doute de belles études dont plusieurs ont été faites ici même ont permis de classer quelques-unes des actions les plus élémentaires. M. Sherrington nous a appris à distinguer parmi les réflexes ceux qui sont prochains et ceux qui sont lointains, ceux qui sont simples et ceux qui dépendent d'une intégration plus avancée du système nerveux. M. Head nous a montré des sensations primitives et d'autres plus évoluées en rapport avec l'activité de l'écorce cérébrale. Mais ces notions fondamentales qui rendent de grands services dans le diagnostic des lésions élémentaires sont encore bien peu applicables aux troubles de la conduite qui se présentent dans les névroses et dans les psychoses. Pour comprendre ceux-ci il nous faudrait établir les mêmes classements dans les actions bien plus compliquées qui constituent les relations sociales, qui remplissent la vie humaine de chaque jour; il faudrait établir non seulement le tableau hiérarchique des réflexes élémentaires, mais le tableau hiérarchique de toutes les actions humaines, même de celles qui entrent dans les conduites morales ou scientifiques. Cela est évidemment aujourd'hui un rêve bien téméraire, mais l'utilité d'un tel tableau fait excuser les tentatives trop audacieuses. C'est pourquoi je vais essayer de vous présenter une esquisse rapide d'un tableau hiérarchique des actions humaines que depuis bien des années je m'efforce de construire dans mes cours au Collège de France.

[1] Three lectures delivered before the University of London.

[2] Second lecture delivered May 12, 1920.

I.

Au début de ce tableau nous placerons la conduite animale, car l'homme a d'abord une conduite animale sur laquelle il a édifié une conduite humaine, mais qu'il n'a pu supprimer car elle est indispensable[1]. Cette conduite animale est relativement aux conduites proprement humaines une conduite simple: chaque action provoquée par la stimulation extérieure peut être composée de mouvements nombreux quelquefois compliqués et systématisés, mais elle reste simple parce qu'elle est accomplie d'une seule manière par des mouvements des membres sans être compliquée par le langage qui ajoute aux mouvements des membres une seconde exécution de l'action. En un mot la conduite animale c'est la conduite simple sans la complication du langage, c'est la conduite avant le langage.

Le point de départ de la vie psychologique ne me semble pas devoir être cherché dans les sensations telles qu'elles nous sont connues quand nous les exprimons par le langage, car il s'agit là de phénomènes psychologiques beaucoup trop complexes. Les premiers actes psychologiques dérivent des grandes fonctions de la vie animale, la protection du corps, l'alimentation, l'excrétion, la fécondation, quand celles-ci ne se bornent pas à déterminer des modifications à l'intérieur de l'organisme, mais quand elles donnent lieu à des mouvements des parties extérieures du corps ou à des déplacements de ce corps. Ces fonctions pour s'exécuter dans des conditions plus complexes ont besoin de mouvements de rapprochement et d'écartement qui sont les premiers faits psychologiques, points de départ de toutes les autres conduites plus élevées.

Quand ils sont tout à fait élémentaires, ces premiers mouvements prennent la forme d'*actes réflexes*. Les physiologistes donnent de l'action réflexe une définition fort juste à leur point de vue, mais incomplète quand nous tenons compte du point de vue psychologique. Ils constatent que les réflexes sont des mouvements de telle ou telle partie du corps ayant une étendue et une force bien déterminées qui se produisent régulièrement à la suite d'une modification également bien déterminée de telle ou telle partie de la périphérie du corps. Si l'on se bornait à cette définition tous nos actes même les plus élevés seraient des réflexes:

[1] Ces études sur les conduites élémentaires ont été présentées dans les cours de psychologie du Collège de France, 1904–5, Cours sur *les mouvements des membres*, 1909–10, sur *les tendances élémentaires*, 1910–11, sur *les sensations et les perceptions*. Des résumés de ces cours ont été publiés dans *L'Annuaire du Collège de France*; j'espère pouvoir un jour les publier complètement dans mes *Eléments de psychologie clinique*, en préparation.

je viens de commencer à parler quand M. le président m'a donné la parole, c'est aussi une réaction déterminée à la suite d'une certaine réception et cette conférence est en un sens un réflexe. Comme nous nous proposons de distinguer les actes les uns des autres et de séparer ceux qui sont inférieurs de ceux qui sont supérieurs, je vous proposerai de compléter un peu le sens du mot réflexe quand nous parlons le langage de la psychologie en ajoutant certains caractères négatifs à la définition précédente. Les réflexes sont en outre des actes explosifs qui commencent quand la stimulation atteint un certain degré et qui une fois commencés se déroulent complètement, au moins quand ils ne rencontrent point d'obstacles, jusqu'à ce que la tendance soit complètement déchargée. Ils ne peuvent s'arrêter d'eux-mêmes à tel ou tel degré de leur développement, ils ne peuvent pas davantage être complétés par une addition de force quand la décharge est insuffisante. Les réactions d'écartement, phénomène essentiel de la douleur, les réactions de rapprochement, phénomène essentiel du plaisir, les réactions d'introduction dans le corps et d'excrétion qui en sont des complications se présentent au début sous cette forme.

Au-dessus des réflexes ainsi entendus se sont constitués des actes qui se réalisent d'une manière un peu plus compliquée. Les tendances ne se déchargent pas d'une manière complète après la première stimulation suffisante, elles ne sont plus explosives. La décharge se fait en deux temps après deux ou plusieurs stimulations distinctes. La première stimulation éveille la tendance, provoque une certaine mobilisation des forces, elle est préparante; mais la tendance ainsi éveillée reste à un degré incomplet d'activation jusqu'à ce qu'une nouvelle stimulation déchaînante amène l'acte complet à la consommation. Le chien qui sent dans la plaine l'odeur du lapin ne fait pas immédiatement d'une manière explosive l'acte de manger du lapin, car il le ferait à vide, le lapin n'étant pas dans sa bouche. Le chien se borne à éveiller la tendance à manger du lapin jusqu'à un premier degré que l'on peut appeler le stade de l'érection, il la maintient à ce degré pendant qu'il va, vient, court de tous côtés; maintenant il voit le lapin, la tendance monte à un stade supérieur d'activation, mais ne se décharge pas encore. Enfin il a dans la bouche la stimulation produite par le contact de la peau du lapin, il laisse la tendance se décharger complètement et il mange le lapin. Ces *tendances suspensives* ou à activation échelonnée sont l'élément essentiel des perceptions, elles permettent la constitution de l'objet ou si l'on préfère des conduites en rapport avec l'objet. Les

notions relatives aux objets dépendent de ces actions variées, fuites ou attaques de différentes espèces qui sont déterminées par la présence prochaine ou lointaine de l'objet. Mais il s'agit toujours d'activations incomplètes de ces tendances arrêtées au premier stade, qui se présentent sous la forme d'attitudes, comme je le disais dans mes cours, ou de schèmes. La suspension de l'activation des tendances reste le caractère essentiel des conduites perceptives.

Par une confusion et une extension des tendances relatives au corps propre se sont constituées les premières *tendances sociales*[1]. La conservation du corps des semblables, l'imitation des actions commencées par eux et que l'on continue comme si elles étaient des actions du corps propre, l'acte de suivre le chef, la pitié, la collaboration aussi bien que la rivalité, la lutte et la haine sont devenues des actions bien systématisées. En même temps par un retour sur soi-même apparaissent les tendances personnelles, les tendances à se distinguer des autres, à jouer un rôle, à augmenter le corps propre par toutes sortes d'acquisitions. Ce sont toutes ces actions qui ont préparé les conduites conscientes que l'on a trop souvent le tort de considérer comme primitives.

Le caractère essentiel de ces conduites socio-personnelles me paraît être la collaboration des tendances. L'individu ne réagit plus seulement aux stimulations qui viennent du monde extérieur, il réagit à ses propres actions. Un nouveau mouvement est provoqué par le mouvement précédent comme si celui-ci était devenu une stimulation particulière. L'animal social ne collabore pas seulement avec les autres, il collabore avec lui-même, il surveille, il arrête, il complète ses propres actions. C'est là, si l'on veut, une variété des réflexes appelés proprio-ceptifs, mais une variété particulière qui est devenue le point de départ des phénomènes de conscience. L'acte conscient s'est constitué en même temps que les actes sociaux et ce degré d'évolution peut être appelé le stade des *tendances socio-personnelles*.

La plupart des animaux n'ont que des conduites appartenant à l'un ou à l'autre des deux groupes précédents, des actes perceptifs ou des actes socio-personnels. Certains hommes dégénérés, certains idiots se comportent de la même manière et ne dépassent pas ce niveau.

Nous trouvons au-dessus les actes qui constituent l'intelligence élémentaire, les premières *tendances intellectuelles*. Ces actes apparaissent

[1] *Les tendances sociales et le langage*, Cours de 1911-12; *les premières tendances intellectuelles*, Cours de 1912–13.

en germe et exceptionnellement chez certains animaux supérieurs et ce stade est en quelque sorte intermédiaire entre l'animal et l'homme. Nous ne connaissons guère de peuplade sauvage qui soit encore uniquement à ce niveau: les individus que l'on appelle des primitifs et auxquels on attribue l'intelligence dite prælogique sont comme nous allons le voir au niveau immédiatement supérieur. On pourrait dire que parmi les dégénérescences, l'imbécilité au moins dans ses formes inférieures correspond à cet état d'esprit.

Pour comprendre cette forme d'activité je vous proposerai d'étudier les conduites relatives à certains objets tout particuliers, par exemple les conduites relatives à un panier de pommes. Nous trouvons là d'abord les conduites perceptives relatives à des pommes, objets comestibles, petits, pleins, nombreux: chacun de ces caractères correspond à des mouvements particuliers. Nous y trouvons aussi les conduites perceptives relatives au panier, objet non comestible, grand, vide, unique, c'est à dire réclamant des mouvements différents. La conduite du panier de pommes, pour résumer ainsi les actes qui sont provoqués par lui, contient évidemment quelque chose de chacunes de ces conduites, mais elle ne correspond exactement ni aux unes ni aux autres. Elle comprend en particulier deux sortes d'actions qui n'appartiennent ni aux pommes, ni au panier, l'acte de remplir le panier de pommes et l'acte de vider le panier. Ces deux actes qui sont caractéristiques de la conduite du panier de pommes contiennent l'un et l'autre des parties appartenant aux pommes et des parties appartenant au panier, mais ces actes sont mélangés, combinés ensemble à des degrés divers; dans l'un la conduite du panier prédomine, dans l'autre la conduite des pommes. Nous pouvons faire les mêmes remarques sur les conduites relatives à l'image, à la statue ou au portrait: il y a là des actes perceptifs correspondant à l'animal ou à l'individu dont c'est la statue ou le portrait et des actes perceptifs correspondant à la pierre ou au papier dont est faite l'image. On ne peut supprimer complètement ni l'un ni l'autre: se comporter complètement devant une image d'un animal comme on ferait devant l'animal lui-même, c'est se laisser prendre à un trompe-l'œil et non avoir la conduite de l'image. Celle-ci réclame une combinaison des deux conduites perceptives précédentes comme on le voit dans les deux actes caractéristiques de faire le portrait et de reconnaître le portrait où les deux éléments apparaissent à des degrés inégaux.

Un certain nombre d'objets réclament des conduites analogues, par exemple le drapeau, l'outil, le tiroir de l'armoire, la place du village, le chemin, ce sont des objets intellectuels. A propos de tels objets il y a

toujours combinaison de deux conduites perceptives et suivant la prédominance de l'une ou de l'autre il y a toujours deux actes caractéristiques, fabriquer l'outil et se servir de l'outil, tracer le chemin et suivre le chemin, etc. Cette combinaison de deux conduites perceptives en un seul acte synthétique me paraît le caractère propre des premières conduites intellectuelles. Ces conduites ont, si je ne me trompe, leur point de départ dans les actes sociaux, dans le besoin de modifier les actes individuels par l'addition de caractères particuliers afin de les rendre sociaux, de les rendre intelligibles aux autres, c'est à dire de permettre les réactions sociales.

C'est au milieu de ce groupe de tendances combinées et en même temps qu'elles que s'est constitué le langage qui est une conduite du même genre. La conduite de l'homme qui parle et la conduite de l'homme qui est parlé (si je puis me permettre l'emploi si utile de ce verbe au passif) sont sorties des actes du commandement et de l'obéissance qui existaient déjà chez l'animal. Mais chez les premiers êtres vraiment intelligents il y a eu à ce propos une combinaison des conduites relatives au cri, à la parole, et des conduites relatives à l'exécution des actes. Cette combinaison a donné naissance aux conduites relatives au signe comme précédemment aux conduites vis-à-vis du panier de pommes ou du portrait.

Ces conduites combinées et en particulier la plus importante, le langage, ont transformé les conduites précédentes et les ont intellectualisées. Le mot s'est ajouté à tous les actes et il a précisé la notion d'objet et d'individu. La plus grande intellectualisation a été la formation de la mémoire qui est une opération beaucoup plus tardive qu'on ne le croit généralement quand on confond la mémoire avec la simple conservation des tendances[1]. La mémoire est une certaine transformation de l'action de telle manière qu'elle puisse être communiquée même à des absents. La mémoire est d'abord le commandement aux absents avant d'être le commandement des absents. C'est grâce à cette adaptation à l'absence que la mémoire a pu être adaptée à une propriété remarquable des choses celle de devenir passées. Le passé et la mort ne sont primitivement qu'une absence prolongée. Mais il a fallu pour cela une modification remarquable de la conduite. Les tendances ne peuvent pas s'activer d'ordinaire indépendamment de l'événement qui leur a donné naissance et qui est leur stimulant. Le soldat se bat en présence de l'ennemi, mais il ne se bat plus quand celui-ci n'est plus là. La sentinelle placée aux portes du camp a dû à l'approche de l'ennemi con-

[1] Cf. *Les médications psychologiques*, 1919, II. p. 272

stituer une tendance à une action particulière, le récit, qui pourra être reproduite plus tard en l'absence de l'ennemi simplement par réaction à une question du chef. Cette transformation est des plus remarquables, elle rend la mémoire indépendante de la stimulation à l'action, ce qui aura plus tard une importance très grande.

Ce groupe des opérations intellectuelles élémentaires qui a donné naissance aux symboles, au langage, à la mémoire est l'un des plus importants et des plus difficiles à étudier; il constitue la transition entre la conduite animale et la conduite humaine. Les troubles qu'il peut présenter amènent les plus graves perturbations de l'esprit.

II.

Par suite de diverses circonstances le langage de l'homme s'est développé démesurément et il s'est étendu à tous les actes, car chacun d'eux a été accompagné par une parole. Non seulement l'homme se servait du langage pour communiquer avec ses semblables, mais encore, comme il obéit toujours à la loi fondamentale de se conduire avec lui-même comme il se conduit avec les autres, il s'est mis à se parler à lui-même. Cette parole adressée à soi-même n'avait plus besoin d'être bien haute, car elle était saisie non seulement par l'ouïe mais par ces réceptions internes qui avaient permis dès le début les réactions de la conscience à nos propres actes. L'homme s'est parlé tout bas, la pensée est née, cette parole intérieure à laquelle aucun autre homme ne peut réagir excepté celui-là même chez qui elle se développe. De cette manière des paroles intérieures ou extérieures ont dorénavant accompagné toutes les actions ou à peu près toutes. C'est là ce qui caractérise les débuts de la conduite proprement humaine, car l'homme est avant tout un animal bavard qui parle ses actes et qui agit ses paroles.

A partir de ce moment l'homme a eu à sa disposition deux manières de se conduire à propos de toutes les circonstances. L'une était la conduite ancienne constituée par des mouvements des membres et des déplacements du corps, l'autre était également constituée par des mouvements, mais par des mouvements tout petits, d'une seule partie du corps, du larynx et de la bouche, par des paroles. S'agit-il de franchir la distance qui sépare deux points, l'homme peut marcher réellement avec ses jambes, mais il peut aussi comme les chanteurs de l'Opéra rester sur place en criant: "Marchons, marchons." S'agit-il de la lutte contre les ennemis, il peut se battre en réalité, donner des coups et en recevoir, mais il peut aussi rester chez lui en parlant de combats et de victoires.

Sans doute ces deux conduites ont des relations étroites l'une avec l'autre car le mot n'était primitivement qu'un fragment de l'acte. Mais elles ont cependant des propriétés fort différentes: l'action corporelle, si nous pouvons l'appeler ainsi, a des avantages anciens qui sont la raison même du mouvement des êtres vivants. Elle seule est capable de modifier le monde et de permettre le développement de la vie, elle est la seule vraiment indispensable, mais elle est lente et lourde, et fatigante. L'action verbale semble impuissante et incapable de changer le monde par elle-même, mais aisément communicable elle peut faire faire par d'autres le mouvement que nous ne faisons pas, elle peut même le faire exécuter par nous-même un peu plus tard; mais surtout elle est rapide, ailée et si peu fatigante, si peu coûteuse que comparée à l'autre elle représente une énorme économie de nos forces si précieuses.

Ces deux conduites qui ont ainsi des avantages différents sont juxtaposées et combinées de bien des manières et toute la psychologie des fonctions supérieures devient une analyse de ces relations entre l'action corporelle et la parole. Cette dualité de la conduite humaine est importante même au point de vue philosophique, car elle a été le point de départ de la célèbre distinction du mouvement et de la pensée, du corps et de l'âme, elle a donné naissance à la fameuse théorie du parallélisme entre les phénomènes cérébraux et les phénomènes de la conscience qui a eu une influence si funeste sur les études psychologiques. Bornons nous à constater que l'établissement de relations de plus en plus compliquées entre la parole et l'acte ont déterminé les progrès de la conduite humaine et constitué les stades supérieurs de la hiérarchie psychologique.

Au début, le mot et l'acte étaient inséparables, le mot n'était que le début de l'action, le cri que le chef poussait en commençant un acte pour en rendre l'imitation plus facile[1]. Mais déjà dans le commandement le mot s'est séparé de l'acte, puisque le mot existait chez l'un, chez le chef et que l'acte existait chez un autre individu, chez celui qui obéissait. Afin d'être mieux compris par le plus grand nombre le mot n'est plus resté attaché à une seule action précise, individuelle, il a été rattaché à plusieurs actions légèrement différentes les unes des autres, des mots sont devenus des symboles communs. La mémoire a construit des discours indépendants des actions au milieu desquelles ils étaient nés et capables d'être reproduits dans des circonstances différentes. Dans les plaisanteries, dans les conversations les hommes ont appris à jouer

[1] Cours de 1913–14 sur *les tendances réalistes*, 1914–15 sur *les tendances réfléchies*; cf. *Les médications psychologiques*, I. pp. 215 et seq.

avec le langage, à tirer une excitation du langage lui-même indépendamment de l'action à laquelle il était primitivement lié. Sans doute cette séparation entre le langage et l'action n'a jamais été tout à fait complète car le mot aurait perdu toute espèce de sens, le sens du mot n'étant pas autre chose que l'action ou au moins l'attitude avec laquelle il est associé. Mais la séparation est devenue assez considérable pour que le langage perdît une grande partie de son utilité.

Le langage séparé de l'action était devenu en quelque sorte inconsistant ainsi que l'on peut le constater dans le bavardage de bien des malades. Ils modifient leur langage sous la plus légère impulsion sans se préoccuper le moins du monde du désaccord qui grandit entre leurs paroles et les actions faites par eux-mêmes ou par les autres. Les hommes ont éprouvé le besoin de faire des actes spéciaux pour rétablir intentionnellement cette union entre le langage et l'action ou pour établir et préciser le degré de leur séparation. Des opérations nouvelles ont cherché à rendre au langage une certaine consistance: la promesse est devenue une action qui transforme nos paroles et en refait des ordres pour nous-mêmes. Les promesses, les serments, les engagements d'honneur sont devenus le point de départ de l'affirmation qui a réuni de nouveau au moins dans certains cas l'action verbale et l'action corporelle.

Cette union entre la parole et l'acte s'est faite de deux manières qui ont donné naissance aux volontés et aux croyances. La volonté est une affirmation dont l'exécution est immédiate: je veux marcher et je marche, je veux sortir et je sors. Dans la croyance l'exécution immédiate est impossible; si je vous dis: "Je crois que le jardin de Hyde park est ouvert au public," je fais allusion à certaines actions, entrer dans le jardin, m'y promener. Mais je ne peux pas les exécuter immédiatement parce que le jardin n'est pas ici. Je me borne à unir la parole à l'acte conditionnellement: "Si je me trouve devant la porte de Hyde park, j'y entrerai, je m'y promènerai," c'est une sorte de suggestion à échéance.

Des variétés de la volonté et de la croyance ont créé de nombreux phénomènes psychologiques: je ne vous parlerai pas des acceptations, des refus, des négations, des affirmations intéressantes relatives à des souvenirs. Mais je vous rappellerai qu'à ce moment seulement ont commencé à se constituer les phénomènes si importants des désirs inséparables des croyances, comme l'ont montré autrefois les sociologues, en particulier G. Tarde. Sans doute l'appétit élémentaire existe dans la vie animale, il existe également chez l'idiot au niveau des tendances suspensives. Il n'est pas autre chose qu'un stade d'activation incomplète,

supérieur à l'érection dont nous avons parlé à propos des perceptions. Mais le désir proprement humain, le désir conscient et formulé dans le langage n'existe qu'au moment où nous nous représentons la fin de l'action, où nous la formulons par avance grâce à une croyance. Je vous rappellerai également une autre notion importante qui dérive de la croyance. De même que la conduite perceptive avait créé les objets, la conduite affirmative crée les êtres, car un être n'est pas autre chose qu'un objet auquel la dénomination et la croyance ajoutent la persistance, la stabilité.

Cette forme d'affirmation présente donc des avantages incontestables, mais elle est encore bien peu précise. Il n'existe pour elle que deux formes de paroles, celles qui restent inconsistantes sans aucune importance pour l'action et celles qui sont affirmées avec ténacité, entre les deux il n'existe pas d'intermédiaire. Une parole que l'on entend prononcer, une parole que l'on prononce soi-même tout haut, celle que l'on se borne à penser, une imagination, une métaphore, tout cela se confond: ou bien ce n'est rien, ou bien c'est un être affirmé avec conviction. Cette affirmation même, si brutale qu'elle soit, est-elle au moins appliquée avec quelque précaution? Evidemment l'homme à ce niveau ne transforme pas toutes les paroles en volontés et en êtres, il en laisse un grand nombre conserver la forme inconsistante. Comment choisit-il les langages sur lesquels il opère la transformation? Nous avons envie de répondre: il les choisit par des motifs raisonnables, en raison de la vérité qu'ils contiennent. Hélas c'est se figurer que l'homme est raisonnable avant qu'il n'y ait une raison et qu'il discerne la vérité avant de l'avoir inventée. Il suffit d'avoir fréquenté des névropathes ou même des gens qui se figurent ne pas l'être pour savoir que bien souvent l'homme veut et croit sans raisons. Bien des individus ont affirmé jusqu'au martyre les plus grandes absurdités, bien des malades dès que leur esprit s'abaisse affirment avec un entêtement désespéré des choses manifestement fausses.

A ce moment du développement, en effet, l'affirmation se fait presque au hasard. Elle dépend de la force momentanée qui accompagne telle ou telle formule, elle dépend de l'activation plus ou moins complète des tendances, des attitudes qui restent accrochées à certaines paroles ou sont éveillées au moment où les paroles sont prononcées. Tantôt il s'agit de tendances faibles ou de tendances mal éveillées dont les forces latentes ne sont guère mobilisées. Tantôt il s'agit, au contraire, de tendances puissantes ou de tendances excitables qui mobilisent rapidement, comme la fuite de la douleur, la peur, la colère, l'amour

ou simplement l'obéissance chez les dociles. Dans le premier cas les langages restent inconsistants, dans le second les langages accompagnés par ces fortes tendances sont immédiatement transformés en volontés et en croyances. Nous sommes à l'époque où l'on croit ce que l'on désire ou ce que l'on craint et où les croyances fondées sur des motifs aussi accidentels s'imposent avec une énergie, une ténacité que l'on ne retrouvera plus dans des croyances plus raisonnables.

Comment désigner ces tendances à l'affirmation immédiate qui créent à tort et à travers des volontés et des croyances sans aucune critique, simplement pour suivre l'impulsion momentanément la plus forte? J'ai employé dans mes cours divers termes, je les ai appelé des tendances asséritives parce qu'elles affirment, des tendances appétitives parce qu'elles créent le désir, ou même des tendances réalistes parce qu'elles donnent naissance aux êtres. Peut-être pourrait-on employer un terme plus frappant qui a aujourd'hui quelque succès quand on l'applique à tort à une maladie. Le mot pithiatisme me paraît fort mal placé quand on l'emploie pour remplacer l'ancien mot si célèbre d'hystérie; il pourrait peut-être être conservé pour désigner ce stade du développement de l'esprit humain si important, le stade des *tendances pithiatiques.*

La connaissance de ces tendances, si elle était plus complète, permettrait de comprendre ces mentalités si bien étudiées aujourd'hui par les sociologues comme MM. Durkheim et Lévy Bruhl[1] sous le nom de mentalités prælogiques. Des mentalités tout à fait analogues existent aujourd'hui d'une manière constitutionnelle chez les débiles mentaux. Les auteurs qui ont décrit les prælogiques semblent disposés à croire qu'il s'agit là de tendances psychologiques très différentes des nôtres. Je crois au contraire que nous possédons ces tendances aussi bien que les prælogiques: elles ont joué un grand rôle dans notre enfance, elles ne sont pas anéanties en nous, elles sont simplement dépassées par des tendances supérieures qui les dominent momentanément et il suffit d'une dépression accidentelle pour qu'elles réapparaissent toutes puissantes. Il ne me semble pas possible de comprendre les suggestions ni les délires si l'on n'a pas approfondi l'état mental pithiatique.

Les défauts d'une telle conduite sont trop évidents: tous les degrés de la croyance sont ignorés et la croyance est appliquée brutalement à tort et à travers suivant des influences accidentelles. La volonté et la croyance peuvent être momentanément très violentes, mais elles ne

[1] Lévy Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, 1910.

correspondent pas en réalité aux véritables dispositions de l'esprit: trop souvent l'homme est amené à regretter des affirmations de ce genre.

Aussi peu à peu se sont développées sinon une autre volonté et une autre croyance, au moins une autre méthode de localisation des volontés et des croyances. Cette transformation s'est faite par l'évolution d'un phénomène social extrêmement important qui devrait avoir une place plus grande dans les études de psychologie, je veux parler de l'opération de la discussion entre plusieurs individus qui opposent les unes aux autres leurs volontés et leurs croyances naissantes. Cette discussion sortie du bavardage et de la conversation a eu un long développement. Elle a fini par s'étendre à un grand nombre d'affirmations même quand l'homme se trouvait seul. *La réflexion* est une conduite qui reproduit en dedans de nous-mêmes la discussion d'une assemblée et qui ne laisse l'assentiment se faire qu'après une discussion interne. Ce travail se décompose en une série d'opérations psychologiques qui n'existaient pas au stade du pithiatisme. La première de ces opérations, le doute, est un arrêt de l'affirmation, un maintien actif de la parole à la forme de langage inconsistant. "La plus grande marque de puissance sur soi-même," disait William James, "est de suspendre sa croyance en présence d'une idée qui excite les émotions." Nous ne serons pas étonnés de voir cette opération fragile présenter bien des désordres chez les malades.

Pour sortir du doute l'esprit cherche par une interrogation active à évoquer les diverses tendances en rapport avec la formule proposée pour constater leur force véritable et permanente et non leur puissance momentanée. Quel genre de réponses cette interrogation va-t-elle obtenir? Il ne faut pas se figurer que dès le début la réflexion va être complète et qu'elle va se servir des notions psychologiques les plus élevées. Par exemple, nous pensons volontiers que la réflexion va évoquer des souvenirs: "dans une circonstance semblable j'ai déjà fait ceci et j'ai échoué" et nous pensons que la réflexion va se servir de ce souvenir pour éviter un nouvel échec. En réalité cela n'est pas possible; les souvenirs dont nous avons vu la formation ne sont pas des tendances puissantes capables de donner des ordres. Ce sont justement des tendances à des récits, très séparées des circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont été formées et très isolées de l'action. M. Lévy Bruhl dans son livre sur l'intelligence primitive s'étonne que ses sauvages ne tiennent pas compte de l'expérience, c'est que tout justement ils n'ont pas encore la mentalité d'un Claude Bernard. L'expérience ne fait pas au début partie de la réflexion. La réflexion évoque-t-elle au moins des règles morales et des règles logiques? Oui, sans doute s'il s'agit de règles trans-

formées en tendances à l'obéissance par un long usage social, s'il s'agit de rites traditionnels entourés de peurs et de respects. Mais non en aucune façon s'il s'agit de règles purement morales ou logiques qui demandent à être respectées pour elles-mêmes et qui ne sont pas transformées en tendances puissantes.

La réflexion primitive favorise seulement la lutte de nos tendances, mais elle les évoque toutes et leur permet de se présenter avec toute leur force latente. La lutte de ces tendances constitue la délibération quand elle doit aboutir à une volonté, elle constitue le raisonnement quand elle doit aboutir à une croyance. M. E. Rignano de Milan a bien montré que le raisonnement est une sorte d'essai de l'action par l'imagination; cette observation s'applique également à la délibération dans laquelle les choses se passent exactement de la même manière. Après cette lutte, après ces essais en imagination intervient la décision qui affirme, qui transforme la formule en volonté ou en croyance. Cette dernière opération est analogue à l'impulsion qui caractérisait les tendances pithiatiques, mais elle est précédée et transformée par tout le travail précédent.

Le doute donne naissance à l'idée qui est un langage arrêté d'une manière active au stade du langage inconsistant: l'homme prend des précautions pour que ni les autres ni lui-même ne le laissent dépasser ce degré. Le rôle de l'idée, de la conduite par l'idée, en sachant ce que l'on fait est considérable. Rappelons seulement que l'idée a permis l'essai de l'acte que nous avons déjà vu intervenir dans le raisonnement et qui facilite beaucoup tous les progrès. S'il fallait construire tout de suite en fer la locomotive qu'un ingénieur vient d'inventer, ce serait bien long et bien coûteux, il est plus simple de la construire d'abord en dessin sur le papier et de l'essayer en idée, ce sera beaucoup plus économique. L'intention également dérive de ces notions ainsi que la conduite intentionnelle qui prend deux formes suivant que nous avons nous-mêmes des intentions ou bien que nous soupçonnons les autres d'en avoir. Les explications des choses qui ont déjà commencé avec les productions artificielles et la recherche des procédés de production se précise par la recherche des intentions et des fins. D'autres variétés du doute plus ou moins complet donnent naissance à la conception du passé, de l'imaginaire, du mensonge qui est un développement de la ruse et de la cachotterie des stades précédents et qui va prendre une grande importance. Le mensonge aux autres va engendrer le mensonge à soi-même qui, si je ne me trompe, intervient dans beaucoup de délires. Le mensonge qui donne de l'importance à cette parole intérieure si

réduite que personne ne peut l'entendre ni la deviner amènera le concept de la pensée et de l'esprit: un esprit n'est pas autre chose qu'un être capable de dissimulation et de mensonge.

Il vaut mieux insister sur les transformations que la décision réfléchie impose aux volontés et aux croyances. La volonté réfléchie s'est rattachée à la personnalité d'une manière bien plus nette parce qu'elle ne dépend pas d'une impulsion momentanée, mais de l'ensemble des tendances. De telles actions font partie de la personne, elles entrent dans son histoire, elles sont accompagnées du sentiment de responsabilité. Les impulsifs du degré précédent n'avaient qu'un sentiment vague de leur personnalité, sans doute ils obéissaient à des instincts vitaux et de temps en temps ils présentaient de l'égotisme. Mais les hommes qui possèdent la volonté réfléchie sont devenus capables de faire des calculs d'intérêt, ils ont inventé le véritable égoïsme.

Une modification de langage assez curieuse accompagne ce développement, c'est l'usage des pronoms personnels pour remplacer le nom propre. Au début un individu nommé Jean se bat simplement tout seul, c'est le stade perceptif; puis il se bat en même temps que d'autres, en avant d'eux et en criant, c'est le stade social. Plus tard il reste immobile en criant aux autres: "Marchez, marchez," c'est le stade intellectuel; ensuite il précise sa formule de commandement en criant: "Jean veut que vous marchiez," c'est le stade assértif. Enfin maintenant il crie: "Je veux que vous marchiez," c'est le stade réfléchi. Cette phrase signifie en effet non seulement que Jean veut que les soldats marchent mais encore que c'est lui-même qui le dit: Jean le veut et Jean dit qu'il le veut, c'est ce redoublement exprimé par le pronom personnel qui est propre à la réflexion.

J'insiste aussi sur une modification essentielle de la croyance. Les objets de la croyance simple du stade précédent avaient gagné la stabilité et la permanence, ils étaient devenus des êtres. Mais la réflexion ajoute qu'il s'agit d'une croyance de toute la personnalité, qu'il s'agit d'une croyance dans laquelle nous sommes capables de mettre de la passion. L'être auquel on parvient ainsi se transforme, il devient le réel par opposition à l'irréel de l'idée et de l'imaginaire. Les études sur les maladies mentales qui nous guident pour établir cette hiérarchie des tendances nous ont particulièrement enseigné cette relation entre le sentiment du réel et les opérations de la réflexion: c'est un point sur lequel nous aurons à revenir dans notre dernière leçon. Nous verrons que le sentiment du présent est également troublé quand l'activité réfléchie cesse d'être normale et que par conséquent il appartient égale-

ment à ce niveau. Bien d'autres faits seraient à signaler pour montrer les nombreuses conséquences de la réflexion: il s'agit là d'une opération fondamentale dans notre conduite et un grand nombre de troubles de l'esprit peuvent s'expliquer par des modifications de l'activité réfléchie.

III.

L'activité réfléchie, plus élevée sans doute que l'assentiment immédiat, n'est pas tout dans l'esprit: elle est certainement dépassée par des activités psychologiques supérieures. Nous en serons facilement convaincus en étudiant les individus qui, soit constitutionnellement pendant toute leur vie, soit accidentellement au cours des dépressions, présentent d'une manière complète cette activité réfléchie, mais sont incapables d'aller au-delà. Ils présentent régulièrement quatre caractères principaux, la passion, l'égoïsme, la paresse, le mensonge qui découlent naturellement de la réflexion quand elle n'est pas dépassée. L'individu intéressé n'est pas le type idéal de la société contemporaine, nous sommes quelquefois capables de nous élever au-dessus.

Recherchons ce qui manque à l'activité réfléchie: on peut voir les insuffisances de cette conduite si on examine non les résolutions elles-mêmes, mais les exécutions de ces résolutions. "Video meliora," disait Ovide, "deteriora sequor." "Je vois le bien, je l'approuve et c'est le mal que je fais." Un alcoolique prend devant nous d'excellentes résolutions et deux heures après il s'enivre dans un cabaret. Bien mieux il y a des troubles de la volonté, des aboulies qui ne portent pas sur la décision, mais qui portent uniquement sur l'exécution: certains sujets n'hésitent pas pour voir le bon parti et pour l'adopter, mais ils sont pris de doutes, d'hésitations, ils présentent tous les troubles de la dérivation psychologique quand il s'agit d'exécuter.

Comment cela est-il possible? On pourrait dire d'abord qu'il y a un intervalle de temps entre le moment où la résolution est prise et le moment où il s'agit de l'exécuter. Je ne crois pas que ce soit bien important, la réflexion ne tient pas compte uniquement de l'état momentané des forces, elle s'appuie sur la force profonde de toutes les tendances et celle-ci n'a guère changé. Il y a surtout une différence dans la manière dont les motifs se présentent pendant la délibération qui précède la décision et dans les moments qui précèdent l'exécution. Dans la délibération les diverses tendances ne sont pas réellement toutes éveillées et n'ont pas réellement mobilisé leurs forces. Elles sont simplement exprimées par des formules verbales qui ont chacune une force très

petite, mais proportionnelle à celle de la tendance qu'elle représente. C'est d'ailleurs à cette réduction des forces verbales qu'est due l'économie des essais faits purement en paroles. La décision par la victoire de la formule qui représente la tendance la plus puissante a été obtenue en arrêtant simplement d'autres formules représentatives. Mais au moment de l'exécution il ne s'agit plus de lutter simplement contre des formules représentatives, on se trouve en présence des tendances elles-mêmes réellement éveillées et de grandes forces mobilisées, il n'est pas étonnant que la formule victorieuse se montre insuffisante.

Permettez-moi, je vous prie, une comparaison: La délibération se passe dans une assemblée magnifiquement composée des représentations de toutes les nations, elle aboutit à une décision acceptée par tous ces représentants. Etes-vous bien surs que les Etats vont immédiatement obéir à cette décision de la Société des Nations? Hélas, un de nos grands chefs militaires, un peu désabusé peut être, me disait dernièrement: "La Société des Nations n'aboutira à rien, car on a oublié l'essentiel. Il ne suffit pas de prendre des décisions entre représentants, il faut les faire exécuter par les nations représentées. Pour cela il faudrait une gendarmerie et on a oublié la gendarmerie." Quand la Médée d'Ovide nous dit en gémissant

> "Aliudque cupido
> Mens aliud suadet, video meliora proboque
> deteriora sequor,"

elle a bien pris la résolution dans le parlement de l'esprit, mais elle ne peut pas faire obéir les tendances, car elle aussi, elle manque de gendarmerie.

Il y a cependant des parlements qui font exécuter les lois qu'ils ont votées, il y a des individus qui exécutent leurs décisions réfléchies: c'est qu'ils ont à leur disposition cette gendarmerie qui manquait aux précédents. Cela signifie qu'il y a dans l'esprit de nouvelles fonctions qui se sont constituées pour ajouter de la force aux formules verbales qui n'en ont pas une suffisante et qui doivent cependant triompher[1]. Je résumerai ces fonctions par un mot, il s'agit du travail et de la tendance au travail. Les psychologues n'ont pas à mon avis donné une place suffisante à l'analyse du travail, peut-être parce qu'ils ne se placent pas suffisamment au point de vue de l'action et qu'ils ne se préoccupent pas assez de sa force ou de sa faiblesse. Le travail est un genre d'action plus difficile et plus rare qu'on ne le croit. Il n'existe pas chez l'animal

[1] Cours de 1914–15, *les tendances rationnelles*, 1915–16, *les tendances explicatives*; cf. *Les médications psychologiques*, 1919, II. p. 77.

ni chez l'homme primitif malgré les apparences: nous les faisons agir et peiner pour notre avantage en utilisant leurs tendances inférieures à la recherche de l'alimentation et à la fuite de la douleur, mais ils ne font pas eux-mêmes l'acte du travail. Les criminologistes, comme Maudsley, Lombroso, Ferri, Tarde, nous ont montré comment le travail disparaît chez les criminels et les prostituées; nous savons que le travail s'altère et disparait dans une foule de névroses professionnelles, qu'il est absent dans les aliénations. C'est que le travail, l'effort, appartiennent à des tendances supérieures à la réflexion, que j'ai souvent essayé de décrire sous le nom de *tendances rationnelles* ou de *tendances ergétiques*.

Ces opérations sont caractérisées par une distribution particulière de la force: elles ne se bornent pas à utiliser la force accumulée dans des tendances inférieures, elles tirent leur force d'une réserve spéciale pour l'ajouter aux idées qui ne sont pas assez fortes par elles-mêmes. Un homme qui a du caractère est un homme capable d'exécuter ses décisions, ses promesses, ses engagements, même si cette exécution ne lui cause aucune satisfaction actuelle. Vous avez en Anglais une excellente expression pour désigner "a reliable man," un homme sur qui on peut compter, car il exécute sa parole même si cette exécution lui coûte un effort.

Ces tendances jouent un rôle considérable dans la conduite morale: sans doute il y avait déjà de l'ordre, de la légalité dans les conduites précédentes: des tendances sociales s'étaient développées, des tendances à la sympathie, au dévouement étaient puissantes chez certains individus, la peur de la loi, la peur du châtiment pouvaient déjà arrêter bien des criminels. Mais ce n'était pas la vraie morale, pas plus que le labour du bœuf n'est le vrai travail. Kant a bien compris le caractère essentiel de l'acte moral, quoiqu'il n'en ait pas donné la théorie psychologique. La morale consiste à faire son devoir, non pas parce qu'il plaît ou parce qu'on a peur du châtiment, mais simplement parce que c'est le devoir. Il faut une réserve de forces particulière pour rendre un homme capable d'exécuter un acte de cette manière. Ce n'est pas là seulement une notion morale, c'est une observation psychologique et même une observation clinique. La valeur d'un homme se mesure par sa capacité à faire des corvées: le devoir n'est qu'un cas particulier de ces corvées que l'homme supérieur est capable de s'imposer.

Bien des faits psychologiques dépendent de cette notion fondamentale du travail: l'attention volontaire bien différente de l'attention spontanée, la patience pour supporter l'attente, l'ennui ou la fatigue, l'initiative, la persévérance, l'unité de la vie, la cohérence des actes et

des caractères, toutes choses qui ne sont pas seulement des vertus mais des fonctions psychologiques supérieures. Je veux seulement rappeler l'importance des principes de la raison, de ces règles de logique analogues aux règles morales auxquelles l'homme s'impose d'obéir. Le principe d'identité est, disait-on autrefois, une loi absolue de l'esprit à laquelle la pensée ne peut pas échapper. Quelle erreur! Dans les bavardages, dans les rêves, dans les religions, dans les délires les contradictions et les absurdités sont perpétuelles; les rêveurs, les malades continuent à penser et même à croire avec conviction malgré ces contradictions. Le principe d'identité n'est pas une loi de la pensée, c'est une loi que l'homme impose à la pensée quand il veut être raisonnable et quand il peut l'être. De même que l'homme ne doit pas dans la cité avoir des pensées trop opposées à celles des autres citoyens, de même il ne doit pas être en contradiction avec lui-même et quand il est capable d'effort il s'impose cet accord avec lui-même comme il s'impose l'exécution de ses promesses. Par ce travail il transforme aussi l'aspect du monde: à l'être et à la réalité il ajoute la vérité, car la vérité c'est ce que nous croyons non seulement après réflexion, mais après soumission aux règles.

Vraiment il semble que chacune des grandes fonctions psychologiques se soit particulièrement conservée et développée dans certaines professions. Nous avons vu que le parlementaire, l'avocat, représentaient la fonction délibérative de la réflexion. Il me semble que le professeur représente ces tendances au travail, à l'ordre, au système. Dans les niveaux précédents de l'activité psychologique les progrès, les inventions nouvelles se transmettaient d'abord par l'hérédité, puis par l'imitation, puis par l'ordre, puis par la discussion. Maintenant commence l'enseignement qui transforme les perceptions, les formules d'action pratique, les explications de telle manière que les élèves puissent les retenir, les répéter, les retrouver avec facilité. Une foule d'opérations psychologiques ou logiques ne sont que des procédés d'enseignement systématique qui se sont développés à ce moment de l'évolution.

Rien n'est parfait et nous devons toujours progresser. L'homme à système, l'esprit systématique qui résume ces tendances ergétiques a bien des faiblesses dans la lutte pour la vie, il devient facilement un esprit faux, dénué de sens pratique et il est vite écrasé par un individu plus adroit. Ce nouveau personnage sait tenir compte d'autre chose que de la loi et des principes, il sait tenir compte des faits. Nous nous figurons que tenir compte des faits est une chose bien simple et on a voulu faire de l'utilisation des souvenirs un caractère de la psychologie

animale. Il a fallu bien du temps pour s'apercevoir que bien des hommes, cependant supérieurs à l'animal, ne savaient aucunement tenir compte de l'expérience.

Le souvenir n'est pas une tendance à agir, c'est une tendance à raconter. Si par accident le récit détermine des actes, c'est qu'il reproduit maladroitement quelques-unes des actions qui ont accompagné sa formation, c'est qu'il cesse d'être un souvenir pour devenir une hallucination. Pour que le véritable souvenir soit de quelque utilité pratique dans la vie présente, il faut qu'il soit transformé. J'ai mangé tel fruit et j'ai été malade, j'ai pris tel chemin et je me suis égaré. Ces accidents ne sont arrivés qu'une fois et n'ont pu par la répétition créer des tendances: pour que le premier événement soit considéré comme aussi dangereux que le second il faut que l'esprit établisse un rapport de production entre les deux événements, il faut qu'il tire de ce récit un ordre: "ne mange pas ce fruit, ne prends pas ce chemin"; mais il faut surtout donner de la force à cet ordre qui n'en a aucune. Il est déjà difficile de donner de la force à un précepte généralement adopté par la tribu quand cet ordre n'est pas devenu une tendance puissante. Il a fallu la longue éducation de l'humanité par les religions de morale austère, il a fallu l'acquisition de la domination sur soi-même, l'habitude de sacrifier ses préférences pour que l'humanité devînt capable de donner de la force à l'ordre issu du souvenir. *La conduite expérimentale* est une conduite vertueuse dans laquelle il y a de l'humilité pour exprimer son système avec hésitation et doute, de la fermeté morale et du caractère pour attendre le fait et pour éviter "de donner le coup de pouce à l'expérience," de la résignation pour accepter le verdict de la nature. La religion ne devrait pas être trop sévère pour la science, car c'est elle qui l'a enfantée.

On croit d'ordinaire que cette conduite est réservée au savant qui construit la science et qui expérimente dans son laboratoire. C'est une erreur, le savant précise cette conduite d'une manière particulière, mais il ne l'invente pas. Dans les temps modernes l'esprit expérimental est répandu partout: une cuisinière, a-t-on dit, fait de la science expérimentale quand elle vérifie le temps de cuisson d'un œuf à la coque. L'habileté pratique, la critique des systèmes par leur succès pratique, le besoin de vérification d'un appareil aussi bien que d'un récit, le besoin de confirmation par les observations d'autrui, le sentiment du possible à la place de l'absolu, la conception de la nature, de la loi naturelle, du déterminisme sont des choses partout répandues. Les premiers progrès se sont faits, a-t-on dit, par la méthode de "trial and error," cela est

juste, si nous comprenons bien que c'est nous qui parlons d'essai et d'erreur et que l'animal lui-même ne fait pas d'essais et ne reconnaît pas d'erreurs. C'est chez l'animal une certaine agitation et une certaine cessation de l'agitation qui nous présente l'apparence de l'essai et de l'erreur. Il a fallu bien des siècles pour que les progrès se fassent réellement par "trial and error" pour que l'homme soit devenu capable d'essayer, de constater ses erreurs, d'utiliser de tels souvenirs et de tenir compte de l'expérience.

Nous ne pouvons essayer de prévoir l'avenir ni de deviner quel sera le nouveau progrès de l'esprit et la nouvelle étape de son développement. Peut-être pourrions nous avoir une indication en étudiant les idées de progrès et d'évolution qui depuis quelque temps s'ajoutent aux idées de loi naturelle et de déterminisme. Sans doute le progrès et l'évolution existent depuis longtemps et toutes les tendances que nous avons décrites sont sorties successivement des tendances primitives à l'écartement et au rapprochement par une invention et un progrès incessants. Mais, de même que la méthode de "trial and error" était appliquée inconsciemment, les progrès étaient accomplis sans être recherchés ni compris comme tels. Prendre conscience du progrès, de sa possibilité malgré le déterminisme, comprendre les idées de hasard, de liberté et d'évolution, tout cela me semble une étape nouvelle dans laquelle l'humanité paraît s'engager. J'ai souvent appelé de telles tendances des tendances artistiques parce que les arts ont toujours cherché à cultiver l'originalité, la nouveauté, parce que tous les actes nouveaux se sont d'abord présenté sous la forme artistique avant de prendre la forme pratique. Mais il est évident que ce mot n'est pas absolument juste car des arts ont existé à toutes les étapes du développement. L'art n'est pas autre chose que la mise en pratique des procédés d'excitation et il y a eu de l'excitation à toutes les époques. Il serait plus juste d'appeler ces tendances *des tendances progressives*, car l'idée de progrès et la recherche du progrès en sont le caractère essentiel.

Une des conséquences les plus remarquables de ces nouvelles tendances me paraît être le développement des conduites individuelles et originales, comprises et recherchées comme telles. On admet que chaque homme a son individualité sans réplique, on veut avoir vis-à-vis de lui une conduite également spéciale et individuelle. C'est la recherche de l'intimité, "parce que c'était lui, parce que c'était moi." L'individualité est étendue même aux événements qui semblent avoir chacun des caractères propres, qui n'ont pas existé tels auparavant et qui ne se reproduiront jamais exactement les mêmes. Les sciences de l'histoire

dont le développement caractérise cette période ont sur ce point une attitude embarrassée. Elles répètent bien avec Aristote qu'il n'y a pas de science de l'individuel et qu'elles cherchent des lois générales; mais elles se complaisent dans l'érudition, dans la biographie qui met en lumière le fait individuel. Vraiment, si j'ose faire une comparaison semblable, l'historien se conduit comme le géographe qui décrit minutieusement les détails individuels propres à une région. Mais le géographe a une excuse, c'est qu'il nous fournit un guide précieux quand nous nous promènerons dans la région. Est-ce que l'historien ne conserve pas au fond de l'esprit une pensée qu'il n'ose pas avouer, c'est que l'homme se promènera un jour dans le passé?

Les plantes se bornent à pousser dans l'espace, les premiers actes des animaux ont permis les mouvements, puis les déplacements du corps qui ont triomphé de plus en plus de l'espace. Les conduites en rapport avec le temps ont été bien postérieures et bien moins heureuses, car nous nous bornons encore à pousser dans le temps comme des plantes dans l'espace. La mémoire, ce commandement aux absents ne s'applique au passé que fort indirectement et n'a pas de prise sur lui. Ce n'est qu'au moment des conduites expérimentales que l'action humaine a utilisé le passé et encore dans une bien faible mesure. Les actes où interviennent les notions de progrès et de création libre essayent de mordre sur le temps et de rapprocher le futur. Est-ce qu'un jour l'homme ne fera pas dans le temps des progrès analogues à ceux qu'il a faits dans l'espace? L'évolution n'est pas terminée et l'action humaine a été et sera encore une source de merveilles.

Ces espoirs bien chimériques sans doute, mais consolants pourront peut-être faire pardonner l'aridité de ce long résumé. Excusez-moi d'avoir voulu vous présenter un tableau raccourci des diverses conduites humaines dans leur ordre d'évolution afin de vous donner le sentiment de la hiérarchie des fonctions psychologiques. Cette notion me semblait indispensable pour comprendre les oscillations de l'esprit.

CRITICAL NOTICE.

Instinct and the Unconscious: A contribution to a Biological Theory of the Psycho-neuroses. By W. H. R. RIVERS, M.D., D.Sc., F.R.S. Cambridge University Press. pp. viii + 252.

"The aim of the study set forth in this book is to provide a foundation for a biological theory of the psycho-neuroses." The attempt to establish this foundation occupies the first fourteen chapters. The formulation of the theory and its application to the psycho-neuroses are compressed into five chapters, consisting in all, of only 40 pages. About one-third of the whole book is made up of six appendices, in which the practical application of the theory is illustrated by cases derived from Dr Rivers' personal experience of the psycho-neuroses of war. The most interesting and instructive portion of the book is that in which the attempt is made to find a biological background for the various psychological mechanisms accepted by Dr Rivers as being concerned in the production of the psycho-neuroses and allied states.

One of the most striking features of "the system of psycho-therapy which came to be accepted in Great Britain in the treatment of the psycho-neuroses of the war" was the unanimity with which those medical officers who had had previous training in psychology, as well as those who had not, accepted the Freudian doctrine of repression as a causative factor in the production of those bodily and mental disorders which came to be grouped together under the term 'shell-shock.' This one concession to the truth of psycho-analytic theory was made by many who were, and who remain, firmly opposed to Freud's teaching as a whole; and of all who appreciated the importance of repression as a psychopathological mechanism, no one has brought more original thought to bear on its possible implications than Dr Rivers has done in this book.

Dr Rivers seems prepared to accept the mechanism of repression, as well as some other Freudian mechanisms, but his study of the psycho-neuroses of warfare has led him to believe that the pathogenic importance ascribed by Freud to repressions in the sexual life finds here no justification, however important these may be in the causation of civil or peace neuroses. But he thinks that repression bearing on another group of instincts—the danger-instincts which have arisen in the service of self-preservation—does sometimes, when it fails, give rise to just those mental and bodily disorders, characteristic of the psycho-neuroses, which were so widely observed in 'shell-shock' cases. Such differences as are found between the neuroses of war and those of civil life are, he thinks, due in large measure to the differences in the nature of the instinctive tendencies which have escaped from control. So far, however, as mechanism is concerned, his conclusions are quite on psycho-analytic lines: "the main function of psycho-neurosis," he says, "is the solution of a conflict between opposed and incompatible principles of mental activity."

In the elaboration of his views Dr Rivers makes a praiseworthy and painstaking endeavour to make clear the sense in which he uses various

terms which have become common in psychopathological writings; and this is the more necessary since he uses some of them in a sense different from that which is customary. His first task is to make as clear as possible the sense in which he uses the two terms incorporated in the title of his book, namely, 'instinct' and 'the unconscious.' Very rightly, as I think, he uses the term unconscious only in what psycho-analysts call its 'systematic' sense. He says, "In so far as the term the unconscious applies to experience, it will be limited to such as is not capable of being brought into the field of consciousness by any of the ordinary processes of memory or association, but can only be recalled under certain special conditions."

Experience of which this is true he calls 'unconscious experience.' His use of this latter term has shocked some of the academic psychologists and the philosophers, just as the notion of 'unconscious ideas' had already done; for they maintain that consciousness is of the very essence of experience. This objection apart, however, there is perhaps some ambiguity in Dr Rivers' use of the words. Generally it is plain that he means by 'unconscious experience' experience that has become unconscious, that is to say, the residua or dispositions left in the mind in consequence of experience; and it is not clear if he would regard as 'unconscious experience' the unconscious activity the occurrence of which he admits. It seems possible to understand his use of 'unconscious experience' in these two senses, namely, either as past experience which has *become* unconscious, or as present experience which *is* unconscious; and although the examples he gives in illustration of his use of the words are to be understood in the former sense, some of the conditions he describes would imply the latter.

The process by which experience becomes unconscious Dr Rivers speaks of as 'suppression.' It is a process which takes place unwittingly, without conscious effort. He chooses the term 'repression' to indicate the process by which we wittingly endeavour to banish experience from consciousness. This would appear to be a most unfortunate choice of words. The principles involved in what is here called suppression are principles which, without any doubt, we owe to Freud's teaching, and to the mechanism by which mental processes are kept out of consciousness he applied the term 'verdrängung.' The psycho-analysts of English-speaking countries have, almost unanimously, adopted the word 'repression' as a suitable translation of this, and have used it extensively in their writings as a technical term which carries with it all the implications of the German word as used by Freud. Consequently, nothing but confusion can result from any attempt to substitute another word,—even if it be etymologically more correct,—for that which has come into common use. Especially is this so when the term whose ordinary usage has been discarded is used to describe a very limited part of the whole process to which it was originally applied. Many writers have felt the need of separate terms for the two processes—the pushing out of consciousness what has been there, and the exclusion from consciousness of what is endeavouring to get in—and some writers have used the words suppression and repression in just the opposite way to that which Dr Rivers has adopted; that is to say, they have used suppression in the sense in which Dr Rivers uses repression, and they have used repression in the sense in which he uses suppression. This way of using the words is not so apt to lead to confusion as that chosen by Dr Rivers, for at least the word repression is here applied to the main part of the process which the psycho-analysts understand by this term. Although

I deprecate Dr Rivers' use of these terms it will be necessary, for the purposes of this notice, to adhere to his terminology.

A physiological parallel to suppression is found by Dr Rivers in the control or inhibition which belongs to the essence of nervous activity. "The suppression by which experience becomes unconscious is only a special variety of the process of inhibition common to every phase of animal activity." The examples chosen to illustrate this parallelism are taken from the work of Dr Head and his colleagues on protopathic and epicritic sensibility, on the relation between the cerebral cortex and the optic thalamus, and on the 'mass-reflex.'

When in the evolution of the nervous system, epicritic sensibility arose, the more primordial protopathic sensibility became in great part suppressed. The vague and crude character of the sensations in the protopathic stage, which sufficed for such movements as would withdraw the threatened part from contact with an object, was incompatible with the finer discrimination and localisation of the stimulus necessary for more intelligent behaviour. Protopathic sensibility, therefore, had to be suppressed, because its persistence would have been detrimental to the developing organism. A somewhat similar relation exists between the cerebral cortex and the optic thalamus. When the cortex is in action the affective over-response which Head and Holmes observed in cortico-thalamic lesions is largely suppressed. So, also, the mass-reflex obtained from the lower end of the spinal cord, when this is isolated from the rest of the nervous system, is wholly suppressed in the normal human being. Dr Rivers sees in these examples a number of processes which form intermediate links connecting the suppression of highly complicated mental processes at one end of the series with the suppression necessary for the perfection of reflex action at the other end of the series.

In considering the nature of the content of the unconscious Dr Rivers gives in illustration the experiences repressed in a case of claustrophobia, his own missing memories of childhood experiences connected with a particular part of the house in which he spent his early years, and the disappearance from consciousness of intellectual and emotional experiences observed in cases of war-neuroses. In all these instances, as also in suppressions at the sensori-motor and reflex levels, he finds that the elements which produce the need for suppression belong to the affective aspect of the mind, and he concludes that suppression is especially apt to occur as a means of getting rid of painful experience, the memory of which would interfere with comfort and happiness, or, as its immediate effect, would prejudice health. This conclusion is not far removed from Freudian teaching, although perhaps the utilitarian aspect of suppression is given more prominence than the purely hedonic aspect which Freud emphasises. But, on the whole, Dr Rivers thinks that the relation of affect to instinct suggests that "the special function of the unconscious is to act as a store-house of instinctive reactions and tendencies, together with the experience associated with them, when they are out of harmony with the prevailing constituents of consciousness, so that, when present, they produce pain and discomfort." This is practically pure Freudian doctrine both as to the mechanism of 'suppression' and, in general terms, as to the nature of the content of the unconscious.

Its innate character is taken to be the distinguishing mark of instinct on the biological side, but various kinds of instincts, differing according to their psychological character must be recognised. Certain forms of instinct are

believed by Dr Rivers to conform to the 'all-or-none' reaction in which there is an absence of graduation according to the conditions by which the behaviour is produced. He finds this all-or-none principle holds very largely true of protopathic sensibility and of certain reflex actions, such as the 'extensor thrust,' and the mass-reflex. So, also, in the child, or in the adult whose emotions are not well under control, instinctive or emotional response to a dangerous situation tends to exhibit the characteristics of the all-or-none principle. In addition to the absence of graduation in the response to stimulation, its immediacy is another characteristic, as is also the absence of discrimination in regard to the degree of danger which is threatened.

When he first put forward the view that instincts are subject to the all-or-none principle Dr Rivers implied that this held true of all instincts, but he now admits that such features as lack of discrimination and absence of grading in the response are not found in the behaviour of many animals whose activities are universally regarded as our pattern of the instinctive. As he says, "it is certain that the all-or-none principle does not hold good of the activity of the bee when constructing the cells of the honey-comb." He thinks, however, that the original modes of response in the insect were of a crude and more 'protopathic' kind, and that these have been modified and regulated by some graduating influence comparable to that which is exercised by intelligence in the grading of certain human instincts. This influence he identifies with suggestion which, with its three constituent processes of sympathy, mimesis and intuition, he regards as an "aspect of the gregarious instinct whereby the mind of one member of a group of animals or human beings acts upon another or others unwittingly, to produce in both or all a common content, or a content so similar that both or all act with complete harmony towards some common end."

The instincts which have most clearly retained their original protopathic character and remain subject to the all-or-none principle are those reactions which subserve self-preservation by ensuring protection from danger; but even here Dr Rivers has to admit that in man they become modified by intelligence and capable of graduation. The principle seems especially true of the reactions of flight and aggression, and also of the suppression of these when other modes of reaction, incompatible with them, come into play. In the reaction to danger by immobility the suppression of the tendency to flee or to fight must be complete if it is to be successful—it must be all-or-none. So, likewise, in man, when a dangerous situation is met by aggression, discriminative and chosen actions, such as the manipulative dexterity necessary for the use of weapons, requires that the crude instinctive impulse to fight in blind anger should be suppressed, though here the suppression need not be so complete.

Dr Rivers believes that originally suppression was subject to the all-or-none principle, but in the course of phylogenetic development became modified, so that now, in adult man at least, it is capable of graduation. Yet he thinks it may still be found in its original form in infancy, and in those morbid states which are associated with regression towards infantile forms of mental activity. It would seem probable however, that Dr Rivers has attached too great importance to the findings of physiological and pathological experiment, and has generalised too widely from the results so obtained. For every demonstration of the all-or-none principle has entailed some mutilation of the living organism whereby that inhibition which he admits to be common

to every phase of animal activity is completely abrogated. Such demonstrations can never show us that the all-or-none principle is ever exhibited in the normal reactions of any living creature, however low its organisation may be. So soon as multicellular organisms arose in the evolutionary process, the mutual inhibitions which mutual interdependence entailed would prevent the retention of the all-or-none reaction by any particular element, and would ensure a certain amount of grading in every response to stimulation. With the growing complexity of instinctive activities as we rise in the animal scale, the possibility and the necessity for grading would proportionately increase. If the grading of the human instincts were due only to the control acquired in the course of individual experience we might agree with Dr Rivers that, in infancy, examples of the all-or-none principle might be found; but when we consider the facts of inheritance, and realise what is innate in the human mind, we may be prepared to admit that the tendency to grading—*i.e.* the inhibitions—as well as the instincts, is there from the beginning. There are, therefore, good grounds for doubting whether the all-or-none principle is ever manifested by the intact living organism.

In such an example of suppression as he found in his case of claustrophobia, Dr Rivers recognises that the unconscious experience shows signs of activity. "This activity," he says, "is usually known by the name of dissociation," but he declines to adopt such a use of this term. And in this he is surely justified, for few, I think, would agree to such a definition. But in his desire to make the facts of psychopathology fit into his biological theory of the neuroses, Dr Rivers sometimes puts disconcerting restrictions on the meaning of terms in common use; and nowhere does this practice seem more confusing and unwarranted than in his chapter on dissociation.

He regards dissociation as a process which experience undergoes when it has been suppressed. The special feature of dissociation, as he understands it, is that the suppressed experience does not remain passive, but acquires an independent activity of its own. This independence of activity he regards as an essential character of dissociation. But another essential character he desiderates is "that this independent activity carries with it independent consciousness." Now I would submit that this definition is much too narrow, and that its adoption would lead to endless confusion.

Dr Rivers takes the fugue as the most characteristic example of dissociation, and by doing so he implies that in the fugue state we witness the independent activity of some suppressed experience. And this is, in some sense, no doubt true. There has been some suppression of feeling or desire which finds an outlet in the fugue. But this is very different from the independent activity witnessed, for example, in what Janet calls monoideic somnambulism; for here behaviour consists entirely of suppressed experience which is merely re-enacted in the somnambulism. Dr Rivers says, "the fugue usually comes into being owing to the fact that some unpleasant experience has become unconscious by the unwitting process of suppression"; but it is not the unpleasant experience in question which shows independent activity in the fugue. The fugue does not, in this respect, seem a very good example of the kind of independent activity which is held in this book to be characteristic of dissociation.

But "if we accept the fugue as a typical and characteristic instance of dissociation, we are at once faced by another problem of definition," namely, the question of "the independence of consciousness" which he holds to be

also characteristic of dissociation. A considerable amount of ambiguity surrounds his use of this phrase. As he truly says, "the subject of a fugue is certainly not unconscious," but his consciousness during the fugue is "cut off or dissociated from the consciousness of the normal waking life." In this sense it may be said that the 'independent activity' carries with it 'independent consciousness,' and Dr Rivers contrasts this with what occurs in claustrophobia, where the unconscious experience, though active, gives no evidence of independent conscious existence. He then goes on to say: "It is wholly out of place to speak of the unconscious or of unconsciousness in the case of a fugue, and Dr Morton Prince has suggested that we shall use the terms 'co-conscious' and 'co-consciousness' rather than 'unconscious' and 'unconsciousness.'"

I cannot help thinking that Dr Rivers here shows some misunderstanding of Dr Morton Prince's use of these terms—or, at least, that his reference to them may lead to misunderstanding in the minds of some of his readers. I do not think Dr Morton Prince would ever apply the term 'co-consciousness' to the consciousness manifested by a patient *during a fugue*. Whether or not he would consider the 'fugue-complex' to be co-conscious when the patient comes back to his normal state, is another matter. I believe he would agree with Dr Rivers that "in an ordinary fugue we have no evidence of such co-existence of independent consciousness." Nor is it correct to say that these terms are especially appropriate to the examples of double or multiple personality such as that of Dr Prince's patient Miss Beauchamp; for only one of the personalities in this case, namely B iii (Sally), was co-conscious. When, therefore, Dr Rivers tells us that he does not propose to adopt Dr Morton Prince's terms for the more ordinary cases of dissociation, we must reply: "Neither does Dr Prince."

In choosing the term 'alternate consciousness' to indicate the kind of independent consciousness shown in fugues, Dr Rivers is hardly introducing anything new into psychopathology. This term has been used for many years exactly in the sense in which it is used in this book, namely, to denote a phase of consciousness which alternates with the normal waking consciousness or with other secondary states.

Many years ago[1], in attempting to classify cases of multiple personality, and, incidentally, all instances of mental dissociation, I tried to divide them into two great groups which I called the 'simply alternating' and the 'co-conscious' types. (It is necessary to qualify the word 'alternating' in this way because co-conscious personalities may alternate also. The true distinction lies in the presence or absence of co-consciousness.) In the simply alternating type there is reciprocal amnesia between the two states, and the one state does not 'know' the other,—A does not know B, and B does not know A. In the co-conscious type amnesia is in one direction only,—A does not know B, but B does know A, and when B comes as an alternating personality it remembers all that A has said or done.

Since a true co-consciousness—the existence of which, in some cases, Dr Rivers admits—is obviously an 'independent consciousness,' it would have led to greater clearness in his exposition if he had reserved the term 'alternate' for such independent consciousness as is exhibited in fugue (my simply alternating type) instead of using, as he does, 'alternate' and 'independent' indifferently, as if they were synonymous.

[1] *Proceedings Soc. Psy. Res.* 1912, Vol. xxvi, p. 257.

Dr Rivers' purpose apparently is so to define dissociation that it may easily fit into his biological theory of the neuroses. He states very clearly his conclusion regarding its nature, on p. 79. He there says: "The term 'dissociation' will then be used for a process of activity of suppressed experience in which this activity is accompanied by consciousness so separated from the general body of consciousness that the experience of each phase is inaccessible to the other under ordinary conditions, in which the two phases can only be brought into relation with one another by means similar to those by which experience can be recovered from the unconscious." Such a definition would exclude co-conscious personalities from the category of dissociation; for in these cases it cannot be said that each phase is inaccessible to the other under ordinary conditions. And if co-conscious personalities are excluded, then hypnotic states must be excluded, for the relation between a co-conscious personality and the normal waking self, in regard to the accessibility of the experience of each phase to the other, is precisely the same as that between the hypnotic and the waking state. Yet we find Dr Rivers saying, on p. 102, that "hypnotism affords a characteristic example of dissociation."

To say that "the hypnotic state only differs from...a fugue in having been produced by the suggestion of another person" is to misrepresent entirely the nature of fugue states. In a typical fugue there is that reciprocal amnesia between the two phases which characterises the simply alternating type of double personality, while between the hypnotic state and the waking state the amnesia is always one-sided. The memory in the hypnotic state includes the events both of hypnosis and of waking life.

In speaking of post-hypnotic suggestions Dr Rivers is constrained to suppose that in some cases their fulfilment may be accompanied by co-consciousness, and he says that this hypothesis would naturally lead us to an interpretation of the fugue on similar lines; that "it would lead us towards, if not to, the view that in a fugue the normal consciousness is there underlying the split-off consciousness accompanying the activity of the fugue." But does anyone suppose that *during hypnosis* the normal consciousness is there underlying the split-off consciousness accompanying the activity of the hypnotic state? What is sometimes asserted is, that in the waking life of a trained hypnotic somnambule the 'hypnotic personality' may persist, and be aroused to function as a co-consciousness,—as an independent stream of consciousness concurrent with the consciousness of the waking self. The true parallel in fugue would be to suppose that in the normal state of the patient the split-off consciousness of the 'fugue personality' is there underlying the normal consciousness. But while there is good evidence of such a possibility in the case of trained hypnotic subjects, there is no evidence, so far as I know, in favour of the view that such co-consciousness ever obtains in cases of fugue.

Thus, although Dr Rivers' definition of dissociation would seem to exclude co-conscious personalities (because here the experience of one phase *is* accessible to the other), he is evidently prepared to admit them among the dissociations provided that they alternate. It would also seem that when he speaks of 'independent' consciousness, he has in mind only 'alternate' consciousness, and disregards or disbelieves in the 'independence' of co-conscious states. It is because hypnosis is an alternate phase of consciousness that he regards it as independent, and includes it among the dissociations; but, as has been pointed out, the fact that the experience of the normal phase *is* accessible to the hypnotic phase should, by his definition, exclude it. It would, therefore,

seem that either his definition is faulty, or hypnotism should not be called a dissociation.

Seeing, however, that hypnotism is included among the dissociations, we are surprised to find that hysteria is excluded. He says that "if...we hold independent consciousness to be a necessary part of the concept of dissociation it is evident that hysteria wholly fails to answer to the definition, for there is no evidence whatever of such independent consciousness. In the absence of any evidence of alternate consciousness, it is doubtful if anything is gained by bringing hysteria within the category of dissociation. I have therefore no hesitation in excluding dissociation from the connotation of hysteria" (p. 134). He admits the close relation of hysteria to hypnotism, but he thinks it differs from hypnotism "in being unaccompanied by independent consciousness."

In speaking thus of hysteria Dr Rivers seems to have in mind only symptoms like anaesthesia and paralysis, for such hysterical manifestations as monoideic somnambulism, for example, present in striking form the characteristics of independence and alternation which he desiderates for dissociation. And even in anaesthesia the presence of 'subconscious' sensations, which Janet so clearly demonstrated,—sensations which Dr Morton Prince would call co-conscious,—is enough to justify us in speaking here of 'independent' consciousness. It has been so frequently insisted—and on very good grounds—that the phenomena of hypnotism and the phenomena of hysteria are indistinguishable, that it is difficult to understand, if this be so, how the former are examples of dissociation while the latter are not.

It is the biological significance which he sees in the process of dissociation as defined by him that makes it necessary for Dr Rivers so greatly to restrict the concept of dissociation. He seeks to show that there has been some biological need to account for the presence of dissociation among the potentialities of human behaviour. He points to the necessity, in such amphibians as the frog and the newt, for the suppression of the memories of one phase of their existence when the other phase is entered upon. "It is essential to the comfort, if not to the existence, of the frog that it shall not be disturbed by the memories of its experience as a tadpole." As early, then, as the amphibian phase of man's evolution the mechanism of dissociation was already present. In morbid states early instinctive modes of reaction tend to reappear, and the occurrence of dissociation under morbid conditions is an example of such a regression.

This is Dr Rivers' explanation of the mechanism of hysteria. He regards it as "a state dependent on the coming into activity, in a modified form, of a mode of reaction which dates back to a very early stage of animal development." It is a regression to one of the modes of reaction shown by animals when confronted by danger, namely, the reaction of 'immobility.' The paralyses and anaesthesias of hysteria are partial manifestations of a process which, if it were complete, would produce immobility and insensibility of the whole body. In the war-neuroses the conflict between the danger-instincts and the call of duty is solved by a modified form of the "reaction of immobility," which brings about bodily states that unfit the soldier for further participation in warfare.

Dr Rivers seems to accept Babinski's view of the importance of suggestion in the production of hysteria, and, indeed, he has proposed 'suggestion neurosis' as an appropriate term for the state. Primarily, however, he regards it as

being due to the activity of a danger-instinct—an instinct whose primary function is protection from danger. For this reason he now prefers to call hysteria 'substitution neurosis.'

Dr Rivers sees that if his view of the nature of hysteria is sound, it ought to be possible to show that it holds good not only for the neuroses of warfare, but also for hysteria as we know it in civil practice. He admits that his own experience in this field is too small to enable him to deal adequately with this problem; but, even in the brief consideration he gives to it, he finds the difficulties so great that he is inclined to believe that the hysteria of peace and the hysteria of war are "two distinct varieties of hysteria," the two differing in the nature of their aetiology.

It is hardly possible to examine here Dr Rivers' application of his biological theory to the neuroses as a whole. Restricted in his experience, as he admittedly was, to the psycho-neuroses of war, he escapes many of the problems which are presented by the more complex conditions of the peace or civil neuroses. He admits the similarity of the mechanisms in both cases, but the importance he ascribes to the danger-instincts and his insistence on their sufficiency to produce the symptoms of hysteria and other neuroses, run counter, on almost every page, to that body of knowledge which psychoanalysis has built up in the course of many years of investigation of the neuroses and psychoses of civil life. Nevertheless, Dr Rivers' contributions to the problems of nervous and mental disorders are of great interest, and his endeavour to give them a biological setting is a legitimate application of that principle of continuity which should ever dominate the pursuit of the biological sciences.

T. W. MITCHELL.

REVIEWS.

The Croonian Lectures on the Psychology of the Special Senses and their Functional Disorders. By ARTHUR F. HURST, M.A., M.D., F.R.C.P. London: Henry Frowde, Hodder and Stoughton, 1920. pp. x + 122.

The Croonian Lectures delivered this summer before the Royal College of Physicians are here published in full with additional case-records. They are devoted to a description and an interpretation of some of those symptoms which are manifestations of the psychical disorder often termed 'Hysteria,' a label which Dr Hurst adopts because of its ancient usage.

He defines an hysterical symptom as one "which has been produced by suggestion and is curable by psychotherapy." and hysteria as a condition in which such symptoms are present. That suggestion is perhaps an essential factor in the production of hysterical symptoms no one will gainsay. But such a definition does not take into account the variable suggestibility of different individuals or of the same individual on different occasions. Dr Hurst believes that "given a sufficiently powerful suggestion, there are probably no individuals who would not develop hysterical symptoms." But there are surely other variables than the strength of stimulus. It would seem evident that in any attempt to arrive at an adequate explanation of the occurrence of hysterical phenomena it is necessary to take into consideration not only the strength and nature of the suggestion but also the psychological situation of the individual before, during and after the presentation of the suggestion. Within the province of the enquiry should also be included the question as to whether hysterical manifestations show any trace of unconscious aim or purpose and the cause of their perpetuation in the absence of treatment.

Dr Hurst is of opinion that the patient who is suffering from blindness or deafness of psychogenic origin fails to see or hear because he is inattentive to visual or auditory impressions. One gathers from his book that he considers this process to be a passive one, a view which is in direct opposition to the findings of most investigators. In this connection mention may be made of the comparative freedom from anxiety and emotional distress in many patients with sensory or motor disturbances of psychical origin who before the appearance of the somatic disorders were depressed and worried. This observation which has been made by many psychologists seems to have escaped the attention of the author but it is one of some significance. Further no comment is made on the absence of paralysis and anaesthesia in so large a number of those cases of psychoneurosis in which anxiety forms a prominent symptom.

In his description of cutaneous, auditory and visual sensibility and certain associated motor and reflex disturbances the author has presented much interesting material. He brings forward a mass of evidence to show that the so-called mental and physical stigmata in hysterical subjects are the result of suggestion on the part of the investigator, and so far as the physical manifestations are concerned his findings are most striking. Of especial interest are his observations on the efficiency of the tests commonly used for diagnosis in cases of deafness. He clearly demonstrates the uselessness of the tests usually employed to distinguish complete deafness of psychical origin from that due to structural changes in the auditory apparatus. In both groups of cases there

may be failure of response to the vibrations of a tuning fork conducted through air or by bone, and the auditory-motor reflex may not be obtained. In addition Hurst has observed that patients with complete deafness which has proved later to be psychogenic in origin may, during sleep, appear to be entirely uninfluenced by loud noises, and under deep hypnosis may show a similar inability to respond to sounds. The tests, however, which are of value in differentiating the two groups of cases are those for the vestibular reactions; with deafness of psychical origin the vestibular reactions are normal while they are diminished or absent when the internal ear or the eighth cranial nerve has been injured. Many other points of practical importance will be found in this book which will be read with admiration for the success which has attended the author in his treatment of hysterical conditions.

GEORGE RIDDOCH.

Suggestion and Autosuggestion. A Psychological and Pedagogical Study based upon the Investigations made by the New Nancy School. By CHARLES BAUDOUIN. Translated from the French by EDEN and CEDAR PAUL. Pp. 288. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1920. Price: 15*s.* net.

A book exclusively devoted to suggestion might seem almost an anachronism at the present day, when the analytic study of unconscious mental activity so completely holds the field in psychology, psychotherapy and pedagogy. But in the present volume Charles Baudouin has shown that it is still possible to say something new about suggestion and, what is more, something decidedly to its credit as a mental force. With great modesty he attributes his views to Emile Coué of Nancy, to whom he dedicates his book, and he devotes much space to a description of Coué's methods. But it is to Baudouin himself that our gratitude is due for the wonderful clearness with which he has presented these views and for the most interesting speculative theory which sums up his philosophical position.

After a clear analysis of earlier definitions of suggestion, in which he finds the emphasis wrongly put on the first part of the process, viz. the *acceptation* by the mind of the subject of an idea proposed or imposed by the operator, Boudouin defines it as "the subconscious realisation of an idea." He thus emphasises its active rather than its passive side, and also opens the way to the view that suggestion is primarily auto-suggestion and does not need an operator, and that hetero-suggestion itself is not the primary form, as is usually believed, but is secondary to, and dependent upon, auto-suggestion. Spontaneous auto-suggestion is continually occurring, especially in childhood, and is often noxious. It needs therefore to be counteracted. No doubt the greater intellectual insight given by analysis is the most effective antidote, but Baudouin has much to say in favour of counter-suggestion here, because he looks upon suggestion as an active force which can go beyond the neutralising of bad tendencies and, through the subconscious, can give greatly enhanced power over the physical organism.

The laws of suggestion are formulated as follows:

(1) *Law of Concentrated Attention.* "The idea which tends to realise itself in this way [by suggestion] is always an idea on which spontaneous *attention* is concentrated, or an idea which has been forced on the attention after the manner of an obsession."

(2) *Law of Auxiliary Emotion.* "When, for one reason or another, an idea is enveloped in a powerful *emotion*, there is more likelihood that this idea will be suggestively realised."

(3) *Law of Reversed Effort.* "When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes and tend to intensify the suggestion."

(4) *Law of Subconscious Teleology.* "Suggestion acts by subconscious teleology. When the end has been suggested, the subconscious finds means for its realisation."

Baudouin attributes the great practical success of the New Nancy School to the explicit recognition of the law of reversed effort by Coué. Coué's own formulation of the law is as follows:

"When the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination *invariably* gains the day."

"In the conflict between the will and the imagination, the force of the imagination is *in direct ratio to the square of the will.*"

It is thus clear that suggestion, which belongs to the sphere of imagination, is different in kind from voluntary effort, and that the attention, needed by it in accordance with Law (1), must not be *voluntary* attention. It is rather a state of *recueillement* (collection) and *contention*—the latter being a French term which Baudouin defines as "a psychological equivalent of attention, minus effort."

The author has much to say on the practice of auto-suggestion which is of the utmost interest and value, and he gives a description of Coué's practice and concrete results which will arouse high hopes. His occasional attempts to link up his doctrine with that of psycho-analysis are not conspicuously successful. Indeed, his apparent approval of the latter is little more than mere lip-service. He uses the term 'transference' where he should be speaking of 'displacement,' and he does not even mention the Freudian theory of suggestion as transference—thus missing a great opportunity of bringing the two schools of thought face to face. He sums up his ultimate theory in the pregnant words: "Suggestion (autosuggestion) is to the will what the complex is to the sentiment and what intuition is to intelligence." Whereas the will is the normal mode of acting on matter, on the external world, suggestion is the normal mode of acting upon ourselves as living beings. By training one's powers of auto-suggestion, one is therefore supplementing one's will-power, not supplanting nor diminishing it.

The obvious criticism that arises is that the subconscious plays too much the part of *deus ex machinâ* in this New Nancy Doctrine. There is a close resemblance, almost amounting to identity, between it and the *subliminal* of F. W. H. Myers. We need a more positive account of its nature and activities. For this we must look to the methods of psycho-analysis. Coué's law of reversed effort has long been known to successful suggestionists, but it is well to have the law accurately formulated and justified by skilful psychological analysis, as is done in these pages.

The book can be whole-heartedly recommended as the most important and helpful book on suggestion of modern times.

WILLIAM BROWN.

The Elements of Practical Psycho-Analysis. By PAUL BOUSFIELD, M.R.C.S. (Eng.), L.R.C.P. (Lond.). London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. New York: E. P. Dalton & Co., 1920. Pp. xii + 276.

When we speak of Psycho-Analysis we may be referring to a special technical method of investigating the human mind; or to the body of doctrine which has been built up on the results obtained by the use of this method; or to the practice of this method for therapeutic purposes. Anyone who undertakes to expound the elements of practical psycho-analysis needs to be very well qualified in all three directions; he must have a sound knowledge of the technique of the method; he must be well informed on the theoretical side; and he must have had sufficient experience to give weight to what he has to say on the practical applications of psycho-analytical doctrines.

Our doubts of Mr Bousfield's competence for the task he has set himself are aroused on reading his preface. He there concedes that Freud is the originator of the technique and theory of the psycho-analytic system, but he informs us that there are three notable subjects on which he considers Freud's evidence to be insufficient—"firstly, in his theory of complete determinism as opposed to Free-Will; secondly, in his statement that all dreams have the same causative factors; and, thirdly, in his theory that sexual desire is the fundamental desire underlying all the other desires and emotions."

Mr Bousfield's first point of disagreement with Freud arises from a strange misapprehension—a misapprehension which is not uncommon among some recent writers whose first introduction to psychology seems to have been by way of psycho-analysis. These writers seem to think that Freud was the originator of the notion of psychic determinism. The most casual acquaintance with the history of philosophy should have prevented such a misconception. In every attempt to subject the mind to scientific investigation we must, perforce, adopt the postulate of psychic determinism. Just in so far as we abandon this postulate we are abandoning scientific method. It is, however, open to anyone to believe that science is inadequate to the understanding of man's whole being, and to deny that there can be any true science of man. And so it is true, in a sense, as Mr Bousfield says, that "Freud's belief or otherwise in this matter does not in any way affect the main postulates of psycho-analysis"; for it is not a question of anyone's belief: it is a question of how far scientific method will carry us in our investigation of the human mind.

The author's second point of disagreement with Freud is too vaguely put to show exactly what he is referring to, but it is doubtful if Freud would say that all dreams have, in any sense, the *same* causative factors. The third point of disagreement, however, is stated explicitly enough, and is sufficient to show that Mr Bousfield has no real understanding of Freudian doctrine. Freud has, over and over again, insisted on the distinction between the sexual impulses and the 'ego-tendencies'; and, far from showing that "sexual desire is the fundamental desire underlying all other desires and emotions," his whole theory of the neuroses is founded on the conflict which arises between sexuality and the 'ego.'

Perusal of the body of this book serves but to justify the doubts raised in our minds by the preface. The author begins with a chapter on the unconscious mind in which, by way of simplification, he divides the mind into

conscious mind and unconscious mind, and denies the necessity for any more precise classification of mental contents and processes. This is a bad start for a book which purports to give an account of psycho-analytic theory; for if Freud himself found it impossible to formulate his views without introducing his conception of the preconscious, it is unlikely that Mr Bousfield will succeed where Freud failed. The psycho-analytic doctrine of the unconscious is now quite definite and precise, and it is desirable that a book dealing with psycho-analysis should expound psycho-analytic doctrine in terms which render its conceptions intelligible. In the absence of a suitable terminology we are not surprised to find it stated that the unconscious mind "can reason clearly, it can control to some extent the physiological functions of the body, it can carry out complicated automatic actions, known as 'habits,' it can to some extent register the thoughts of others by a 'sixth sense,' as yet but little understood, the process being known as telepathy."

Besides refusing to use the terms which psycho-analysts have provided for the exposition of their doctrines, Mr Bousfield commits the more serious error of using technical terms incorrectly. Thus, for example, he speaks of the exhibition tendency "sublimating itself as its antithesis"; he says of coprophilia that "its opposite becomes its sublimation"; he describes pity as the opposite of cruelty, and adds that "pity is a form of the sublimation of cruelty." In a footnote we are told that "pity and other 'opposite manifestations' are not true sublimations." That is so, for they are not sublimations at all. They have a different mechanism and a different name. Psycho-analysts call them 'reaction-formations.' Again, 'projection' is a technical term which does not mean the same thing as 'transference'; but on page 199 we read that "the impulses and emotions directed towards the father...have merely been projected upon the physician as substitute."

Not only is there misuse of technical terms in this book, but there is also serious misunderstanding in the author's mind concerning many important mechanisms. The processes of repression are here almost wholly ascribed to forces acting from without; hardly any indication is given that the repressing forces exist in the mind and are innate. In a similar way, the part played by *conflict* in the production of fixation is entirely missed. Dreams are not "outlets" for infantile wishes or for anything else; the dream does not serve two purposes, but one only—the preservation of sleep. Symbolism is not the only means made use of by the censor in dream distortion, as is implied in the summary at the end of the chapter on dreams. The assertion that "there is of course no fixed symbolism in dreams" is directly opposed to the views of psycho-analysts. The parents cannot be held responsible for a child's failure to sublimate his primitive impulses; for sublimation must arise spontaneously and cannot be forced.

When we come to the chapter on Functional Diseases we are apt to forget that we are reading a book the object of which is stated to be "to give an account of the theory, technique, and scope of psycho-analysis, in such a form that its essentials may readily be understood by the student or practitioner without previous systematic reading in psychology and psychotherapy." A member of an ambitious village choir, when asked if they did not find Handel too difficult, replied cheerfully, "Oh no, we alters him." This seems to be Mr Bousfield's way of making Freud's views clear to his readers. He says that Freud's classification of the various neuroses is probably the best, and adds: "if I vary this slightly it is in order to simplify it from the point

of view of the student." On the principle, presumably, that it is always desirable to teach the student something false to start with, in case he should learn the truth too soon, he gives a classification which includes early paranoia and certain cases of dementia praecox among the psycho-neuroses, and omits hypochondria from the list of actual neuroses.

It is difficult to imagine how his distinction between the psycho-neuroses and the actual neuroses is to simplify the student's task. The psycho-neuroses are, he says, "conditions following repressed ideas; the actual neuroses, those dependent upon accumulated emotions, whether ideas are there in a subsidiary form or not." This does not seem as simple as if he had said that actual neuroses are of physical origin, while psycho-neuroses are of mental origin—which is the essential difference laid down by Freud.

The promulgation of error in matters of theory does not perhaps do much lasting harm; but misdirection in the practical application of the methods of psycho-analysis has far-reaching effects which may be pernicious in many ways. It is therefore necessary to warn the student that the chapter which is devoted to the technique of psycho-analysis, and the chapter which gives extracts from the analysis of a case, should be read in conjunction with Freud's own papers on technique, or the writings of some competent exponent of psycho-analytic teaching. They will then be found useful as a very full account of "how not to do it," and the necessary 'dont's' may be interpolated in the text.

Questioning the patient about his life, and instructing him in psycho-analysis are not profitable ways of utilising the first few interviews. These are invaluable for free association, since the patient is then quite ingenuous, and reveals the kernel of his neurosis by allusions which the psycho-analyst can easily understand. If questions are asked all indications of the degree and character of the resistance to the emergence of the facts will be lost. No questions should be asked except to make clear some point about which the patient is talking; for much can be learnt from the patient's attitude about volunteering facts. Facts are, however, the unimportant things in analysis; it is the buried feelings which have to come out, and in regard to these it is no use to probe and force; the patient must overcome his own resistances. Nothing extracted by the analyst will help him.

It is highly undesirable, in these early interviews, to explain the nature of analysis, since all knowledge of this kind is useful to the resistance, and warns the unconscious how to avoid discovery. Certain explanations may be given *later on*, but only as opportunity arises. Any preliminary explanation interferes with the subsequent emergence of associations. It is not desirable to "point out that the patient is not alone in possessing repressed infantile forms of sexuality etc." All reassurance of this kind, as well as any expression of opinion or indications of praise or blame by the analyst, hinders the appearance of the patient's subjective, unconsciously controlled, ideas on the matter.

The extracts from an analysis show very clearly the author's mistaken tendency to 'attack' or 'concentrate on' whatever he wishes 'to remove,' and his failure to appreciate the necessity for passivity on the part of the analyst. The methods described may be of value for some purposes, and anyone is free to adopt them if he finds them suitable; but no one has any right to teach that these are the methods of psycho-analysis.

In regard to the applications of psycho-analysis to educational and social problems a strong protest must be made against Mr Bousfield's attempt to

force his own views on the public as if they were legitimate inferences from psycho-analytic practice, or accepted truths of psycho-analytic doctrine. One striking instance of this may be mentioned. Throughout this book a notable depreciation of women and of all that is distinctly feminine, obtrudes insistently on the reader's mind. It looks as if the writer was in some way afraid of women. Again and again he declares that there is far too much 'artificial differentiation' between the sexes, and he shows but grudging acceptance of such differentiation as "nature has itself bestowed." He thinks that moral education will some day ensure that the woman of the future is not differentiated from the man, either as regards clothing, business remuneration, or anything else 'artificial.'

Whatever Mr Bousfield's private views of the proper relationship and desirable difference, or lack of difference, between the sexes may be, or whatever opinions about woman's dress, woman's conversation, woman's titles and woman's privileges he may hold, he has no possible justification for implying that these views and opinions are based on the results of psycho-analysis, or that they correspond in any way to its aims. The past history of mankind provides us with enough examples of noble men and women to serve as models in the future, and we need neither hope nor expect to breed a race of *artificial* beings such as Mr Bousfield desires, or to construct a human society devoid of those amenities and courtesies which are naturally pleasurable to everyone. His diatribes against sex-differentiation are diatribes against the sex-instinct, against normal human nature and its normal enjoyments. A world of sexually indistinguishable human beings such as that looked forward to by Mr Bousfield is mere phantasy, and has no part or place in psycho-analysis—except in so far as, like all phantasies, it is not devoid of psycho-analytic meaning. In the past, man's jealousy has undoubtedly been the main factor in excluding woman from the enjoyment of much in life for which she is naturally qualified, but this has not been so detrimental to women or to humanity as would be the effect of man's fear, if it led him to attempt to deprive her of her womanliness and of her distinctive, feminine, part in life.

T. W. MITCHELL.

ABSTRACT.

OEDIPUS AND THE SPHINX.

By THEODOR REIK.

Abstracted from *Imago*, Vol. VI, pt. 2, by CECIL M. BAINES.[1]

"Lo, Oedipus
Who solves the riddles sublime." SOPHOCLES.

Untrammelled by the long-cherished prejudices of a cultural society, psycho-analysis has thrown light upon the nature of the deepest psychic impulses, and, in so doing, has discovered the hidden meaning of the Oedipus myth in its universal application to mankind. It has taught us that the old story is that of the fulfilment of the two mighty, primitive desires, which are of crucial importance in the development of individuals and of peoples.

Psycho-analytic investigation may well busy itself with the figures of Oedipus, the riddle-solver, and of the Sphinx. In this paper an attempt is made to solve another riddle, that of the being of the Sphinx itself, the winged monster, sister of countless similar figures, which in prehistoric times were introduced from Western Asia.

In entering upon our discussion, two paths are open to us: we may seek to find the interpretation of the Sphinx in its connection with the Oedipus story, or to solve the riddle in conjunction with that of the allied figures of the ancient Orient. If we adopt the former method, we run the risk of taking for the original a late and secondary figure with all its acquired meanings; if the latter, we are confronted with difficult questions arising out of the development of human thought and belief. Yet this is the method we have chosen to adopt.

The Sphinx is not autochthonous to Greece, but is found in Egypt and the adjoining countries. These figures have a lion's body, and a human head, and are akin to the other phantastic hybrid creatures of antiquity, *e.g.* the siren, the harpy, the griffin and the cherubim.

These Sphinx figures vary in many particulars: some have male faces, others female; some are standing, others crouching or lying. They are found on all manner of objects: sculptured reliefs in temples, utensils of various sorts, ornaments and scarabs; some are colossal statues, others are of a delicate minuteness.

The many contradictory features in the Sphinx figures make interpretation difficult, whether it be attempted by psycho-analyst, historian, archaeologist or artist. The following are some of the many attempts at explanation:

(*a*) the Sphinx represents a king or queen, as is shown by the efforts after portraiture and by the inscriptions;
(*b*) the Sphinxes are images of the gods (a frequent classical interpretation);
(*c*) they represent watchers before temples and palaces;
(*d*) they are symbols of wisdom, strength and understanding.

[1] This abstract is, in the main, an abridged translation and is published here by kind permission of the Editors of *Imago*. (Ed.).

No really satisfactory explanation of the Egyptian Sphinxes has been arrived at, and the same is true of the Sphinx of Oedipus, which has been interpreted as a prophetess or a daring female robber. Modern explanations incline to the allegorical, the Sphinx being regarded as the understanding invisibly present in the head of man. Very popular are those interpretations which see in the Sphinx a symbol of Nature power, *e.g.* of Helios or Aether, sunrise or sunset, the waning moon or the powers of the under-world.

Nor have the psycho-analysts failed to seek an explanation. Rank would interpret the figure of the Sphinx by connecting it with the ancient myths which identify the human and the animal mother suckling their young. But, since the Sphinx combines the upper parts of a woman with the lower parts of a male animal, he has recourse to the familiar dream-vision in which all human beings, female as well as male, have the penis, and discloses a hidden homosexual element in the interpretation of the Sphinx of the Oedipus myth, tracing to this element the anxiety affect. According to this theory the Sphinx would be a secondary representation of the mother. Laistner, in his well-known work, *The Riddle of the Sphinx*, also makes use of the anxiety dream in his explanation.

C. G. Jung brings forward his theory of the theriomorphic representation of the libido. He sees in the Sphinx a 'half-theriomorphic' representation of that mother-imago, which may be designated the Terrible Mother, of whom we find many traces in mythology. "The libido," he says, "thus theriomorphically represented, is the repressed 'animal sexuality.'" This is the root from which Jung always derives the theriomorphic attributes of the gods. According to this explanation then, the Sphinx is an 'anxiety animal,' showing clear traces of its mother-origin. It represents "an original incestuous amount of libido detached from the bond to the mother[1]."

For any satisfactory explanation two things are necessary: (1) that all the striking and essential features of the Sphinx, however seemingly contradictory, should be made comprehensible, and (2) that the connection between the Oriental type of Sphinx and that of Greek legend should be made clear.

We will postulate that the Sphinx of Gise, representing the antique Western Asiatic type, is closely related to that of Oedipus as shown on Etruscan funeral urns.

Our investigations will take as starting-point the outward form of the Sphinx, which, as a creation of human phantasy, must yield its own interpretation. The creation of such a composite form is analogous to the condensation which takes place in dreams, by which one person in the dream may be a composite figure, bearing resemblance to several real people, often combining many contradictory features in a single whole.

A similar psychic creation occurs in the hallucinations of persons suffering from psychoses. Doctors who practise the psycho-analytic method have shown that the seemingly absurd figures are full of meaning, though investigations are necessarily incomplete owing to the peculiar nature of psychotic illness, in which there is a breaking of the connection with the real surroundings. Yet all analysts agree that the hallucinatory apparitions are in every instance subject to determination and that their explanation lies in the emergence of recollections of definite experiences and impressions, to which are attached special emotional affects. They can only be understood when their proper

[1] v. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, pp. 204, 205.

place as a feature of the illness is assigned to them, and no exception to their absurdity is taken at the outset.

In illustration of these remarks we may quote the case of a patient of Dr Bertschinger, in which there was a special liability to apparitions of composite figures, *e.g.* (*a*) a goat with the upper part of a man or a woman, the apparition being accounted for by the fact that as a little child the patient had involuntarily witnessed coitus and mentally compared the man with a goat, and further, while staying in the country, had for the first time seen the male organ erected, in a goat; (*b*) a spotted hyena with the face and upper parts of a woman, the explanation of this figure lying in her recollection of an attendant who had offended her as a child of eleven, and whom she had compared with a spotted hyena, because she wore a spotted blouse and her eyes looked green and evil. In the case of recent impressions, the phantasy always recurred to past experiences of special feeling-tone: that is to say, the patient saw as an animal any person whom she had compared with an animal. A second person, who by reason of some characteristic possessed an imaginary or real similarity to the first, was either merged in the first figure, or was represented by a head attached to the body of the animal, or a particular characteristic was symbolised in some attribute of the phantasy. Each single part of the apparition had to be traced back from the recent experience to the experiences of early childhood.

So, in our interpretation of the Sphinx, where condensation is carried to a high degree, its attributes must be taken singly. Corresponding to the recollections of individuals which in dreams are superimposed one upon the other, deposits from the experiences of successive generations accrue in the formation of the mass psyche.

Folk-psychology takes us back to a time when there was no such great gulf as now exists between man and the animal kingdom. On the contrary the animal was held in special awe, and comparison with an animal was rather an honour than a shame. (In the case of our own children, we note that they find no difficulty in imagining themselves or others to be animals.)

Totemism, the first comprehensive religion of mankind, which made of the animal a divinity, rests upon this primitive attitude of mind. After many thousands of years the totem gave place to the anthropomorphic god, or rather, when we remember that the prototype of the god was the father of the primitive migratory peoples, we may say that the anthropomorphic god resumed his sway. Again, for thousands of years, the animal and anthropomorphic representations of the deity must have existed side by side, and when at last the anthropomorphic god finally prevailed, there must have remained, in spite of the repudiation of the animal-god, the recollection, charged with powerful emotional affects, of the important rôle it once played in religious worship. The animal body of the Sphinx remains as a relic of hoary antiquity, while the human head represents the anthropomorphic god of later times.

The combination of man and beast indicates the drawing of a comparison (cf. the case of a patient cited above), but it also reflects an historic process. The difference between individual and collective psychic activity is apparent in the fact that, in dreams, persons from real life are, by a process of condensation, blended with others recollected from early childhood, whereas, in prehistoric art, beings from far-off stages of development are comprehended in a single image with those figures which at the time engage its attention.

The representation of these two historic stages in the conception of the

deity, with its seemingly absurd blending of animal and human, leads us to suspect, according to the psychology of dreams, an element of unconscious mockery. Now it would be quite wrong to connect such a feeling with the overcoming of 'animal' sexuality—nothing was further from the mind of the ancient Egyptian—or with a tendency to deride the animal. Possibly, in the course of a long cultural development, the original high valuation of the animal may have given way to a lower estimation, which in historical times might tend to be treated symbolically after the manner of C. G. Jung, but as regards the early times in question such an anagogic conception, amounting rather to a repetition of a stage in development than an explanation of it, is beside the mark.

In the history of the development of the Sphinx, the political and national history of the ancient Egyptians is reflected. The people of Egypt in the earliest times were no single homogeneous race, but had absorbed many heterogeneous elements. Now tribal and local organisations had for the Oriental peoples, who only at a late period achieved a State organisation, a special significance from the religious point of view. As one god was assimilated to, or replaced by, another, their different characteristics went through a process of condensation. Similarly, in totemism, the totem of one tribe would be combined with the totem of another, and composite figures were formed, of which the Sphinx with ram's head and the griffin were indications of conflict and compromise between old and new, in a long succession in which the human-headed Sphinx was the last product.

Both historical and psycho-analytic methods of investigation make it clear how it comes about that the figure of the Sphinx represents both god and king. Amongst the early races, as amongst primitive peoples of to-day, there is very little distinction between the two. The Egyptian kings were deified and worshipped in special temples, and represented to their people "the mighty god," golden Horus and especially the son of the sun-god Ra. As sign of their divine nature, the prehistoric kings wore the lion's skin (that of their totem animal), long after totemism had been succeeded by a higher form of religion.

To this brief sketch of a phase of religious development belongs the interpretation of the Sphinx as a sun-god. It seems certain that the worship of heavenly bodies originated in totemism, and that the elevation of the gods to the skies took place under the combined influence of natural processes, psychic revolutions and changes in the conditions of human life. Presumably the Zodiac bears witness in its composition to the totemistic origin of astral mythology and religion. The translation of the deities from the earth, their natural home, to the skies, manifestly belongs to a loftier and more advanced stage of religious development and shows a more spiritual outlook.

The elevation of the totems to the skies took place at a time when religion had already progressed from totemistic to higher conceptions of the gods. The totems, no longer answering to any need, could be thrown into the celestial lumber-room. In this connection we may note the fact that this removal to a distance later became a universal euphemistic symbol for death, as is seen in dreams, poetry, folk-lore and mythology[1].

Now this elevation of the gods betokens not merely an advance in religious ideas, but also an unconscious wish to depose the deities from their rule upon earth: that is to say, as man's awe of the gods rose to its highest point, their removal was desired by the unconscious revolutionary wishes which forced their way up. This expression

[1] Cf. Freud's *Traumdeutung*.

of an increasing ambivalency of emotion (for as such we must regard the translation of the gods to the skies), was repeated when the authority of the anthropomorphic deities became endangered. The ancient peoples could conceive of the gods as walking the earth in bodily form and dying a bodily death; it was later that they were made immortal, dwellers in the heavens.

In this religious conception, the effects of unconscious hate-tendencies and of feelings of love and veneration (strengthened as these were by force of reaction) become clear.

The Sphinx must in some definite way have participated in the long process which made of the animal-god on earth an animal-god in the skies. As Horus was changed from a totem to a sun-god, the Sphinx, his image, may have represented the sun itself, and attributes and functions of the sun-god, incompatible with its original totemistic character, may have been assigned to it. It is amazing how successive features of a long, slow cultural development appear side by side in the figure of the Sphinx, as if the Unconscious of the race, indestructible and immortal, could not wholly divest itself of ideas and feelings long since superseded and laid aside.

In the history of the celestial gods the bird has a special significance. Here we arrive at one of the most striking attributes of the Sphinx: its wings—an attribute seemingly incongruous in conjunction with its lion's body. Doubtless, in the mind of primitive man, wings stood for swiftness, but beyond this obvious interpretation lie others of great moment. Wings were bestowed in ancient religion and mythology, not only upon divine hybrid-creatures, but upon anthropomorphic deities, *e.g.* Mercury, and on the messengers of the gods, *e.g.* cherubim, seraphim and the angels. In the totemistic system there must have been some definite point at which birds, *e.g.* the eagle, were made into totems.

To primitive man, the flight of the bird was a mystery. He was impressed by its swiftness, and its power of maintaining itself in the air, while its disappearance and reappearance may have served to suggest the omniscience and omnipresence of the gods. The later conception of the soul's embodiment in a bird probably arose from the fact that birds were observed to settle upon dead bodies, feed upon them and fly away.

It is likely that the totemistic significance of the bird belongs to a late phase of religious development. The bird winging its way to the sun-god represents the soul, and its flight prefigures the translation or resurrection of countless heroes from Moses and Elijah to Jesus.

It is at present impossible to indicate the precise point at which the bird enters into the totemistic system, but it appears that it had its rôle and task assigned to it in terms of totemism when that system was already declining. Later the bird may have been the theriomorphic representation of the saviour or the hero. The vulture of the Egyptian deities, the dove of Aphrodite, the raven of Wotan, the birds whose flight was of oracular significance, the dove sent out by Noah, the dove of the Annunciation—all these birds were originally gods, who at a later date became the helpers and messengers of anthropomorphic deities.

So too the Sphinx became a winged watcher in the service of the gods, like other more familiar figures. These had their place in the Pantheon before they became mediators between Jehovah and men in the persons of the winged angels whose totemistic origin we recognise in the Old Testament descriptions of their predecessors, the Cherubim.

(Note that the oldest Sphinxes were not winged; the wings only became general in the Greek figures.)

We have been compelled to trace the long and difficult path trodden by primitive humanity up to that stage in religious development at which we encounter it in early antiquity. As the rings in the tree trunks mark the passage of the years, so in the Sphinx figure we recognise signs of long-past stages of development. It is due to the remarkable conservatism of primitive cults that the old did not vanish as the new arose, but was assimilated, transformed, and finally entirely divorced from its original meaning.

It is possible that this consideration may throw some light upon the peculiar bisexual character of the Sphinx figures. We know that male Sphinxes were predominant in oldest Egypt, but that, later, female Sphinxes were found in increasing numbers side by side with the male figures, till in Greece the latter were completely superseded.

How does the appearance of the female type fit in with our explanation of the totemistic derivation of the Sphinx? We conclude that the original male form was, by a process of historical development, replaced by the female, the penis being retained as a relic of the earlier male figure.

In order to make this hypothesis acceptable, we must cite in its support certain facts from prehistoric times.

We know that the present form of the family was preceded by the matriarchy, under which the members of the horde were grouped round their natural centre, the mother. Where relics of matriarchal organisation are still to be found, as in the case of certain aboriginal tribes, we have, even when we make allowance for the manifold changes wrought by the passing of thousands of years, a fairly accurate presentation of the primitive organisation of group-marriage.

It is difficult to detect the influence of matriarchy on religion, for we have no direct approach to that prehistoric stage in human development. Freud suggests that the great mother-deities may universally have preceded the father-god[1], and two facts seem to confirm this: (1) the relatively late character of totemism, which, judging by its origin, presupposes the existence of the brother-clan, *i.e.* a more highly developed form of the family group, and (2) the improbability that the libido-invested figure of the mother, so long the centre and head of the family, should not have been apotheosised by primitive man.

Nevertheless we must counsel caution in the adoption of the hypothesis of an original mother-religion. The Oriental cults of mother-deities, *e.g.* of Isis, Ischtar and Cybele, and other embodiments of the 'Mater Magna,' originally bore a totally different character from that of the father-religion. Laying stress as they did upon the sexual, the celebration of the fruitfulness of humanity and of Nature, they stand in contrast to the father-religion, which brought into prominence the social motive, and in the consciousness of guilt gave rise to a sort of social fear. Even if we regard these cults as later developments, we must yet assume that in their rudimentary, prehistoric stages they possessed their peculiar characteristic features without any of their subsequent cultural modifications. We do not admit the contention that the difference between the cults of male and female deities rests upon externals, for those very externals, which no later artistic assimilation sufficed to erase or destroy, are the mark of a deepseated difference which has its roots in instinct.

Now in considering the development of the race it is merely a question of nomenclature whether the existence of religion be admitted at this or that particular point, or whether it be dated from some later period. But the social bond and, with it, that powerful agent, a sense of guilt, appear to be necessary and integral parts in the structure of religion. These characteristics are lacking in the mother worship at the time of the matriarchy. Hence we cannot speak definitely of a *religion*.

(Note: the point must be emphasised that the rough indications here given

[1] *Totem u. Tabu*, p. 138.

apply only to prehistoric times: in the ancient mother-cults of the East there is manifestly a genuine mother-religion.)

The mother in matriarchal times was honoured with every indication of sexual-overestimation, typifying the object-choice characterised by dependence. It is certain that through a long period the mother was the love-object to which, above all others, the crude libido of primitive man was directed, and, mainly on account of the urge of heterosexual impulses, she became his idol. It is just here, in this very factor of the initial choice of the love-object and the sexual overestimation, that the difference between the original mother-worship and the primitive father-religion becomes manifest.

As the mother became the idol of the first organisation of the matriarchal period, so the father of the original horde subsequently became the father-ideal to the members of the brother-clan.

From the contrast of *mother-idol* and *father-ideal* we may deduce not only an essential feature of the attitude of primitive man to the archetypes of his religion but the very nature of the object-choice upon which highly important developments depend. That is to say that in primitive times the object-choice of which we find indications in the matriarchal period belongs to that type which is characterised by dependence, while later the narcissistic type assumes prominence.

The libidinous worship of the mother, bound up as it was with the glorification of the crudely sexual, was naturally capable of becoming a religious cult in a more or less sublimated form, but before this could take place the deity as such must come into being, and the father-religion, in the form of totemism, enter into the history of the race.

The deification of the mother took place later, after the pattern of the father-religion. She now appears as the rival of the father, but the latter, as the prototype of every god, could still claim to have been the originator of religion, and this claim does not rest on the primary and unbroken force of the first libido-investment, but on the strength of the longing for the father, subsequently operative, strengthened and deepened as it was in virtue of reaction.

The features of mother and lover, combined in the first love-object, remain blended in the original feminine deities, the maternal aspect becoming more and more strongly emphasised, while the sexual element is forced more into the background or appears in the more spiritual form of universal grace and charity or womanly loving-kindness. Even in the most advanced stage of development the sexual element is never wholly discarded—the goddesses always remain the guardians of love and marriage. Gretchen in *Faust*, addressing her love songs to the Virgin Mary, is only a modern representative of countless sisters of old, who, in a similar situation, fled for refuge to their native goddesses. The matriarchy has originated many an important cultural development in human society: it did not produce religion as such.

In the contrast between mother-idol and father-ideal lie those forces which later, with the greater inwardness of religion, were to assume such importance. The cults of the mother-goddess led to an excessive extolling of the sexual, and only at a very late period did they attain to a partial sublimation, as in the case of the worship of the Madonna. They acted always as the impulse to the overthrowing of the laws, prescribed although unwritten, of the father-religion, for they found constant reinforcement in the springs of passion. The strength of Antaeus as he fought was renewed as often as he touched mother

earth. The father-ideal, viewed as a divinity, became the hidden lawgiver of mankind, its personified conscience, its guard against the storm of passion threatening to break up society.

In the struggle of these principles, one of the most important instances of the invasion of sexuality into the social institution of religion is to be found; the conflict between the mother- and father-religions corresponds to the life-long oscillation of the individual between male and female love-objects.

We have accepted the hypothesis that the father-religion, in the form of totemism, preceded the deification of the mother, and we can comprehend how it is that the Sphinx (originally a male god), now assumes a female form. It is tempting to connect this form with the victory of anthropomorphism and to conclude that, when the totem was to be superseded by a human god, the image of the mother-goddess first appeared. In any case the female Sphinx is a secondary conception, seeing that totemism, of which it is a very late relic, was a pure father-religion, the creation of associations of *men*.

The totem animal had the same characteristics as the prototype of the god, *i.e.* the father of the primitive horde, a stern, powerful and awe-inspiring chief, of whom traces survive in Jehovah. These features could only be transferred to the mother-goddess if we suppose that far-reaching changes had taken place in the relations of the sexes. The picture painted by C. G. Jung of the Terrible Mother is, even if we leave out of consideration his anagogic interpretations, no primary conception, and presupposes definite changes in the psychic relation to the mother. Owing to great modifications in the conditions of life, the tender feelings towards the mother must have undergone a radical change before she became the Terrible Mother.

Considerable light is thrown on this point, in the study of neuroses, by those unconscious psychic processes which lead to the inversion of the Oedipus complex. In such cases the mother appears as a terrible and hateful woman, often indeed a persecutor and tyrant. Analysis shows that this peculiar psychic attitude is a late transformation of the original positive affect, which has taken place under the pressure of definite psychic needs.

Chief amongst the forces which bring about the destruction of the original relationship to the mother, are intimidation in the sexual field on the part of the father and the fear of castration. The intercourse with the mother, urgently desired by the Unconscious, involves for the child the loss of the highly-prized bodily organ. For that reason the beloved mother becomes terrible, an object of abhorrence.

A good analogy to this individual development is found in that of the mass psyche. We may infer that the stern commands of the fathers as regarded incest were first enforced on the younger generations from without, and later became their psychic possession.

The creation of the mother goddesses gave only a partial outlet to the impulse to incest, for, with the deification of the first love-object, which seemed to stimulate to the carrying out in reality of those infantile desires, the long-inherited prohibition of incest made itself unconsciously felt, changing the love-object into a fear-object, and threatening calamity. This process was reflected in the bestowal on the mother-imago of the characteristics of the father. The command had issued from the father and was supported by the unconscious homosexual tendency directed towards him.

The fact that the totemistic father-god blended with the image of the mother-goddess indicates that the homosexual tendency, so powerful a factor

in religious development, had frustrated the invasion of the impulses to incest and foiled the attempt to substitute for the dreadful totem god the more lovable image of the mother, for that image, even as goddess, was bound up with the taboo of the incestuous love-object. These homosexual impulses, represented in the Sphinx by the lower parts of the male animal and the later retention of the penis, were transitory. The female nature became more clearly manifest, and the Greek Sphinxes have gracious, gentle faces, very different from the gloomy and grave, masculine type of features of the Egyptian Sphinxes. The animal body continued as a token of their origin and dangerous character.

From this genetic investigation several points have become clear:

(1) it solves the riddle of the bisexuality of the Sphinx figures, emphasising the fact that their formation reflects the process of the supersession of the heterosexual by the homosexual love-object at a later stage of development;

(2) it explains the interchange of male and female figures and connects it with religious development.

This has a bearing on psycho-analysis.

In the penetrating interpretation of the Oedipus myth, contained in Rank's book on the incest complex, he recurs to the infantile sexual theory, demonstrated by Freud, according to which women also are possessed of the penis. Rank also cites the homosexual anxiety dream in his explanation.

Whether these explanations be right or not, our historic interpretation may claim to have thrown some light on the psychic processes which go to the formation of the Sphinx figure.

Our interpretation involves a radical modification of Jung's conception of the Sphinx. A critical review of Jung's exposition shows clearly the inadequacy of the symbolic interpretation of the Swiss School. As in the analysis of the individual, so in investigations into religion, Jung altogether fails to go back to the earliest stages in the development of psychic conceptions. It is probable that at a very late stage of advanced cultural development, the Sphinx was a theriomorphic representation of the libido and is to be recognised as the half-animal portrayal of the mother-imago, in its 'terrible' aspect. But we do not think that this symbolic portrayal furnishes any real explanation, or makes it clear how such a conception as that of the Sphinx was arrived at, or that either the psycho-analyst, or the scholar who makes researches in the realms of religion and culture, can be satisfied by explaining the Sphinx as "an incestuous amount of libido detached from the bond to the mother." For this interpretation by means of lofty modern symbolisation contributes nothing to the explanation of the Sphinx figure of early antiquity, and at the outset refuses to enter into the contradictory constituent elements of that figure or to treat of them in detail.

With the new insight we have gained, we may now return to the story of Oedipus and the Sphinx, and it is to be expected that fresh light will be thrown on the still hidden meaning of the Sphinx-episode in the old myth by a consideration of the meaning of its incorporation there.

We have supported the theory of the common origin of all Sphinx figures, and believe that the Theban monster of the story must be sufficiently true to type for our present findings to have some bearing on the meaning of the dark rôle it plays in the fate of Oedipus. Before we can solve the riddle of its being, we have to find out what the mythologists and philologists regard as

original features of the legend, as distinct from later embellishments and alterations.

It is said by authorities on the subject that the story of Oedipus was at first much more crudely told than in its present form, and that originally the mother was present at the slaying of the father, and, immediately after the murder, was overpowered by her son.

Many points in this story are the subject of controversy. Gruppe thinks it was added to the original myth only with the introduction of the well-known romantic motive: the killing of the monster by the hero who thereby wins the hand of a princess. Other critics assert that the original contest between Oedipus and the Sphinx was one of physical strength, not a trial of wits in the solution of the riddle; others again, that the tale of the suicide of the Sphinx rose out of a late analogy to that of Jocasta.

We may then believe that that version of the Oedipus story is the earliest, in which there was no question of the solving of the riddle, but the hero is represented as slaying a terrible monster which was laying waste the land.

The next question which arises is that of the relationship of this part of the story to the whole myth: is it, as it seems at first sight and as is maintained by most philologists, a mere episode, added later to the essential myth?

The difficulties in connection with the incorporation of the Sphinx episode into the story lie in the fact (noted by Robert), that the Sphinx has been represented as being concerned in the fate of Laios, as indeed the story itself indicates, but the connection is very obscure. If the Sphinx be regarded as the avenger of Laios, it is absurd that the murderer should with impunity slay the avenger. If, on the other hand, she were sent to punish a crime committed by Laios himself, it is equally absurd that she should appear after his death and punish his innocent subjects. So she could only be sent by the god whose Oracle had foretold the fate of Laios, or else we must seek for another motive outside the Oedipus story. Robert thinks no motivation is necessary: the monster is there—to refer its appearance to human guilt is a late and secondary conception.

He would appear to have given up too soon the attempt at explanation. The connection between the Sphinx and Laios is certainly puzzling, but psycho-analysis shows that such a connection has a psychic, and therefore real, motivation.

Again, the parallelism between the slaying of Laios and that of the Sphinx is significant. The Sphinx, a late development of the totem animal, is confronted by the young Oedipus, who slays her and receives the city as a prize. If we believe in the results of our researches into the origin of totemism, we see that, in the last resort, the killing of the Sphinx stands for the murder of the father. Further, in the symbolism of dreams, myth, poetry and wit, the city or country stands for the woman. So that, in the guise of the Sphinx episode, we recognise a second appearance of the same theme: the killing of the father and the rape of the mother.

Again we are confronted with difficult questions. What is the original form of the story, and why should it be re-told in another form? From what psychic motive has the male figure of the Sphinx been transformed into the female?

The emotional content of the Oedipus myth meets with such universal response in human nature that in psycho-analysis it is quoted as typical of the strongest unconscious wishes. But the very frankness with which it is

presented to us in all its crudity, should arrest our attention. We may be on our guard when crudely sexual themes are freely treated in the myth. Nearly always it means that other motives are hidden, and that the emphasis upon, and prominence of, the one sexual theme often serve to hide another part of the content, which has some sexual or sinister motive.

Strip from the story the Oracle, the Sphinx episode and other special mythological features, and what remains? The life and deeds of one who has committed parricide and incest, whose fate could rouse in us no deep feeling of sympathy. Why should this hero have been chosen from so many for immortalisation, so that for his sake the tribunal became the stage?

This consideration, in conjunction with our earlier observations, leads us to suppose that the Sphinx episode is an integral part of the original myth, and the relationship of the one part to the other is defined when we state that the Sphinx plays in the Oedipus myth the same part as the ghost in *Hamlet*.

The Sphinx episode is older than what we may call the 'human' motive in the story, and in it the slaying of the Sphinx has still its primary awful significance. Later this act of superhuman impiety appears in the guise of a hero's liberation of his country, yet, since that act was perpetrated upon a late successor of the totem god, it remains of tragic significance in the fate of the man himself. The murder of Laios was the transgression of a human law, but the slaying of the Sphinx was a crime committed against the deity.

The tragic motive is greatly strengthened by the fact that Oedipus has offended not only against the transitory codes and questionable customs of man, but against the eternal and sacred laws laid down by the gods; he has not only slain his father, but, in him, the authority—the god himself.

To the Greeks, already arrived at the stage of anthropomorphism, the slaying of the totem did not appear in its overwhelming significance. The Sphinx had, in the course of progress, become a monster, and its slaying, through the inversion of the emotional affect, was looked on as meritorious. Religious feeling had become more sensitive, and no compassion could have been roused for the slayer of a god, therefore another crime was substituted, sufficiently heavy and similar to the original, which yet did not amount to a mighty insurrection against the gods—the crime, that is, of parricide. But the choice of this substitute was no matter of chance. Remembering as we do that the totem itself was a primitive substitute for the father, we recognise in the development of the myth an echo of a real event in primitive times, times long vanished from conscious memory.

So we reach the following conclusion: the myth as we have it does not reflect the primary content of the story, but represents a late return of the repressed material. Some happening, similar to the events of the Oedipus story in its present version, may have been the germ of the original myth.

We understand now that its crude form is not to be attributed to its primitive character, but is to be regarded as a breaking forth of material repressed for thousands of years. Here, as in other myths, we already meet with traces of religious elaboration and change of interpretation. We can never have the pre-religious myth in its pure form, which was allied to animism.

In the Oedipus myth the chief accent has been shifted on to the conflict with the human father. In the psychic realm this shifting of accent is familiar in dreams; that which originally was the kernel appearing as the husk.

We have intentionally disregarded those elements in the story which seem to assign the part of the mother to the Sphinx. Rank has it that the introduction of the Sphinx represents the splitting off of certain offensive features from the conception of the mother. The original overpowering of the mother gave place to the fight with the Sphinx and long afterwards was transferred into a contest of wits. The Sphinx mother puts to the youth, who is struggling to understand the sexual problem, a sexual riddle about the being of man, and only after the solution of the riddle (in the original sense, after the overpowering of the mother), can he consummate the marriage. According to Rank, the Sphinx episode is a reappearance of the rape of Jocasta, interpolated, during the process of repression, amongst the different strata of the myth.

Rank recognises that this interpretation is insufficient and adduces the history of Chrysippus, which is allied to that of Laios, so that the homosexual meaning of the Sphinx is obvious. His hypothesis and our own are complementary, but his seems to refer to a later version of the story.

So we arrive at the belief that the Sphinx story, as we now have it, is a wonderful piece of condensation, accomplished by many generations, which has compressed the slaying of the father and the rape of the mother into a single deed wrought upon the Sphinx.

Homosexual and heterosexual, sadistic and masochistic impulses pass into one another, undistinguished and indistinguishable. We find the explanation in the psychic processes which analysis has brought to light in the individual. The child who witnesses coitus identifies himself with both parents. He wishes to play the part not only of the father but also of the mother. This sadistic-masochistic phantasy corresponds to the first heterosexual and homosexual attachments of the child. The infantile sadistic conception of coitus causes it to appear in the child's eyes as a struggle. So it comes about that he wishes to follow the father's example (according to his own misconception of it), by doing violence to, and overpowering, his mother.

Transferring these observations to folk-psychology, our attention is directed to the alternate ebb and flow of the homosexual and heterosexual wave in the life of peoples—the unconscious hate of the mother allying itself to the love of the father, and *vice versa*.

So the Sphinx may embody these two strong tendencies, for Oedipus, killing his father, committed rape upon his mother, and, assaulting his mother, had for love-object his father.

If we enquire as to the succession in time of these libido tendencies, we find that the slaying of the father (the totem), *appears* to precede the rape of the mother. But the component parts of the hybrid figure, in which apparently the lower parts of the male animal are the older, and the female human parts the younger, lead us to infer that here, as in the whole story, there has been a reappearance of some old repressed material. The condensation of the slaying of the father and the intercourse with the mother, which, by the cleavage in the Oedipus story, resolves itself into two separate streams of action, directs our thoughts back to a primitive age of mankind, when the love-choice of the young man was not so decidedly inclined to the woman as now, nor was there so clear a distinction between wooing and fighting—a phase analogous to the anal-sadistic period in the development of the individual.

If then the condensation contains the possibility of a return to this atavistic stage, we must suppose that in the sadistically-coloured phantasy of intercourse with the mother, to which was added that of the interference of the

father, we have the impulse for the creation of the Oedipus myth, which is nothing but the objective hallucination of wish-fulfilment.

From individual analysis we know that this formula corresponds to the biogenetic law, for the child at the outset finds in phantasy the fulfilment of the wishes which are denied to him in reality.

Having traced the Oedipus myth to its original germ—the phantasy of forcible intercourse with the mother, we are not surprised to find in its latest versions an indication of its derivation:—that dream chosen by Freud as starting-point for his analysis, of which Jocasta speaks in Sophocles' play: "Many a man in dreams has seen himself mated with his mother." Freud then is right in maintaining that the Oedipus story sprang from a primitive dream content.

The condensation which we have indicated could only have been effected when there was no longer a psychic reaction towards the slaying of the father in fact, and the original myth had already been created. Accordingly, the rape of the mother, represented simultaneously with the slaying of the father (the totem animal), in the overcoming of the Sphinx amounts to the recurrence of the wish which gave the impulse to the creation of the myth.

With the reappearance of this theme, dividing as it does, the Sphinx figure into those of Laios and Jocasta, we find again the hostile and the tender impulses of the young hero towards father and mother. As in the Sphinx episode, intercourse and murder coincide in a single deed wrought upon a single object, so in a pre-Sophoclean version of the myth, Oedipus takes from his father's body his girdle and his sword. To remove the girdle is a well-known erotic symbol of Greek antiquity, while the taking of the sword symbolises castration. Here again we have the combination of conflicting feelings directed towards a single object.

We mentioned above that in dreams the creation of phantastic composite creatures, such as the Sphinx, indicates hidden feelings of derision or contempt on the part of the dreamer. If we apply this rule to the mass psyche, we should expect to find some analogy to the remarkable hybrid creatures of ancient art. Possibly the mixture of animal and human in the Sphinx corresponds to the opposition felt towards totemistic deities in a time of cultural advance when the gods were conceived of in human form. Again, the combination of male and female parts would reflect an unconscious revolutionary impulse against the father-god, heterosexual libido-tendencies being opposed to the religion based on homosexuality.

The Oedipus myth was of extremely weighty significance in the religious life of the Greeks, and the performance of the Oedipus drama stood in intimate relationship to their religious ritual. The deep and lasting influence of this myth in antiquity is due to this religious motive showing as it does human passion in collision with divine laws. At the Dionysia and in the ritual of Attis, Adonis and Osiris, a young revolutionary saviour is represented as paying an awful penalty for his offence against the mighty father-god. A parallel may be found in the effect upon the faithful in the Middle Ages of the Passion Play of the Church: an effect due to the same psychic processes. The history of Christ is not unlike that of Oedipus as saviour.

In the Oedipus myth the hearers' unconscious sense of guilt was awakened. This goes to confirm us in the belief that the germ of the myth is the same as that of the Bible story of original sin. In Assyrian and Babylonian art the

Sphinx is represented as guarding the Tree of Life. In the story of the Fall of Man this guardianship is assigned to the cherub, whose original animal form we recognise in the Vision of Ezekiel. In this tradition of the Tree of Life, precisely the same condensation has taken place as in the Sphinx episode in the Oedipus myth, the Tree playing in the Bible story the same apparently non-essential rôle as does the Sphinx in our myth. Hence the Oedipus myth may be called the Greek story of the Fall of Man.

ABSTRACT.

INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHO-ANALYSE, 1920, PART 2.

This number of the *Zeitschrift* opens with a short article by Abraham, on "Prognosis of Psycho-Analytic Treatment in Middle Age." He begins by quoting Freud's opinion, from one of his earlier works, that after a certain age the success of analysis is very doubtful and goes on to say that in most cases this is certainly true. But psycho-analysis is full of surprises and it is undesirable to approach any of its problems with *a priori* expectations. Psycho-analysis itself must be used as an instrument of research to ascertain whether and under what conditions success can be achieved with patients who are no longer young.

Having undertaken several analyses of patients over 40, and of some over 50, years of age, the author finds that a considerable number react very favourably to psycho-analysis and that some of his best successes are amongst them. His first case of this type was a man of 50, suffering from melancholic depression, who was relieved in five months and became able to resume his work, after various fruitless attempts at cure by other methods. The neurosis had assumed its severe form 15 months previously, although there had always been a nervous disposition and there were evident signs of a chronic tendency. Other cases followed, including two cases of obsessional neurosis, in men of 50 and 53 years respectively. Excellent results were obtained with both, and also with a woman of 41 years. They had all shown symptoms since childhood, but in all cases the neurosis had not developed to an incapacitating extent until between the ages of 30 and 40. There were similar successes with other cases, and also a number of failures and partial successes.

From these facts it became apparent that the explanation of such different results in various cases is a simple one. Good results may be expected when the neurosis does not break out in full severity until some considerable time after puberty, and when the patient has enjoyed a comparatively normal sexual life, and been capable of normal social activity, for some time. The unsatisfactory cases are those of patients who already showed well-developed obsessional symptoms, etc., in childhood. But patients of this class, even at an early age, provide most of the failures in analytic treatment, and the conclusion is that the *age of the neurosis* is a more important factor in determining the probability of success than the age of the patient. This corresponds with experience in the psychoses.

The question arises as to how far it is possible to retrace and revive the infantile sexuality in such patients; experience shows that this is by no means impossible, and in some cases can be achieved to an extent only to be expected in very young patients.

Many of these cases differ in one point from the usual type under analysis, namely, in the lack of initiative frequently shown by them. They have to be prompted to begin the communication of their ideas at the start of each sitting. They seem unable to find their thoughts independently, but any little remark will set them going. In this respect they are *infantile*, and this characteristic is also common in the analyses of children, but in them often vanishes when the negative transference is uppermost. Abraham also calls attention to the problem as to why certain cases of neurosis in children prove unamenable to treatment, and he remarks on the desirability of obtaining further evidence on this point.

The next contribution is a small one, in French, from de Saussure (Geneva), called "Le Complexe de Jocaste," in which he raises the interesting problem of incestuous love on the part of a mother for her son. He remarks that Freud has dealt very fully with the Oedipus-situation, but has said nothing of the corresponding attitude of Jocasta, the mother of Oedipus, in her incestuous love for her son. The author gives details of two cases observed by him of obvious infatuation, hardly distinguishable from sexual desire, on the part of a woman for an adult son. He thinks it is important to establish a definition of the distinction between normal maternal love and a mother's incestuous attachment to a son, and makes various suggestions towards such a distinction, particularly, that normal maternal love is dominating and protective, whereas in the cases of sexual desire for the son he sees a more wifely dependence and submission (masochism and exclusivism).

These questions are extremely interesting in themselves, and it is unfortunate that de Saussure's knowledge of psycho-analytic theory and research does not appear to have been sufficient to enable him more fruitfully to investigate the cases under his observation. Freud of course has taken Oedipus as a type, representing the primary experience and unconscious foundation of hetero-sexual love in every man. Jocasta is hardly a simple universal type of this kind, since in infancy no woman is the *mother* of a son to whom an incestuous fixation of *Libido* can be attached. So that a Jocasta-complex can never be a primary infantile experience as the Oedipus-complex is. The nearest approach to it would be the case of little girls who 'mother' a younger brother and also make him the object of sexual impulses, probably by a transference from the father, but this case would be complicated by the Electra-complex.

Apart from this, however, psycho-analytic literature is not wanting in references[1] to the fact that children of one sex always become unconsciously associated with the parent of that sex, and that a woman's love for her son is closely bound up with her father-fixation. Probably every analysis gives proof of this transference from the parents to the children of a given person. The author has arrived at this possibility, but it is not clear why he designates women with a father-fixation as 'homosexuelles.' His question as to the distinction between normal maternal love and incestuous attachment ignores the fact that this distinction is, in every relationship, sexual or otherwise, a matter of the degree of *consciousness* of the underlying sexual attraction and not of the degree of intensity of love, in itself; since every human relationship of any kind with another person will fall into line with, and be founded

[1] Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*. "The Phantasy of the Reversal of Generations," p. 659.

on, some infantile sexual situation in the Unconscious[1], in most cases an incestuous one. Moreover, the maternal instinct is part of the sexual instinct in woman, and is largely a sublimation and further development of the partial-components of her sexual instinct (anal-erotism and various kinds of *activity* in other impulses); so that in this way it may well happen that a fixation on the pregenital phase of development might show itself later in an abnormal fascination, instead of in normal love, for a child.

The author's suggestion, that normal maternal love is protective, is true, but not exclusively; for as a boy becomes a man his attitude to the mother gradually assumes more and more an active character, so that 'protection' may be exercised by both mother and son, in varying degrees, according to the case. The exclusivism which he sees in these cases is likely to be related to the father-fixation or to narcissism, but the masochistic traits to repressed sadism (regression to pregenital phase), rather than to any approximation to a wifely attitude (genital phase) in the woman. But the results of analyses of cases such as he describes would certainly be interesting and valuable, particularly as, so far as we know, little or nothing has hitherto been published on the subject.

The study entitled "An Unconscious Phantasy of Pregnancy in a Man under the guise of Traumatic Hysteria," by Eisler, which was published in part in the previous number of the *Zeitschrift*, is here concluded. This is an extremely interesting and remarkable case, and is very well presented. The main interest of it depends upon the very strongly accentuated anal-erotism of the patient; Eisler's report extends our knowledge of this impulse and its development, together with that of the character-traits derived from it. He reminds us of two of Freud's studies (of obsessional cases) and of Ernest Jones' works on this subject[2], and points out the value of further research.

The patient in this case was an employee on the tramway service, aged 33; 2½ years previously he had fallen from his car and been taken unconscious to hospital suffering from injuries to the head, arm and side (all on the left). They proved to be slight, but an X-ray examination was made of the left side. After recovery and resumption of work the neurosis developed; it consisted in attacks of pain in the left loin, which increased with time in frequency and severity until he was quite incapacitated by them. After all attempts to discover organic injury had failed, the case was diagnosed as traumatic hysteria and sent for psycho-analysis. In spite of some difficulties the case proved very suitable for analysis which effected a cure in seven months.

A strongly-marked transference evinced itself in two peculiar symptomatic acts which occurred in the first few days of the treatment. One of these was an ostensible fainting-fit, in which the man fell *on his face* beside the doctor, thus betraying his passive-homosexual tendencies. The other had a similar meaning; in fact a feminine attitude towards the doctor governed all the transference-manifestations. As the analysis proceeded the emphasis on the fall from the car as an important occurrence gradually declined, and a subsequent event came more and more into the foreground of the picture. This was the X-ray examination of his left side performed at the hospital. It turned out that on this occasion the patient had been very much excited and nervous beforehand, and very much disappointed with what actually occurred.

[1] Freud, *Neurosenlehre*, IVte Folge, p. 394.
[2] Ernest Jones, *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, pp. 540 and 664.

In his anxiety he had expected that some kind of operation would be there and then performed, or at least that the doctor would suddenly plunge an instrument into his side! The whole affair had rapidly fallen out of conscious importance, but became a crystallizing-point for a passive-homosexual wish-phantasy, subsequently expressed by the hysterical pain attacks in the left loin.

These attacks were described as follows. About 24 hours before one came on, he would become restless and silent and extremely irritable, especially to his wife; as time went on he could not endure her near him. He showed marked defiance and treated his illness as his private and personal affair exclusively and resented any enquiry as to his condition. (The resentment at intrusion into anal-erotic pre-occupations.) As the attack came on severe constipation set in, which no drug was able to relieve. On the following day the pain in the left loin began, and in a few hours became so overpowering that he could neither sit nor stand. He had to lie on his left side with a little pillow under him, but could not keep still owing to the pain. After a time he would feel a thrill going through his limbs; then flatus would pass and, lastly, an evacuation of the bowels would occur.

This description eventually suggested to the analyst the idea that the attack could only be an unconscious *imitation* (by the neurosis-mechanism in which the anal-impulse played the leading rôle) of a *confinement* (the constipation being a conversion-symptom of a pregnancy); it appeared to be closely connected with the X-ray experience. As a child of ten, the patient had heard a neighbour's wife groaning and shrieking in childbirth for two days, the doctor at last having had to extract the child with instruments. He had been able to look on through the window and clearly remembered the scene; a very dim recollection came back to him of the dead dismembered child in a basin. Analysis further revealed the left loin as a symbolic substitute for a female genital organ (left = female), possibly in part through the prehistoric association of loins with procreation ("child of his loins," etc.), also seen in the myth of the creation of Eve out of the rib of Adam. The patient recalled how on two occasions as a boy, he had fled from his irate grandfather and been overtaken and thrashed while suffering from a violent *stitch* in the left side. At the age of 15, on account of diphtheria, he was given an inoculation of antitoxin with a hypodermic needle in the *left side* by a doctor. Other details pointed to a strong accentuation, during puberty, of the anal and passive-homosexual impulses.

Before going on to discuss the infantile origin of the neurosis from the external (accidental) aspect, Eisler goes in detail into the constitutional aspect, and describes the extent and importance of the anal-complex and previous anal-symptoms in the case. In character, the patient showed many traits which we know to be derived from this complex.

> He was a practical man, with a strong 'sense of reality,' and a good memory, with definite ambitions and reasoned opinions. He had greatly improved his position by prudence and foresight in changing his occupation. He had a passion for collecting, for keeping diaries and 'commonplace' books, and for accumulating old menus and bills, which were kept in pedantic order. He 'kept in his head' a great deal of useful knowledge which he liked to impress upon others. He was greatly interested in biological problems and theories of 'creation.' His dearest wish was to settle on the land and breed poultry, one which the analyst thinks he will probably carry out. He was first apprenticed to a baker where he enjoyed the kneading and moulding of the bread and learnt cooking. Later he became an assistant in a chemical laboratory

where the aromatic scents and odours of the drugs pleased him. His attitude to money revealed the anal-erotic in one respect only; he disliked dirty paper-money so much that he would overcome his economical nature to the point of spending it needlessly, if he did not give it to his wife! As regards time, he was extraordinarily sensitive, punctual and exact, and so economical that he loved to 'do two things at once,' to read while eating, to think while walking and so on (which Eisler remarks was known as a characteristic of Caesar's); this was traced back to a pleasure in performing defaecation and micturition at the same moment. Also the patient had a compulsion to do everything thoroughly, which extended to a dislike of anything not *whole* and complete, anything mended, or previously used by another person. These two last points Dr Eisler recommends to Dr Ernest Jones for inclusion in his paper on *Anal-erotic Character-traits*.

The pleasurable interest in the defaecatory act had been early sublimated into character-traits, but the libidinous interest in the product had been less successfully resolved. It was clear that this anal-interest had played a dominating part and had coloured the whole of the infantile sexuality. The curiosity-impulse was related entirely to faeces originally, and later to its substitutes, and was connected with the frequent confinements of his mother. The sadistic impulse was also related exclusively to the anal-product and its derivatives (children), connecting with death-wishes against younger brothers and sisters, evinced in many symptomatic acts and in several 'accidents' while he was a tram-car driver. (Compare 'the dead dismembered child' previously mentioned.) The smelling-complex was likewise here connected, as it always is; but although the patient had no dislike of the odour of faeces he was extraordinarily sensitive about the odour of decomposition (he could detect the presence of a corpse in a house he was passing), this also connecting with death-wishes, as did his mouth-erotism too. He could eat nothing which was unconsciously associated with anything dead; he was nervous about being poisoned (a fixed impregnation-symbol). Various symptoms and acts connected with the mouth and teeth pointed to their constituting substitutes for anus (cloaca) and child. The flatus-complex also pointed in the same direction; through the association of flatus with thought he believed he had a prophetic gift—that he could foretell the weather, or the arrival of a stranger (= child) and so on.

In the first year of his marriage, seven years before, the patient had suffered from a severe hysterical disturbance of the bowel function. He would be seized by an irresistible need to defaecate and be forced to leave his car for the purpose, only to find himself unable to pass a motion. He was subjected to every possible kind of examination for this malady but no disease was discovered. The symptoms gradually changed to an extremely severe and obstinate form of constipation which finally threatened his livelihood, after which it gradually subsided. Numerous means were employed to relieve it, but only one satisfied the patient, and this was the introduction of pessaries into the rectum by a doctor. This mono-symptomatic hysterical illness was elucidated by the analysis and found to be the expression of the unconscious wish that a child should result from the marriage, although actually he had decided not to have children until later, when he could better afford it. Various circumstances in connection with his marriage were of importance, notably that his mother was at the time confined of her youngest child. His desire for children was limited to male offspring, which pointed to a strongly narcissistic tendency in the wish (as opposed to the hetero-sexual desire for a child of the opposite sex). The nervous constipation represented the conflict about the hoped-for child—it must be 'postponed.'

As further evidence of the paramount influence of the anal-complex the author describes in detail the peculiar *reserve* characteristic of the patient. This proved the main expression of the resistance in the analysis, but was already constitutional in the case and not elaborated for the purpose. Eisler points out that *hate* has received more attention from psycho-analysts in its connection with the development of control of the anal-function, but that as a psychical accompaniment *reserve* actually takes first place. He remarks that this trait is capable of most extensive adaptation to the other psychical

constituents, for we recognise several kinds of it—a proud, a modest, a self-conscious or a mocking reserve, and so on. It may be that in paranoiac dissimulation we have another form of this reserve.

As regards the accidental (external) influences in childhood bearing on the formation of the neurosis the following points may be noted. The patient was the eldest child of 14; his first sister was born when he was six years old. He was jealous of the pleasure her arrival caused the parents (wish to be a woman). He had been the unwitting cause of an accident by which a younger brother met his death. The grandparents, of peasant stock, lived with the family and were more significant than his own parents to his childish mind. The grandfather, whom he much admired and envied, ranked as his earliest object-love; later the grandfather played the part of 'rescuer' by saving the boy's life from a mad bull. The grandmother began his upbringing and from her emanated the first castration-threats. (It appeared that at nine months he gave up his oral-erotic pleasures—thumb-sucking—in consequence of her treading on his thumb![1])

The event which was actually of traumatic significance took place soon after he was three years old; this was a scene in which his mother threw a knife at him which cut his head open. She bathed the wound and laid him at the foot of her bed, where new-born children are laid. The effects of this were far-reaching. It seems probable for one thing that it put an end to the phase of infantile onanism, this time again by an injury inflicted by a woman. The head-injury must also undoubtedly have had the effect of activating prematurely the latent masculine narcissism, resulting in the first *Libido*-fixation. That there was such a fixation was proved in many ways. Sublimation of both narcissism and homosexuality was shown in the great interest the patient took in trades-union and similar movements, with the object of improving his own position along with that of other men. After his cure he became a leader in his own union where his word was respected. He showed great moderation in his views and knew how to influence others in the same direction. He showed no aesthetic tendency; Eisler points out that he belonged to the type of active thinker and was entirely lacking in the necessary self-observation and criticism which leads to appreciation of style and form.

This masculine narcissism was evident in his attitude to women, which was highly depreciatory; he objected to their emancipation, would allow them no reasoning power or educational ability (the 'castration' experiences!), though he himself had signally failed to train his youngest sister and his wife's illegitimate daughter, owing to his impatience with the sex; but he attributed this to their natural inferiority. He never allowed his wife any part or knowledge in the plans and schemes which made up his life. Jealousy of women was very marked; he could never resign himself to the fact that the forming and bearing of children had been entrusted by nature solely to the female sex. He had phantasies of being self-begotten and created, which the author compares with those of the very similar Schreber case, described by Freud, of paranoiac delusions of being a woman impregnated by divine rays. The patient's dreams were markedly egocentric and his hypochondria pointed in the same direction.

Even so, it appeared that the masculine narcissism had been forced to accommodate itself to the presence of another predominating impulse. As we

[1] This is interesting as an indication of an inherent disposition to connect the two ideas of bodily pleasure and bodily loss or injury. J. R.

have seen, the strength of the anal-erotic impulse, by inborn constitution (not, like the narcissism, called forth by an external occurrence, the head-injury) was sufficient to penetrate and colour all the other impulses. One such strongly accentuated impulse can often interfere with the development to the narcissistic stage, on which all the partial-impulses are to be co-ordinated with the Self as Object, even though some event, such as the head-injury, has otherwise induced the onset of this stage. This state of things is no doubt more or less typical, since we have reason to presume a second stage (pre-genital) of anal-sadistic interest between the narcissistic and the genital stages of development. From all which, we see the enormous importance of anal-erotism in psychical development.

Every neurosis is, in a certain sense, a subduing, auto-erotically effected, of desires which, being unrealizable, become incapable of entering consciousness. Such ideas in this case were the homosexual phantasies and we know from the symptoms that the anal-erotism here again proved stronger than the masculine narcissism, which would otherwise have mastered these phantasies. For we may assume, *a priori*, that the narcissism must adjust itself in some way to a passive-homosexual wish before a neurosis can result. This struggle was fought out on the field of the castration-complex. The anal-erotism, the interest in 'giving-up,' is transferred from the faeces on to the penis and makes the sacrifice possible. Later reinforcements come in the castration-threats and in the knowledge of the missing penis in woman. As further evidence that the neurosis-mechanism forms itself along these lines, Eisler instances two observations; first, that symbols of excreta, hair, nails, teeth, etc., are also castration-symbols, and secondly, that in all cases of unconscious passive-homosexuality the signs of any psychic defence against the castration-threat are noticeably absent. This state of things is due to the success with which the infantile psyche has adjusted itself to a traumatic experience, from which Eisler infers that the auto-erotic tendencies have not merely a preparatory, but also an adaptatory, function.

In conclusion, this case was not, as was at first supposed, a traumatic 'Accident'—neurosis (fall from the car), but arose out of a harmless experience (X-ray examination) which re-activated, by means of a strong anal-erotic impulse, passive homosexual wishes active during childhood and puberty. The hysterical attack was an imitation of a confinement, witnessed by the patient as a child, in which the exclusion of all recollections of his own mother's frequent child-bearing was reproduced. This had, however, largely contributed to the enormous development of the anal-erotic impulse in conjunction with the passive-homosexuality. (Identification with the mother.)

Although the *Libido* at the disposal of consciousness had sufficed to ensure a comparatively normal sexual life to the patient, the symptoms arising from the repressed wishes had become so intolerable as to enable him to go through the work of analysis to a successful end.

All those interested in the aberrations of the psyche will find this study a fascinating piece of work, most capably executed.

"Examination-fears and Examination-dreams" is the subject of a short article by Sadger (Vienna). He remarks that W. Stekel first pointed out that examinations in dreams stood for tests of sexual capacity. These dreams never refer to any real examination which has not been successfully passed, and this has led to the conclusion that they are 'consolation'—or 'reassuring'—dreams.

Freud supported this view from his wide experience, but Sadger submits that more lies behind.

Analysis of a case of dementia paranoides in a young man of 25 furnished some remarkable material on the point, as often happens, the content of the Unconscious being so much more accessible than with psycho-neurotics. The patient suffered from delusions of persecution and hallucinations of ghosts and spirits, and lived an isolated life, withdrawn into himself. He had always been closely attached to his mother and the castration-complex was very marked. Until puberty he had occupied the same bedroom as his parents. After being one of the best pupils at school he suddenly acquired, at the age of 14 or 15, a terrible dread of examinations. Everything would be in his head till he was asked a question, then his mind became a blank, until he was passed over, when he again knew everything. Being asked questions was 'like receiving a blow on the head.' At the time of the analysis he became dumb with fear if asked a question, which was the reason of his isolating himself and avoiding the society of others.

The patient in the analysis spontaneously revealed the meaning of these symptoms in words which were taken down and are reproduced in the article. "I think the terrible fear that I have, which makes me incapable of concentrated thought and prevents me from answering questions according to my knowledge, is my terrific castration-fear. At bottom, though, this fear is a longing and that is why I cannot answer—I run the risk of being castrated. It is a fear and a desire at the same time—I have exactly the feeling that the utter vacuity in my head is as if something had been cut away from me." In subsequent communications the patient established the identity of the teacher, and the pursuing spirits of his hallucinations, with the father, and arrived at the meaning of the unknown question which he could never answer.

From this and other cases the author believes that observation of parental coitus is one of the most frequent causes of castration-fear and of nocturnal enuresis. The patient traced back to sex-curiosity much of his interest, and his incapacity, in study. The fear of examinations is the fear of castration, and the questions which are dreaded are:—how does the father perform the act with the mother? what is the mother's organ like? and how can one find the way to it? According to Sadger. in the dreams an examination-test which has been successfully performed, in reality, replaces the coitus which in infancy had been successfully performed with the mother in phantasy.

There follow nine short notes from various sources describing incidents observed among (normal) small children, or sayings of theirs, which plainly demonstrate the truth of psycho-analytic conclusions about infantile sexual desires and emotions. All are interesting and instructive, particularly the last, which is actually a song to the beloved in lyrical prose, by a quite healthy little girl, to her rubber teat. "When I went to school they would have laughed at me, they don't know how good it is to suck you....I always thought there was nothing so lovely as sucking you. And yet there is; and it is, to kiss someone whom one really truly loves....You can't say how lovely you feel all over your body when you're sucking...you are away from the world, quite contented and happy. It is a wonderful feeling...you want nothing but peace, uninterrupted peace....It is unspeakably lovely. Some kisses are like it, and anyone who knows that can tell the joy of sucking, but if all kisses were alike, no writing could describe it."

JOAN RIVIERE.

NOTES ON RECENT PERIODICALS.

The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. I, part II, 1920.

This number contains a translation of Freud's paper on "The Psychogenesis of a case of Female Homosexuality," an abstract of which appeared in the October number of this *Journal*. It also contains Dr Ernest Jones' paper on "Recent Advances in Psycho-Analysis," which we had expected to see in part I. Our readers are already familiar with this masterly summary of recent psycho-analytic work; and this they owe to Dr Jones' courtesy in allowing its publication in this *Journal* before it appeared in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*.

Pierce Clark of New York contributes "A study of Primary Somatic Factors in Compulsive and Obsessive Neuroses"; but, as the Editor points out in a footnote, "all the symptoms mentioned by Dr Clark would be considered by other psychopathologists to belong to anxiety-hysteria." Pierce Clark's contention is that in the compulsive and obsessive neuroses we may find "somatic defects of instincts" underlying, and prior to, the introversion of libido revealed on analysis. The neurosis is a developmental unfoldment of such defects of instinct. Tone deafness, colour blindness, lack of appreciation of rhythm, and incapacity for graceful gesture or movement are instinctive defects of this kind. They are, in a sense, organic inferiorities, but unlike those postulated by Adler, they are trait or faculty inferiorities rather than inferiorities of particular organs.

Defects of this kind lead to difficulties in social adaptation, especially in the period of adolescence, and give rise to various forms of character distortion which compensate for the original inferiority. In all the cases examined, Pierce Clark found an inborn defect of the social instincts, and he advocates that in the training of children every trait of emotional expression should be cultivated to the utmost. "The child is to be given as definite a training in emotional expression as that of the discipline of nursery ethics."

E. R. Mason-Thompson gives a condensed report of a case of simple phobia and obsession in which the symptoms were interpreted as "an unconscious infliction of self-punishment for the wish of her father's death." The elder sister had taken the place of the mother in the father's affections, and the jealousy and revenge of the patient were directed against the sister rather than against the mother. The idea of taking the sister's place (and hence the mother's place) with the father was superseded by the idea of revenge on the sister; and this could best be accomplished by removing the father.

"A Note on William Blake's Lyrics" by Dr J. W. Preger of Hilversum, Holland, is an example of the psycho-analytic interpretation of works of poetic genius—a mode of interpretation which, in some minds, arouses more resistance than any other application of psycho-analysis.

A few notes on points arising in actual analyses are contributed by Mrs Riviere, Dr Ernest Jones, and C. P. Oberndorf of New York. "Reviews of Recent Expository Books on Psycho-Analysis," and "Reports of the International Psycho-Analytical Association," complete the contents of this number.

The Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, Vol. I, No. 2, 1920.

William Brown writes on "Some Factors in Psychotherapy." The factors which he enumerates are *re-association* or *psychosynthesis*, *psychocatharsis* or abreaction, *autognosis* (self-knowledge), *regression*, *transference*, and *suggestion*. Dr Brown found, in dealing with his 'shell-shock' cases, that the beneficial effects of re-association were augmented if, at the same time, the accompanying emotion (fear) could be recalled in all its original vividness. "The continuation of the symptoms was incompatible with the reinstatement of the original fear which had been their apparent

cause." So long as it was 'bottled up' the fear could show itself only indirectly in the form of symptoms. Dr Brown thinks the facts point to "an actual persistence of a past emotion in the unconscious, under certain conditions of conflict and repression." His results were obtained by means of light hypnosis. It would be interesting to know what he means by light hypnosis, for he draws a distinction between hypnosis and suggestion. He seems to accept Janet's view of hypnotism, namely, that it is the reproduction of a hysterical somnambulism in a hysterical subject. Hypnosis, he thinks, implies a definite break in the memory continuum —a definite dissociation. He implies that increased suggestibility can be obtained without dissociation.

The practise of autognosis seems to correspond to the methods of Dubois and Déjerine, and "differs from psycho-analysis in all its forms." The value of autognosis as a factor in psychotherapy will probably be found to depend on the answer to the question, How far is autognosis—true self-knowledge—possible without psycho-analysis? In a certain class of cases Dr Brown says autognosis "may give findings that correspond with the theories of psycho-analysis. In such cases it should, of course, be called psycho-analysis." There are many objections, however, to calling any method psycho-analysis which is not psycho-analysis. The technique of psycho-analysis and the technique of autognosis are not at all the same, and, on the practical side, at least, what is and what is not psycho-analysis may be known by its technique.

Of the factors of regression and transference Dr Brown here says little, but he promises a further discussion of transference in another place.

"The Acute Confusional States in the Psychoneuroses," by W. Johnson, is a paper on states of confusion observed in an Army centre for psychoneuroses. The cases are divided into *the mildly confused group* and *the severely confused group*. In those belonging to the latter group the confused state was profound, and usually persisted from seven to ten days. Emotional disturbance was found to be the main aetiological factor in the cases observed, not more than 5 per cent. showing any clinical evidence of concussion of the central nervous system. The cases observed ranged from those of simple type, with a short confusional period, to those of definite mental disorder—'acute confusional insanity.'

"The Nature of Insomnia in the Psychoneuroses" is discussed by R. G. Gordon. The deflection of attention from the stream of consciousness is recognized as the main psychological factor in the onset of normal sleep. In the neurotic, owing to mental conflict, and the need for keeping painful memories out of consciousness, complete relaxation or deflection of the attention, conscious or unconscious, is impossible. An effort of attention, conscious or unconscious, is needed to keep the painful thought out of consciousness. The fatigue induced by this effort may cause 'fatigue sleep,' but as soon as this occurs the barrier which has been set up between consciousness and the painful thought breaks down, and if the painful complex can find expression in consciousness in the form of a terrifying dream the patient may awake. He then immediately reimposes the barrier, and sleep is impossible until fatigue again comes into play, and so the process goes on all through the night.

Dr Aldren Turner reviews the work of Redlich and Pierce Clark on *Epilepsy*. He is favourably disposed towards Pierce Clark's work of which he gives a précis, but he is of opinion that a "much fuller understanding of the mechanism of epilepsy and of its root causes is necessary before the purely psychogenic causation of this disease can be accepted, and its treatment by psychotherapy regarded with assurance."

The Journal of Neurology and Psychopathology, Vol. I, No. 3, 1920.

The third number opens with an interesting and timely article by Professor C. Lloyd Morgan on "Psychology and the Medical Curriculum." He pleads for the introduction of psychology into the curriculum of our medical schools for some students, if not all. It should be officially taught by those who have made a special study of this department of scientific knowledge and know, and can show, at least

in broad outline, how it may be applied in professional life. The one-sided training of the medical student is emphasised, and cogent reasons are given why every practitioner should have some knowledge of psychology, and why this knowledge should be imparted by a trained psychologist—not merely a specialist in psychotherapeutics. This teacher must be "a psychologist who has been trained not only in a school of philosophy but also in a school of biology....He must know not only about the emotions but about internal secretions....If he himself be a member of the profession, so much the better; but he must be a psychologist."

In the course of his paper Professor Lloyd Morgan makes some criticisms of Psycho-Analytic theory, "Here the trouble is that one has to grapple with new technical terms, some of them founded on metaphor and mythology, and with old terms used in quite unfamiliar ways." In speaking of the Freudian theory of dreams, he says, "There are, I should contend, unconscious psychical *processes* ...but there are, in the unconscious, no ideas, no re-presentations, no memory-images, such as are developed in consciousness and there only,...ideas or memory-images are no more preserved, as such, in the mind, than sounds, as such, are preserved in the gramophone record. Only the conditions of reproduction are preserved....If I am right, there are no phallic ideas in the unconscious. We may cleanse these Augean stables. The latent dream is a bit of sheer mythology."

"Education and its Rôle in the Prevention of Neurosis" is discussed by J. Ernest Nicole. The education which the writer desiderates is based on knowledge which has been acquired by psycho-analysis and 'analytical psychology.' The importance of the unconscious and the significance of the primitive tendencies and their possible fates are insisted on from the Freudian point of view. Jung's theory of 'the types' is also drawn upon as a possible source of help in the training of the child. "Thus, in order to prevent deficiency of adaptation from, say, an excessive extravert character, the developing child should receive an education tending towards introvert characteristics." But the application to child-education of Jung's constructive psychology is stated to be rather problematic "on account of the infancy of the subject and the element of uncertainty that still clings round its results." The writer blows hot and cold on the question of sublimation: "we will next attempt to urge and direct a particular child in the paths of sublimation more fitting to its mental attributes. We must never forget, however, that a sublimation cannot in any case be forced." But, if it cannot be forced, why urge?

"The Neuropathic Individual as a Social Unit" is the title of a Critical Review by Henry Devine. His purpose is to indicate some directions in which the present-day interest in the social aspects of psychiatry is finding expression. He deals chiefly with the view of 'mental contagion' put forward by Pierre Janet in his paper on "Les fatigues sociales et l'antipathie" (*Revue Philosophique*, Jan. 1919). Janet contends that those in constant contact with neuropathic individuals tend themselves to become neurotic. This he explains by the production in them of lowered psychological tension due to the prolonged strain of dealing with the whims and exactions of neurotic patients.

Dr Devine thinks Janet's explanation incomplete and unsatisfying, and would refer the nervous symptoms of those living continually with neurotics to "a pent-up libido in which the mechanism of regression comes into play." The whole personality has to be subservient to the caprice and will of another, and every natural impulse and tendency to self-expression has to be curbed. The evil effects of this would be especially pronounced in the case of a child with a neuropathic parent.

The Psychoanalytic Review, Oct. 1920, Vol. VIII, No. 4.

This number is almost entirely devoted to the records of cases of War Neuroses and Psychoses. Karl M. Bowman gives an account of a case seen and analysed by him at Maghull Red Cross Hospital. It may, perhaps, be taken as typical of a method employed very largely in the British War Hospitals. The theoretical foundations of this method need more consideration than they have received. It has some relation to psycho-analysis and is no doubt based on psycho-analytic findings; but its technique is different, and probably its results are different.

A similar comment may be made on the two cases of psychosis reported by Dudley Ward Fay—"The case of Jack" and "The case of Jim." The cure of dementia praecox by a dissertation on Freud's sexual theories, a little analysis and much good advice, is very interesting.

Pierce Clark contributes "A Clinical Study of some Mental Contents in Epileptic Attacks." His main contention is that "a study of the make-up and the content in the petit mal attacks gives us a more rational and enlightened method of conducting the proper therapy."

The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Vol. xv, No. 1.

Among the original articles in this number are two studies of personality. In "Character *vs* Intelligence in Personality Studies" Guy G. Fernald insists that "personality studies should recognize character as an integral field of inquiry." Intelligence refers only to *capacity* or *degree* of intelligence, while character implies *quality* of intelligence. In mental tests the determination of intelligence age level is not enough. Only when investigation of character is superadded do we get an evaluation of the whole personality. Different kinds of culture and training may, therefore, be employed in trying to modify personality. But "intelligence defects are irremediable or nearly so, while character deviations are susceptible of improvement while plasticity remains."

Harold I. Gosline discusses "Personality from the Introspective View-point." He lays down the postulates of introspective psychology. Being psychology and not physiology primarily its logically necessary point of departure is consciousness and not behaviour or any form of 'ism.' All the mental functions of which the individual is capable may be analysed into sensation, association, reaction and inhibition. All these are based upon sensation, and it may be possible by analysis to determine just what sensations are at fault in any disturbances in these fields. "The analysis of the will, the attention, the thinking, the emotional and the attitude disorders should then throw light on the sensations at fault." Here would be the basis of "a rational system of psycho-analysis." One of the author's conclusions is that "the case for lesions in the white matter in the psychoses is then a very strong one."

Lydiard H. Horton contributes the last of a series of letters and papers printed in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology* since 1913, dealing with the problem of validity in dream-interpretation. The conclusion presented is that great accuracy in dream-study can be attained through the so-called "Inventorial Technique." This writer believes there is "an immense peril to common sense" lurking in the technique of both Freud and Jung; and he would substitute for the "go-as-you-please" methods of the analysts, "a standard or criterion by which one may judge the correctness of an interpretation. This standard of interpretative rectitude is no more than the reconstitution of the train of thought." If one prepares an adequate inventory of the items of the dream, all the images in the dream may be traced to a group of particular nerve stimuli, and Horton seems to think that when dream-images are thus traced to their sensory origin the dream is 'explained' and needs no further interpretation. He is very suspicious of the "will to interpret" revealed in many dream interpretations, and he thinks that psycho-analysts can be 'entranced' in the sense that "many of them have literally fallen in love with the psycho-analytic method of thinking through the well-known Uebertragung for Freud!"

"The Psychology and Treatment of Insomnia in Fatigue and Allied States" is the title of a suggestive paper by John T. MacCurdy. He ascribes the restlessness which is part of the fatigue syndrome to a conflict between the sense of duty and the craving for shirking induced by mental and bodily fatigue. "Weariness and an instinctive tendency to avoid that which occasions it, leads him to concentrate his attention abnormally and respond to any environmental stimuli with restless activity. Unconsciously lazy, he becomes pathologically active." If circumstances prevent sleep the unconscious becomes more exacting in its demands. It sets up a yearning for the Nirvana of death, against which the conscious personality fights and reacts by still greater activity. "The patient seeks to maintain contact with his environment

by an apparently purposeless restlessness....On account of its symbolic significance, thoughts of slumber obsess him, while his whole being fights against every symptom of approaching sleep, a reaction biologically appropriate to its unconscious equivalent—death." Thus the more he tries to sleep, the more does he try to keep in touch with life. "Pathologically he clings to what his unconscious would have him lose." MacCurdy has applied these ideas in the treatment of insomnia with very good results.

T. W. M.

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